The following are two recent papers by Dale Allen Pfeiffer.

The first one explains exactly what will happen to the rest of the world due to oil depletion.

It also shows the interdependencies of our systems and how the interact with each other.

 

It is the interdependency of our systems that is not well understood or appreciated.

 

The second paper, Pt.2, concerns Cuba and how it has coped with oil depletion.

The one thing to keep in mind in reading this paper is that it was only Cuba and so the rest of the world was still up and running though trade was down. And secondly the preplanning and timescales involved in Cuba achieving what it has.

 

Norman

 

 

 

Drawing Lessons from Experience;
The Agricultural Crises in North Korea
and Cuba -- Part 1

Why Changing the Way Money Works is the Key
to Resolving Peak Oil Challenges

by Dale Allen Pfeiffer
FTW Contributing Editor for Energy

© Copyright 2004, From The Wilderness Publications, www.fromthewilderness.com. All Rights Reserved. May be reprinted, distributed or posted on an Internet web site for non-profit purposes only.

November 17, 2003, 1100 PDT, (FTW) -- So what happens to an industrialized country practicing modern agriculture when it loses its fossil fuel energy base? There are two countries where it has already happened: North Korea and Cuba. Both countries have little or no oil resources of their own, both relied upon the Soviet Union for their oil imports, and both experienced a swift and severe drop in their oil imports following the demise of the Soviet empire. While showing proper respect for the suffering of people in both countries, perhaps we can benefit from studying their examples.

DPRK (North Korea)—A Warning to the US

North Korea has always held less than half the population of South Korea. Prior to the Korean War, South Korea was a largely agrarian society, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) was largely an industrial society. Following the war, the DPRK turned to fossil fuel subsidized agriculture to increase the production of their poor soils.

By 1990, DPRK estimated per capita energy use was 71 gigajoules per person,¹ the equivalent of 12.3 barrels of crude oil. This was more than twice the per capita usage of China at that same time, or half the usage of Japan. DPRK has coal reserves estimated at from 1 billion to 10 billion tons, and developable hydroelectric potential estimated at 10-14 Gigawatts.² But North Korea must depend on imports for all of their oil and natural gas. In 1990, DPRK imported 18.3 million barrels of oil from Russia, China and Iran.³

An Energy Crisis

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian imports fell by 90%. By 1996, oil imports amounted to only 40 percent of the 1990 level.⁴ DPRK tried to look to China for the bulk of its oil needs. However, China sought to distance itself economically from DPRK by announcing that all commerce with DPRK would be settled in hard currency beginning in 1993. China also cut its shipments of “friendship grain” from 800,000 tons in 1993 to 300,000 tons in 1994.⁵

On top of the loss of oil and natural gas imports, DPRK suffered a series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s that acted to further debilitate an already crippled system. The years 1995 and 1996 saw severe flooding that washed away vital topsoil, destroyed infrastructure, damaged and silted hydroelectric dams, and flooded coal mine shafts rendering them unproductive. In 1997, this flooding was followed by severe drought and a massive tsunami. Lack of energy resources prevented them from preparing for these disasters and hampered recovery.

DPRK also suffered from aging infrastructure. Much of their machinery and many of their industrial plants were ready for retirement by the 1990s. Because DPRK had defaulted on an enormous debt some years earlier, they had grave difficulty attracting the necessary foreign investment. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that DPRK could no longer obtain the spare parts and expertise to refurbish their infrastructure, leading to the failure of machinery, generators, turbines, transformers and transmission lines. DPRK entered into a vicious positive feedback loop, as failing infrastructure cut coal and hydroelectric production and diminished their ability to transport energy via power lines, truck and rail.

The following graphs illustrate the decline in all sectors of commercial energy between the years 1990 and 1996. As a result of this, North Koreans turned to burning biomass, thus impacting their remaining forests. Deforestation led, in turn, to more flooding and increasing levels of soil erosion. Likewise, soils were depleted as plant matter was burned for heat, rather than being mulched and composted.

from Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

By 1996, road and freight transport were reduced to 40% of their 1990 levels. Iron and steel production were reduced to 36% of 1990 levels, and cement was reduced to 32%.⁶ This effect rippled out through the automotive, building and agricultural industries. The energy shortage also affected residential and commercial lighting, heating and cooking. This, in turn, led to loss of productivity and reduced quality of life, and adversely impacted public health. To this day, hospitals remain unheated in the winter, and lack electricity to run medical equipment. There is even insufficient energy to boil water for human consumption. By 1996, total commercial energy consumption throughout society fell by 51%.⁷

from Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

Perhaps in no other sector was the crisis felt more acutely than in agriculture. The energy crisis quickly spawned a food crisis that proved to be fatal. Modern, industrialized agriculture collapsed without fossil fuel inputs. It is estimated that over 3 million people have died as a result.⁸

The Collapse of Agriculture

from Modeling future oil production, population and the economy

 http://www.oilcrisis.com/laherrere/aspoParis.pdf

The above graph, produced by Jean Laherrère, illustrates the relationship between petroleum consumption and agricultural collapse in DPRK.⁹ Note that the decline of agricultural production follows very closely the decline of petroleum consumption. Also, note that the rise in petroleum consumption after 1997 is not mirrored by the rise of agricultural production. Agriculture begins to make a comeback, but appears to enter another decline sometime around 1999. We do not have enough data at present to state conclusively the reasons why agricultural recovery has faltered. It is likely a combination of other factors, such as failure of farm equipment and infrastructure, adverse weather, and—quite likely—the failure of soils that have been depleted of minerals over the past decade. In any case, the above graph sums up the agricultural collapse of DPRK and hints at the suffering that collapse has entailed.

Fertilizer

Agriculture in DPRK requires approximately 700,000 tons of fertilizer per year.¹⁰ North Korea used to manufacture 80 to 90% of its own fertilizer, somewhere from 600,000 to 800,000 tons per year. Since 1995, DPRK has had difficulty producing even 100,000 tons per year. Aid and foreign purchases brought the total for 1999 to 160,000 tons, less than one quarter of the required amount.¹¹

The DPRK fertilizer industry relies on coal as both an energy source and a feedstock. They require 1.5 to 2.0 million tons of coal per year to produce 700,000 tons of fertilizer.¹² To obtain this coal, the fertilizer industry must compete with the steel industry, electricity generation, home heating and cooking needs, and a host of other consumers. Flooded mine shafts and broken down mining equipment have severely cut the coal supply. Likewise, delivery of this coal has been curtailed by the breakdown of railway infrastructure. Furthermore, transporting 2 million tons of coal by rail requires 5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity,¹³ while electricity supply is diminished because of lack of coal, silting of dams and infrastructure failure. So once again, we have another vicious positive feedback loop. Finally, infrastructure failure limits the ability to ship the fertilizer—1.5 to 2.5 million tons in bulk—from factories to farms.¹⁴

The result of this systemic failure is that agriculture in DPRK is operating with only 20 to 30% of the normal soil nutrient inputs.¹⁵ The reduction in fertilizer is the largest single contributor to reduced crop yields in DPRK. Tony Boys has pointed out that to run DPRK's fertilizer factories at capacity would require the energy equivalent of at least 5 million barrels of oil, which represents one quarter of the oil imported into DPRK in recent years.¹⁶ However, even capacity production at this point would be inadequate. For the past decade, soils in the DPRK have been depleted of nutrients to the point that it would now require a massive soil building and soil conservation program to reverse the damage.

Diesel Fuel

Agriculture has been further impacted by the limited availability of diesel fuel. Diesel fuel is required to run the fleet of approximately 70,000 tractors, 8,000 tractor crawlers, and 60,000 small motors used on farms in DPRK.¹⁶ Diesel is also required for transporting produce to market, and for food processing equipment. It is estimated that in 1990, North Korean agriculture used 120,000 tons of diesel fuel. Since then, agricultural consumption has declined to 25,000 to 35,000 tons per year.¹⁷

Compounding the problem of diesel supply is the military allocation, which has not been cut proportionally with the drop in production. Only after the military takes its allocation can the other sectors of society—including agriculture, transportation and industry—divide the remainder. So, while total supplies of diesel have dropped by 60%, the agricultural share of the remained has fallen from 15% in 1990 to 10% currently.¹⁸ In other words, agriculture must make due with 10% of 40%, or 4% of the total diesel supply of 1990.

DPRK Diesel Fuel Consumption in 1990 & 1996

from Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

The result is an 80% reduction in the use of farm equipment.¹⁹ There is neither the fuel nor the spare parts available to keep farm machinery running. Observers in 1998 reported seeing tractors and other farm equipment lying unused and unusable while farmers struggled to work their fields by hand. The observers also reported seeing piles of harvested grain left on the fields for weeks, leading to post-harvest crop losses.²⁰

Loss of mechanized power has required the substitution of human labor and draft animals. In turn, due to their greater workload, human laborers and draft animals require more food, putting more strain on an already insufficient diet. And, although a greater percentage of the population is engaged in farm labor, they have found it impossible to perform all of the operations previously carried out by machinery.²¹

Irrigation

Finally, the agricultural system has also been impacted by the decreased availability of electricity to power water pumps for irrigation and drainage. The annual amount of electricity necessary for irrigation throughout the nation stands at around 1.2 billion kilowatt hours (kWh). Adding to this another 460 million kWh to operate threshing and milling machines and other farm equipment brings the total up to 1.7 billion kWh per year.²² This is not including the electrical demand for lighting in homes and barns, or any other rural residential uses.

Currently, electricity for irrigation has declined by 300 million kWh, and electricity for other agricultural uses has declined by 110 million kWh. This brings the total electrical output currently available for agriculture down to 1.3 billion kWh; a shortfall of 400 million kWh from what is needed.

In reality, the situation for irrigation is worse than that hinted at by these figures. Irrigation is time sensitive—especially in the case of rice, which is DPRK's major grain crop. Rice production is dependent upon carefully-timed flooding and draining. Rice is transplanted in May and harvested in late August and early September. After planting, the rice paddies must be flooded and remain in water until they are drained at harvest time. In DPRK, virtually all rice irrigation is managed with electrical pumps. Over half of the irrigational pumping for all agriculture takes place in May. Peak pumping power demand at this time is at least 900 MW. This represents over one-third of DPRK's generating capacity.²³

On top of this, the national power grid is fragmented, so that at some isolated points along the grid, irrigation demand can overtax generating capacity. This overtaxed system is also dilapidated, suffering the same disrepair as other energy infrastructure, both due to weather disasters, the age of the power stations and transmitters, and the lack of spare parts.

The records of three major pumping stations in DPRK showed that they suffered an average of 600 power outages per year, spending an average of 2300 hours per year without power. These power failures resulted in an enormous waste of water, translating into an irrigation shortfall of about one-quarter of the required amount of water.²⁴

Home energy usage

Home energy usage is also severely impacted by the energy crisis, and—particularly in rural areas—home energy demand is in turn impacting agriculture. Rural residential areas have experienced a 50% drop in electricity consumption, resulting in a decline in basic services and quality of life. Homes in rural villages rarely have electrical power during the winter months.²⁵ As has already been mentioned, hospitals and clinics are not excluded from this lack of power.

Rural households use coal for heating and cooking. The average rural household is estimated to require 2.6 tons of coal per year. The total rural coal requirement is 3.9 million tons annually. Currently, rural areas receive a little more than half of this requirement.²⁶ On the average, rural coal use for cooking, heating and preparing animal feed has declined by 40%, down to 1.6 tons per year.²⁷ Even public buildings such as schools and hospitals have limited coal supplies. Lacking enough coal even for the purpose of boiling water, the result is a reported increase in waterborne diseases.

To make up for the shortfall in coal, rural populations are increasingly turning to biomass for their heating and cooking energy needs. Herbage has been taken from competing uses such as animal fodder and compost, leading to further decreased food supplies. Biomass scavenging is also stressing all rural ecosystems from forests to croplands. Biomass harvesting reduces ground cover, disrupts habitats, and leads to increasing soil erosion and siltation.

Moreover, biomass foraging requires time and effort when other labor requirements are high and nutritional availability is low. This contributes to the positive feedback loop of calorie requirements versus food availability. It is estimated that 25% of the civilian workforce was employed in agriculture in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, the ratio had grown to 36%.²⁸ Furthermore, agricultural work has grown much more labor intensive. Farm labor is conservatively estimated at a minimum of 300 million person-hours per year. However, researchers point out that this number could easily be a factor of two or more higher.²⁹ Workers are burning more calories, and so require more food. This is further complicated by greater reliance upon draft animals with their own food requirements. So necessary caloric intake has actually increased as food production has decreased, leading to less food availability per demand and increasing malnutrition.

Impacts to Health and Society

U.S. congressmen and others who have visited North Korea tell stories of people eating grass and bark. Other reports talk of soldiers who are nothing more than skin and bones. Throughout the country, there is starvation to rival the worst found in Africa. Chronic malnutrition has reached the point where many of the effects are irreversible.³⁰

A study of children aged 6 months to 7 years found that 16% suffered from acute malnutrition—this is one of the highest rates of wasting in the world. 3% of the children suffered edema. 62% of the children suffered from chronic malnutrition. 61% were moderately or severely underweight. Chronic malnutrition can lead to irreversible stunting.³¹

Furthermore, malnutrition weakens the immune system, leaving the population even more vulnerable to contagions. And the lack of fuel for boiling water has led to a rise in water-borne diseases. Without electricity and coal, hospitals and clinics have become harbors of despair, where only the hopeless go for treatment.³²

The situation in DPRK has rendered the country even more vulnerable to natural disasters. The country lacks the energy reserves to recover from the natural disasters of 1995-1997, much less withstand future ones. The infrastructure is fragmented and in disrepair. There is a very real threat that portions of the infrastructure, such as the electrical grid, may fail altogether. Complete electrical grid failure would result in a near-complete crop loss.³³

So far, the people of DPRK have faced this crisis together. But continued deprivation may very well lead to rivalry, regional fragmentation, social breakdown and internecine fighting. Rural society is currently faring better than the urban population, and it is actually absorbing urban workers to help meet the rising labor demands of agriculture. But worsening conditions and widespread flight from the cities could lead to violent confrontations. It is even possible that rural instability could eventually result in civil war.

A Model for Disaster

The history of DPRK through the 1990s demonstrates how an energy crisis in an industrialized nation can lead to complete systemic breakdown. Of particular note is how the energy crisis sends ripples throughout the entire structure of society, and how various problems act to reinforce each other and drag the system further down. The most serious consequence for the people is found in the failure of modern agriculture and the resulting malnutrition. The collapse of infrastructure not only makes it more difficult to deal with the decline of agriculture and other immediate disasters, but also acts to amplify the crisis and leads to further social disintegration.

The various far-flung impacts and the numerous interlinking problems render the crisis nearly impossible to remedy. Even with a healthy economy, it is doubtful that North Korea could repair its degenerated society. Though the original problem may have been a lack of fuel, it cannot be corrected now by a simple increase in fuel supply. At this time, it will take an international effort to save the people of North Korea. And given the current political animosity between DPRK and the U.S., it is doubtful that this effort will take place.

The painful experiences of DPRK point out that dealing with an energy crisis is not just a matter of finding an alternative mode of transportation, an alternative energy source, or a return to organic agriculture. We are talking about the collapse of a complex system, in this case a social system that evolved gradually from a labor-intensive agrarian society to a fossil fuel-supported industrial/ technological society. It simply is not possible to step back to an agrarian society all at once, or to take a leap forward into some unknown high-tech society. Complex systems change gradually, bit by bit. Faced with immediate change, a complex system tends to collapse.

For a world facing the end of growing energy production, this means that the changes should have begun decades ago, giving time for a gradual transition. We had our warning back in the 1970s, when there might have been time to make a transition to a society independent of fossil fuels. Now it is simply too late. It is a waste of our time talking about a hydrogen future, or zero point energy, or a breakthrough in fusion. Even if we could find a technological quick fix, there is no time left to make the transition.

This is not to say that our future has to be bleak. We might be able to make a transition into a simpler society. In fact, if we can concentrate our efforts on easing the decline and on building an equitable and democratic social system, we might manage to provide a comfortable existence for ourselves and for the generations to come.

In part two of this article, the author will look at how Cuba has handled its own energy crisis, and will use this positive example to list some ways in which industrial civilization could handle the transition from fossil fuel dependent agriculture.

-------------

¹ Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, William, James H., Von Hippel, David, Hayes, Peter. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper  46, 2000. http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

² Demand and Supply of Electricity and Other Fuels in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Von Hippel, D.F., and Hayes, Peter. Nautilus Institute, 1997.

³ Op. Cit. See note 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Causes and Lessons of the “North Korean Food Crisis”, Boys, Tony. Ibaraka Christian University Junior College, 2000. http://www9.ocn.ne.jp/%7Easlan/dprke.pdf

⁶ Op. Cit. See note 1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Op. Cit. See note 5.

⁹ Modelling future oil production, population and the economy, Laherrère, Jean. ASPO Second international workshop on oil & gas, Paris, May 26-27 2003. http://www.oilcrisis.com/laherrere/aspoParis.pdf

¹⁰ DPR Korea: Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) Program, Identification of Investment Opportunities, Vol. 2: Working Papers 1-3. United Nations Development Programme And the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1998.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Op. Cit. See note 2.

¹³ Op. Cit. See note 1.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ “…the energy cost of ammonia synthesis even in large modern plants averages over 40 GJ/tN, of which 60 percent is feedstock and 40 percent is process energy. It is unlikely that the DPRK fertilizer factories can produce ammonia for less than 50GJ/tN. Further, because ammonia requires special storage and application, most of it is converted to liquid or solid fertilizer (e.g. urea) for easy shipping and application. The conversion of ammonia to urea requires an additional 25 GJ/tN. Since one barrel of oil represents approximately 6GJ of energy, and one ton of nitrogen in urea requires 75 GJ (or more) to produce, to run the DPRK's (three) fertilizer factories at capacity for a year would require:

(75 ÷ 6 = 12.5) × 400,000 = 5,000,000

…or at least 5 million barrels of oil, roughly a quarter of the amount of oil imported annually into the DPRK in recent years.”

Op. Cit. See note 5.

¹⁶ Op. Cit. See note 10.

¹⁷ Op. Cit. See note 2.

¹⁸ Op. Cit. See note 1.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. FAO, Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture, World Food Programme, November 12, 1998. http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/economic/giews/english/alertes/1998/srdrk981.htm

²¹ Ibid.

²² Op. Cit. See note 2.

²³ Op. Cit. See note 1.

²⁴ Op. Cit. See note 10.

²⁵ Op. Cit. See note 1.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Op Cit. See note 20.

²⁹ Op. Cit. See note 1.

³⁰ Op. Cit. See note 5.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Op. Cit. See note 1.

³³ Ibid.

The Agricultural Crises in North Korea and Cuba - Pt. 2

Cuba-A Hope

by Dale Allen Pfeiffer - FTW Energy Editor

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)

[The day FTW published Part I of this important series we began to receive many messages deriding what was described as our propaganda on behalf of Fidel Castro. Patiently, I replied that this series had nothing to do with Castro or with "Communism". Both Korea and Cuba are "Communist" countries yet the Cubans are eating while the North Koreans are starving. That, I said, was the point - the only point.

As the effects of Peak Oil and Gas are making themselves felt, even sooner than anticipated, the world stands on the brink of unimaginable global famine. Please see http://fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/112103_china_food.html, and

http://fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/100303_eating_oil_summary.html.

 These issues are coming to center stage about a decade before "experts" had predicted they would and the problems they pose are being exacerbated by a global economic system which has found that "it may not be profitable to slow decline."

Into this mix, we find that "Cuba has disproved the myth that organic agriculture cannot support a modern nation." And in terms of locally privatized agriculture we find a pure form of capitalism advocated by Catherine Austin Fitts (www.solari.com) that centers around neighborhood ownership, place-based financing and decentralized control. Further, the Cuban data shows that privately owned co-op farms are outproducing state-owned ventures. "The CCSs, made up of small, independent farmers, have outperformed the CPAs, the UBPC cooperatives and the state farms."

I have been approached about going personally to Cuba next spring to view these developments for myself. I pray that this opportunity becomes realized. When I go, I will take with me all the protestations I have herd about how the Cuban people suffer under Castro, how unhappy the reportedly are, and how much they live without and I will balance these charges against the fact that the Cuban people are, healthy, educated, eating and surviving in a world we may all soon have to face. Recently CNN's Lou Dobbs broadcast a series showing that American food production is shrinking, while our population is increasing. Soon to end is the ability of the US and Canada (the only two nations to do so) to continue exporting grain to a hungry world.

Happiness, in human terms, is a relative condition. The Cuban people may indeed be in despair because they lack TVs, "good" clothing, new cars and consumer goods. There may be, by comparison, conditions unthinkable to a present-day American or Brit. But I submit that, as global famine caused by Peak Oil and Gas  becomes a reality, the possibility exists that what Cubans have today  might - in a decade or less--look to much of the world like undreamed of abundance. - MCR]

December 1, 2003, 1600 PDT, (FTW) --The story of Cuba begins in much the same vein as the story of North Korea. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought the loss of oil imports as well as the loss of their major trading partner. And U.S. sanctions kept the country isolated from the rest of the world.

However, there are some very important differences between Cuba and DPRK. For one thing, Cuba has a much warmer climate, with a longer growing season. Cuba also has a better ratio of population to arable land, though most of the arable land is not of the best quality.¹ Cuba has a large percentage of scientists, engineers and doctors in its population. With only 2% of the population of Latin America, Cuba holds 11% of the scientists in all of Latin America.² Even before the crisis provoked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuban scientists had begun exploring alternatives to fossil fuel-based agriculture. Research into ecological agriculture began back in the 1980s. By the time of the crisis, a system of regional research institutes, training centers and extension services was in place to quickly disseminate information to farmers.³ And finally, the Cuban government had social programs in place to support farmers and the population through the crisis and the transition into ecological agriculture.

Before looking at the crisis and the Cuban response, it is necessary to look briefly at Cuban society before the crisis, particularly rural society and the agrarian reforms of past decades. It is here that the groundwork was laid for a successful transition.

A Short History

Prior to the 1959 revolution, there was one word to describe Cuba: inequity. Only 8% of the farmers controlled 70% of the land. U.S. interests controlled most of the Cuban economy, including most of the large plantations, a controlling interest in the sugar production, the mining industry, oil refineries, electrical utilities, the communications system, and many of the banks.⁴

The majority of the rural labor force consisted of landless, seasonal workers without schooling, healthcare, electricity or running water. They earned their living during only three months of the year, at planting time and at harvest. Rural workers were lucky to earn one-quarter of the national income.⁵

At the time of the revolution, most of the wealthy landowners fled to the United States. Their former holdings were expropriated and given over to the laborers. Minor Sinclair and Martha Thompson provide a vivid illustration of this transformation in their portrait of Ciego de Avila.⁶

The province of Ciego de Avila encompasses what was formerly the Las Navajas  estate. The estate had been owned by Alfredo and Horacia Arbutio, two brothers who ran their holdings with an iron fist. The brothers ruled over the local peasantry, and meted out a very harsh justice that included beatings and punishment for those who collected firewood on the estate. The peasantry had no schools, no healthcare, and no electricity. There weren't even roads to bring them these amenities. They were starved and sick.

The Arbutio brothers fled to the U.S. at the time of the revolution. Alfredo became a founding member of the Cuban-American National Foundation. The former sharecroppers, 62 families, expropriated the land. They formed the Jose Marti Cooperative, and the new government provided them with technical training, supplies, guaranteed markets, and crop insurance.⁷

Members of the cooperative--sons and daughters of former sharecroppers--have university degrees in agriculture, computers, teaching, engineering and other subjects. The cooperative now supports a school, a clinic and a pharmacy. In the next generation, many children have plans to become doctors and nurses. And, considering that Cuba's medical training program is among the best in the world, it is highly likely that these plans will come to fruition.

The Cuban revolution has been followed by three periods of agrarian reform, first in 1959, secondly in 1963, and finally the current land reform of the 1990s. The first reform limited private land owning to 1,000 acres. This resulted in a tripling of the number of small farmers and in the establishment of state farms to replace the large plantations. The second agrarian reform further limited private land ownership to 165 acres per person.⁸ The land reform of the 1990s would be more properly called a controlled privatization. We will discuss that later.

By 1965, state farms controlled 63% of the arable land, and over 160,000 small farmers owned and worked an additional 20% of the arable land.⁹ The small farmers joined farmer associations, Credit and Service Cooperatives (CCSs) and Agricultural Production Cooperatives (CPAs), which together controlled 22% of the arable land. The CCSs and CPAs are, in turn, confederated in the National Association of Small Producers (ANAP), which provides training and a number of services to its members, and negotiates with the government for prices and credit. ANAP members produce 52% of the vegetables grown in Cuba, 67% of the corn, and 85% of the tobacco.¹⁰ Another 20,000 small farmers own their land independently of cooperatives. These unaffiliated private farmers own about 1% of the arable land.¹¹

The agrarian reforms succeeded because the government was truly intent on a redistribution of the wealth and a more equitable society. Farmers and cooperatives were supported with low-interest credit, stabilized prices, a guaranteed market, technological assistance, transport and insurance. The government also enacted laws that prevented the reconcentration of land, effectively preventing former plantation owners from slowly buying back their estates. The revolution took back control of Cuba from the U.S.; laws were enacted to ban foreign ownership of property. Cuba's isolation did, in fact, have some positive benefits in that it allowed them to affect their social transformation without outside intervention. And finally, the population was educated and provided with decent health care.

By the 1980s, Cuba had surpassed most of Latin America in nutrition, life expectancy, education and per capita GNP. The literacy rate was an astonishing 96%, and 95% of the population had access to safe water.¹² Cubans achieved a large degree of equity and industrialization through a trade regime that was highly import-dependent.

From the time of the revolution to the 1980s, Cuban agriculture became more mechanized than any other Latin American country. Despite the fact that Cuba was a highly industrialized country which manufactured everything from pharmaceuticals to computers, sugar was their major export. By the end of the 1980s, state-owned sugar plantations covered three times more farmland than did food crops. Sugar and its derivatives constituted 75% of Cuba's exports, sold almost exclusively to the Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe and China.¹³

However, because Cuban agriculture was overwhelming dedicated to sugar, tobacco and citrus, the country had to import 60% of its food, all from the Soviet bloc. Cuba also imported most of its oil, 48% of its fertilizer, 82% of its pesticides, 36% of its animal feed for livestock, and most of the fuel used to produce sugar.¹⁴ Although this system of imports and exports had allowed Cuba to modernize and raise the standard of living and the quality of life for all residents, its dependence upon the Soviet Union and the agricultural focus on sugar production left the country extremely vulnerable should anything happen to its major trading partner.

Crisis

The first few years after the Soviet Union collapsed had a severe impact upon Cuba. The crisis was compounded by the U.S., which tightened its already stringent economic blockade. The U.S. economic sanctions increased the suffering of the Cuban people. Throughout the worst years of the crisis, 7,500 excess deaths per year can be directly attributed to the U.S. sanctions.¹⁵

Almost overnight, Cuba lost 85% of its trade. Fertilizer, pesticide and animal feed imports were reduced by 80%.¹⁶ Imports of fertilizer dropped from 1.3 million tons per year to 160,000 tons in 2001. Herbicide and pesticide imports dropped from a combined 27,000 tons to 1,900 tons in 2001.¹⁷ And petroleum supplies for agriculture were halved.¹⁸

from World Resources 2000-2001--People and Ecosystems: The fraying web of life.

http://www.wri.org/wr2000/pdf_final/wr2000.zip

Food imports (which had once accounted for 60% of the food consumed in Cuba) were also halved.¹⁹ And by 1994, agricultural production had dropped to 55% of the 1990 level.²⁰ Per capita daily caloric intake dropped from 2,908 calories in 1989 to 1,863 calories in 1995, a decrease of 36%. Protein intake decreased by 40%,²¹ and dietary fats dropped 65%.²² There are estimates that the average Cuban lost 20 pounds by 1994.²³ Undernourishment jumped from less than 5% to over 20%, the largest increase in undernourished people in all of Latin America during the 1990s.²⁴

Two government policies are credited with preventing the crisis from reaching emergency levels: food programs targeting particularly vulnerable populations (the elderly, children, and pregnant and lactating mothers), and the food distribution ration card which guaranteed a minimum food provision for every citizen (albeit greatly reduced from former levels). This government-maintained safety net kept the crisis from reaching depths comparable to North Korea, while giving the country breathing space to redesign its agricultural sector to meet the challenge.

The agrarian reforms of the mid-1990s were the key to recovering from the food crisis, but they could not have worked without the earlier agrarian reforms and without an educated and modernized peasantry unique in Latin America. The Cuban miracle is the product of a people with vision and solidarity.

The Cuban Miracle

The Cuban economy had to recover from the loss of its closest trading partner, the Soviet Union.

Cuban GNP has grown every year since 1995. There have been solid gains in employment, productivity and exports. Fruit production has returned to its 1989 level (and even surpassed it in the case of plantains). Vegetables and tubers for domestic consumption have seen a prodigious increase in production.