http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_12-8-2005_pg5_14

 

 

High oil prices threaten survival of textile, cement sectors

By Mshfiq Ahmed

KARACHI: The latest increase in international oil prices to a record $65 per barrel has crippled the industry depending on the bi-products of the crude oil or using it as raw material while the most important textile sector of the country is bound to pay a heavy price for the escalating crude oil prices.

Rising international crude oil prices, which have touched the $65 per barrel mark, is going to raise the cost of production of the local textile industry as well as of polyester staple fibre.

The cut-throat competition with the entry of China into the textile world in the WTO quota-free regime has already made it extremely difficult for the export-oriented textile sector of the country to survive. Even the local Pakistani market might be captured by cheaper Chinese products. The threat is even larger if seen in the context of India trying to penetrate into the Pakistani market with cheaper goods.

“Whenever the oil prices rise, the cost of producing polyester staple fibre rises, which leaves it uncompetitive against cotton,” said Khuldoon Bin Latif, an analyst at AKD Securities.

If the cotton production drops, the country might have to face double problem as the textile sector will have to use PSF, a bi-product of oil, as an alternative to the raw cotton.

Last year the country received a record production of cotton, which touched the figure of 14.5 million bales. This huge production saved Pakistani textile industry from using PSF and kept it competitive in the world textile market. However, the situation might change once the textile industry faces a shortage of raw cotton. Then the use of PSF will increase the production cost too high to compete with China.

China has dumped its textile products both in United States and in the European Union, replacing traditional exporters in these two markets. Pakistan is facing a tough situation after abolishment of the quota system and implementation of the quota-free regime.

“The free regime is not in favour of small players as giants like China can afford to drop their prices of products to bottom level and still be able to survive,” said Hamood Khan, a textile exporter.

Another important aspect was that cotton prices fell to Rs 1,800 per maund, which helped the textile sector to remain its competitiveness and it hit the sales of polyester staple fibre producers.

However, Mr Latif, an analyst, said, since the new cotton crop is going to be around 13 million bales, this year is going to be a “much better year” for the PSF. Analysts said those textile units would be more hurt by the rising international oil prices, which had installed their own power generating units. The cost of production for other textile factories would also rise, but not drastically, they said.

Cement price to rise due to transportation cost: On the other hand, the transportation cost is going to rise for the cement manufacturers, which will give them a reason to increase the prices of their various products. Cement prices are already very high due to the increasing demand by the local, Afghan and Middle East construction industries. However, their cost of production is not going to rise due to skyrocketing oil prices, because most of them now rely on coal and gas. They used to use furnace oil two years ago for the production of cement. Now they have switched to coal and gas, said Nomanul Haq, an analyst at Arif Habib Securities.

The Oil Companies Advisory Committee was expected to raise the price of POL products in its fortnightly review, said analysts. It has kept the prices unchanged in its last two fortnightly meetings. It had increased the price of petrol by Rs 3.41 and Rs 48.94 while the oil marketing companies (OMCs) had raised the diesel price by Rs 2.68 and Rs 31.74 per litre on July 1.

The price of kerosene oil was raised to Rs 29.53 from Rs 27.98 per litre while the price of light diesel oil (LDO) was increased to Rs 27.84 from Rs 26.39 per litre. The rate of HOBC was increased to Rs 54.33 from Rs 50.52 per litre.

Oil marketing companies to gain: The oil marketing companies of the country are getting benefits from the rise in international oil prices, because their margins improve with a surge in the prices of their products.

“If the government does not cap the local oil prices, their profits will rise tremendously,” said Hasnain Imam, an analyst at a local brokerage house. “Even if the government does not allow the prices to rise, they will be benefiting because the government compensates them for the losses they suffer by keeping prices low.”

 

Couple of things from today’s Sunday Times.

You have to look for details that are buried in the depths of even this short piece.

An admittance that Oil is running out. Why are our leaders so quiet?

 

Put this with the second item below which is the text of a full page advertisement from Esso in the Sunday Times today.

What does this advertisement say:

 

Energy demand will grow by as much as 50% in the next 25 years.

They are looking at environmental impacts, looking for new technologies.

And to quote from the advertisement:

There are no easy answers. It will take straightforward, honest dialogue about the hard truths that confront us all. Wishful thinking must not cloud real thinking.

 

So why do they say it but we hear nothing in the deafening silence.

Norman

 

‘New Castro’ threatens to take his feud with America nuclear Tony Allen-Mills, Washington

PRESIDENT George W Bush is a “jerk”. His administration is a “mafia of assassins”. And, according to Hugo Chavez, the belligerent populist president of Venezuela, Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, lies in bed at night dreaming of him. Chavez, 50, is rapidly becoming a US nightmare in Latin America. He aroused further American anger last week by threatening to form a nuclear alliance with Iran. The prospect of two hostile, oil-rich governments working together against US interests has shocked Washington and plunged relations with Venezuela to a dangerous new low. US officials have begun to suspect that Chavez is plotting to become the “new Castro” — the leading voice in the region of leftist anti-Americanism. Behind the disintegrating relationship between Washington and one of its most important oil suppliers lies Chavez’s apparent conviction that US agents were behind an attempted coup that briefly ousted him in 2002. Storming back to power after a referendum last August, Chavez has clashed with US officials over a series of issues that prompted Rice to label him “a negative force in the region”. In his latest challenge Chavez declared that Venezuela needed nuclear energy to prepare for when its oil ran out. He said that other Latin American countries should collaborate. “We want to initiate nuclear research and ask for help from countries like Iran,” he said. While US officials have dismissed some of Chavez’s threats as bluster, intelligence sources are concerned about claims that he has given alleged terrorists Venezuelan passports. Venezuelan officials dismiss Washington’s complaints as offensive and undemocratic. “The US is a very ideologically oriented administration and has a lot of animosity towards us,” said Andres Izarra, minister of information. “But we can ally ourselves with whomever we want.” Washington has attempted to isolate Chavez by wooing his Latin American neighbours but when Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, raised concerns about Chavez during a tour of the region, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil remarked a few days later: “We don’t accept defamation and insinuations against a compañero (friend).” +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ESSO ADVERTISMENT IN SUNDAY TIMES. Energy is too precious a resource to take lightly. It is essential to our way of life. Essential to economic progress. Essential to raising living standards for over five billion people in the developing world. And, because we take energy seriously, we take our responsibilities seriously too. In how we look for it.   How we retrieve it. How we transport it. How we process it. And how we use it.   As global energy demand grows (and it will, by as much as 50% in the next 25 years), we will not shirk our responsibility to find ways to meet it - and ways to reduce the emissions this rising demand will inevitably create. It’s a huge challenge. On one hand, the world demands more and more energy. On the other, it demands less and less environmental impact. Meeting this challenge, on a global scale, will take all the technology and human ingenuity we can muster. That’s why, for decades, we have consistently led the industry in research and technology. And why we’re now making the largest ever investment in independent climate and energy research that is specifically designed to look for new breakthrough technologies. The world faces enormous energy challenges.   There are no easy answers. It will take straightforward, honest dialogue about the hard truths that confront us all. Wishful thinking must not cloud real thinking. New energy initiatives, however appealing they may sound, must also be practical, viable and economical  - worldwide. However tough the issues, our answers must reflect  the real world. Energy is simply too important to treat in any other way. esso.co.uk/energychallenges Energy and the environment.

 

System Interdependencies??

Norman

Zimbabwe suffers from fuel crisis

24-04-05 Zimbabwe's social and economic sectors are on the brink of collapse as crippling fuel shortages have resurfaced while a combination of power blackouts and water shortages have gripped cities around the country threatening to grind industry and commerce to a halt. Apart from that, Zimbabwe has run out of food with reports that the country has only 60,000 tons of maize left, enough to feed the nation for only two weeks.
Industrialists and commentators said that Zimbabwe's industry and commerce would soon collapse if the current problems bedevilling the country are not urgently addressed. Already, the transport industry is reeling from the fuel crisis. Earlier, most commuter buses were grounded, leaving workers stranded especially in the country's major towns of Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru, Mutare and Masvingo.

Obert Mpofu, the Minister of Industry and International Trade, insisted that the fuel situation would have improved within a few days.
"All stakeholders are working towards arresting thefuel problem," Mpofu said.
One of the causes of the current crisis is the delay in paying fuel suppliers. As much as $ 2.5 mm due to suppliers since February has not been released and this has adversely impacted on the creditworthiness of Zimbabwean fuel importers. The reason for the delay in paying external fuel suppliers was a demand by the authorities to four or five indigenous fuel importers who reportedly failed to account for the money they were given to import fuel.

As a result of the delay in releasing the funds since February, a consortium supplying the southern half of the country has not been able to bring in fuel because the external suppliers, among them Sasol, are reluctant "to put good money after bad money".
In smaller towns such as Kadoma and Kwekwe, Marondera and Zvishavane, the situation is equally bad and has given rise to a thriving parallel market. In Gweru and Harare, five litres of petrol are going for $ 150,000 and $ 60,000 respectively on the parallel market, against an average pump price of $ 3,600. Unscrupulous public transporters were cashing in on the crisis charging as much as $ 5,000 for the Harare to Chitungwiza route, twice the gazetted fare.

Long queues of desperate motorists, wasting productive time in search of fuel, have become the order of the day at many service stations in the country. On the power supply front, the countrywide blackout resulted in loss of business for most companies.
Most food outlets in Harare were reduced to soft drinks retailers after the power cuts prevented them from preparing fresh food. In supermarkets, perishables such as meat and milk products were thrown away after they went bad -- resulting in huge losses for businesses.
"Our losses run into millions of dollars," said a manager at a supermarket in Harare's Central Business District (CBD).

The scarcities of fuel and electricity blackouts are also likely to impact negatively on the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair (ZITF) in Bulawayo and the Harare International Festival of the Arts (HIFA), which kick-off.
Eric Bloch, an economic analyst, warned that power and fuel shortages were set to worsen the country's social and economic decline and called on the government to increase the fuel pump price to make it more viable for procurement companies.
"The pressure by government on distributors to keep fuel prices down could further worsen the fuel crisis. The current price is prohibitive to producers," he said.

Economist, John Robertson, attributed the fuel crisis to lack of incentives to encourage fuel procurement companies to import fuel. He suggested the fuel price be increased to $ 7,000 a litre.
Robertson said: "The scarcity of foreign currency mainly due to the loss of tobacco earnings, loss of beef earnings and many other industries and sectors is also contributing to the fuel crisis. Export industries are not closing but shrinking because the economic environment is not favourable."

The president of the Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ),Mike Bimha, said the power supply irregularities, water cuts and fuel shortages impact negatively on the overall performance, resulting in low production levels. For a worker to give optimum performance and increase productivity in the workplace, he said, one needs to have peace of mind.
"Imagine waking up to go to work and there is no water for you to bath, no electricity to warm your water up and cook food then there is no transport to ferry you to work? How many problems can befall a person?"

Collin Gwiyo, deputy secretary general of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) said the problems were a result of bad governance and called for dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
Zesa general manager (corporate affairs), Obert Nyatanga, said that electricity interruptions are going to continue until the end of the winter season due to increased demand.
"However, with the encroaching winter peak period, demand for electricity will outstrip supply and the region has run out of excess power to export to deficit markets like Zimbabwe during peak periods," Nyatanga said.

Zesa said it was unable to access the 100 MW power import from SNEL of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) due to a transmission failure (fault).
The parastatal said two of its generators at Kariba and Hwange Power Stations are not working due to a critical shortage of spare parts. The Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ), a body created to protect the interests of the consumers, was saying it needed to consult broadly.

Source: Zimbabwe Standard

 

http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nta52120.htm

 

 

 

The following are two recent papers by Dale Allen Pfeiffer.

The first one explains exactly what will happen to the rest of the world due to oil depletion.

It also shows the interdependencies of our systems and how the interact with each other.

 

It is the interdependency of our systems that is not well understood or appreciated.

 

The second paper, Pt.2, concerns Cuba and how it has coped with oil depletion.

The one thing to keep in mind in reading this paper is that it was only Cuba and so the rest of the world was still up and running though trade was down. And secondly the preplanning and timescales involved in Cuba achieving what it has.

 

Norman

 

 

 

Drawing Lessons from Experience;
The Agricultural Crises in North Korea
and Cuba -- Part 1

Why Changing the Way Money Works is the Key
to Resolving Peak Oil Challenges

by Dale Allen Pfeiffer
FTW Contributing Editor for Energy

© Copyright 2004, From The Wilderness Publications, www.fromthewilderness.com. All Rights Reserved. May be reprinted, distributed or posted on an Internet web site for non-profit purposes only.

November 17, 2003, 1100 PDT, (FTW) -- So what happens to an industrialized country practicing modern agriculture when it loses its fossil fuel energy base? There are two countries where it has already happened: North Korea and Cuba. Both countries have little or no oil resources of their own, both relied upon the Soviet Union for their oil imports, and both experienced a swift and severe drop in their oil imports following the demise of the Soviet empire. While showing proper respect for the suffering of people in both countries, perhaps we can benefit from studying their examples.

DPRK (North Korea)—A Warning to the US

North Korea has always held less than half the population of South Korea. Prior to the Korean War, South Korea was a largely agrarian society, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) was largely an industrial society. Following the war, the DPRK turned to fossil fuel subsidized agriculture to increase the production of their poor soils.

By 1990, DPRK estimated per capita energy use was 71 gigajoules per person,¹ the equivalent of 12.3 barrels of crude oil. This was more than twice the per capita usage of China at that same time, or half the usage of Japan. DPRK has coal reserves estimated at from 1 billion to 10 billion tons, and developable hydroelectric potential estimated at 10-14 Gigawatts.² But North Korea must depend on imports for all of their oil and natural gas. In 1990, DPRK imported 18.3 million barrels of oil from Russia, China and Iran.³

An Energy Crisis

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian imports fell by 90%. By 1996, oil imports amounted to only 40 percent of the 1990 level.⁴ DPRK tried to look to China for the bulk of its oil needs. However, China sought to distance itself economically from DPRK by announcing that all commerce with DPRK would be settled in hard currency beginning in 1993. China also cut its shipments of “friendship grain” from 800,000 tons in 1993 to 300,000 tons in 1994.⁵

On top of the loss of oil and natural gas imports, DPRK suffered a series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s that acted to further debilitate an already crippled system. The years 1995 and 1996 saw severe flooding that washed away vital topsoil, destroyed infrastructure, damaged and silted hydroelectric dams, and flooded coal mine shafts rendering them unproductive. In 1997, this flooding was followed by severe drought and a massive tsunami. Lack of energy resources prevented them from preparing for these disasters and hampered recovery.

DPRK also suffered from aging infrastructure. Much of their machinery and many of their industrial plants were ready for retirement by the 1990s. Because DPRK had defaulted on an enormous debt some years earlier, they had grave difficulty attracting the necessary foreign investment. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that DPRK could no longer obtain the spare parts and expertise to refurbish their infrastructure, leading to the failure of machinery, generators, turbines, transformers and transmission lines. DPRK entered into a vicious positive feedback loop, as failing infrastructure cut coal and hydroelectric production and diminished their ability to transport energy via power lines, truck and rail.

The following graphs illustrate the decline in all sectors of commercial energy between the years 1990 and 1996. As a result of this, North Koreans turned to burning biomass, thus impacting their remaining forests. Deforestation led, in turn, to more flooding and increasing levels of soil erosion. Likewise, soils were depleted as plant matter was burned for heat, rather than being mulched and composted.

from Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

By 1996, road and freight transport were reduced to 40% of their 1990 levels. Iron and steel production were reduced to 36% of 1990 levels, and cement was reduced to 32%.⁶ This effect rippled out through the automotive, building and agricultural industries. The energy shortage also affected residential and commercial lighting, heating and cooking. This, in turn, led to loss of productivity and reduced quality of life, and adversely impacted public health. To this day, hospitals remain unheated in the winter, and lack electricity to run medical equipment. There is even insufficient energy to boil water for human consumption. By 1996, total commercial energy consumption throughout society fell by 51%.⁷

from Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

Perhaps in no other sector was the crisis felt more acutely than in agriculture. The energy crisis quickly spawned a food crisis that proved to be fatal. Modern, industrialized agriculture collapsed without fossil fuel inputs. It is estimated that over 3 million people have died as a result.⁸

The Collapse of Agriculture

from Modeling future oil production, population and the economy

 http://www.oilcrisis.com/laherrere/aspoParis.pdf

The above graph, produced by Jean Laherrère, illustrates the relationship between petroleum consumption and agricultural collapse in DPRK.⁹ Note that the decline of agricultural production follows very closely the decline of petroleum consumption. Also, note that the rise in petroleum consumption after 1997 is not mirrored by the rise of agricultural production. Agriculture begins to make a comeback, but appears to enter another decline sometime around 1999. We do not have enough data at present to state conclusively the reasons why agricultural recovery has faltered. It is likely a combination of other factors, such as failure of farm equipment and infrastructure, adverse weather, and—quite likely—the failure of soils that have been depleted of minerals over the past decade. In any case, the above graph sums up the agricultural collapse of DPRK and hints at the suffering that collapse has entailed.

Fertilizer

Agriculture in DPRK requires approximately 700,000 tons of fertilizer per year.¹⁰ North Korea used to manufacture 80 to 90% of its own fertilizer, somewhere from 600,000 to 800,000 tons per year. Since 1995, DPRK has had difficulty producing even 100,000 tons per year. Aid and foreign purchases brought the total for 1999 to 160,000 tons, less than one quarter of the required amount.¹¹

The DPRK fertilizer industry relies on coal as both an energy source and a feedstock. They require 1.5 to 2.0 million tons of coal per year to produce 700,000 tons of fertilizer.¹² To obtain this coal, the fertilizer industry must compete with the steel industry, electricity generation, home heating and cooking needs, and a host of other consumers. Flooded mine shafts and broken down mining equipment have severely cut the coal supply. Likewise, delivery of this coal has been curtailed by the breakdown of railway infrastructure. Furthermore, transporting 2 million tons of coal by rail requires 5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity,¹³ while electricity supply is diminished because of lack of coal, silting of dams and infrastructure failure. So once again, we have another vicious positive feedback loop. Finally, infrastructure failure limits the ability to ship the fertilizer—1.5 to 2.5 million tons in bulk—from factories to farms.¹⁴

The result of this systemic failure is that agriculture in DPRK is operating with only 20 to 30% of the normal soil nutrient inputs.¹⁵ The reduction in fertilizer is the largest single contributor to reduced crop yields in DPRK. Tony Boys has pointed out that to run DPRK's fertilizer factories at capacity would require the energy equivalent of at least 5 million barrels of oil, which represents one quarter of the oil imported into DPRK in recent years.¹⁶ However, even capacity production at this point would be inadequate. For the past decade, soils in the DPRK have been depleted of nutrients to the point that it would now require a massive soil building and soil conservation program to reverse the damage.

Diesel Fuel

Agriculture has been further impacted by the limited availability of diesel fuel. Diesel fuel is required to run the fleet of approximately 70,000 tractors, 8,000 tractor crawlers, and 60,000 small motors used on farms in DPRK.¹⁶ Diesel is also required for transporting produce to market, and for food processing equipment. It is estimated that in 1990, North Korean agriculture used 120,000 tons of diesel fuel. Since then, agricultural consumption has declined to 25,000 to 35,000 tons per year.¹⁷

Compounding the problem of diesel supply is the military allocation, which has not been cut proportionally with the drop in production. Only after the military takes its allocation can the other sectors of society—including agriculture, transportation and industry—divide the remainder. So, while total supplies of diesel have dropped by 60%, the agricultural share of the remained has fallen from 15% in 1990 to 10% currently.¹⁸ In other words, agriculture must make due with 10% of 40%, or 4% of the total diesel supply of 1990.

DPRK Diesel Fuel Consumption in 1990 & 1996

from Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

The result is an 80% reduction in the use of farm equipment.¹⁹ There is neither the fuel nor the spare parts available to keep farm machinery running. Observers in 1998 reported seeing tractors and other farm equipment lying unused and unusable while farmers struggled to work their fields by hand. The observers also reported seeing piles of harvested grain left on the fields for weeks, leading to post-harvest crop losses.²⁰

Loss of mechanized power has required the substitution of human labor and draft animals. In turn, due to their greater workload, human laborers and draft animals require more food, putting more strain on an already insufficient diet. And, although a greater percentage of the population is engaged in farm labor, they have found it impossible to perform all of the operations previously carried out by machinery.²¹

Irrigation

Finally, the agricultural system has also been impacted by the decreased availability of electricity to power water pumps for irrigation and drainage. The annual amount of electricity necessary for irrigation throughout the nation stands at around 1.2 billion kilowatt hours (kWh). Adding to this another 460 million kWh to operate threshing and milling machines and other farm equipment brings the total up to 1.7 billion kWh per year.²² This is not including the electrical demand for lighting in homes and barns, or any other rural residential uses.

Currently, electricity for irrigation has declined by 300 million kWh, and electricity for other agricultural uses has declined by 110 million kWh. This brings the total electrical output currently available for agriculture down to 1.3 billion kWh; a shortfall of 400 million kWh from what is needed.

In reality, the situation for irrigation is worse than that hinted at by these figures. Irrigation is time sensitive—especially in the case of rice, which is DPRK's major grain crop. Rice production is dependent upon carefully-timed flooding and draining. Rice is transplanted in May and harvested in late August and early September. After planting, the rice paddies must be flooded and remain in water until they are drained at harvest time. In DPRK, virtually all rice irrigation is managed with electrical pumps. Over half of the irrigational pumping for all agriculture takes place in May. Peak pumping power demand at this time is at least 900 MW. This represents over one-third of DPRK's generating capacity.²³

On top of this, the national power grid is fragmented, so that at some isolated points along the grid, irrigation demand can overtax generating capacity. This overtaxed system is also dilapidated, suffering the same disrepair as other energy infrastructure, both due to weather disasters, the age of the power stations and transmitters, and the lack of spare parts.

The records of three major pumping stations in DPRK showed that they suffered an average of 600 power outages per year, spending an average of 2300 hours per year without power. These power failures resulted in an enormous waste of water, translating into an irrigation shortfall of about one-quarter of the required amount of water.²⁴

Home energy usage

Home energy usage is also severely impacted by the energy crisis, and—particularly in rural areas—home energy demand is in turn impacting agriculture. Rural residential areas have experienced a 50% drop in electricity consumption, resulting in a decline in basic services and quality of life. Homes in rural villages rarely have electrical power during the winter months.²⁵ As has already been mentioned, hospitals and clinics are not excluded from this lack of power.

Rural households use coal for heating and cooking. The average rural household is estimated to require 2.6 tons of coal per year. The total rural coal requirement is 3.9 million tons annually. Currently, rural areas receive a little more than half of this requirement.²⁶ On the average, rural coal use for cooking, heating and preparing animal feed has declined by 40%, down to 1.6 tons per year.²⁷ Even public buildings such as schools and hospitals have limited coal supplies. Lacking enough coal even for the purpose of boiling water, the result is a reported increase in waterborne diseases.

To make up for the shortfall in coal, rural populations are increasingly turning to biomass for their heating and cooking energy needs. Herbage has been taken from competing uses such as animal fodder and compost, leading to further decreased food supplies. Biomass scavenging is also stressing all rural ecosystems from forests to croplands. Biomass harvesting reduces ground cover, disrupts habitats, and leads to increasing soil erosion and siltation.

Moreover, biomass foraging requires time and effort when other labor requirements are high and nutritional availability is low. This contributes to the positive feedback loop of calorie requirements versus food availability. It is estimated that 25% of the civilian workforce was employed in agriculture in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, the ratio had grown to 36%.²⁸ Furthermore, agricultural work has grown much more labor intensive. Farm labor is conservatively estimated at a minimum of 300 million person-hours per year. However, researchers point out that this number could easily be a factor of two or more higher.²⁹ Workers are burning more calories, and so require more food. This is further complicated by greater reliance upon draft animals with their own food requirements. So necessary caloric intake has actually increased as food production has decreased, leading to less food availability per demand and increasing malnutrition.

Impacts to Health and Society

U.S. congressmen and others who have visited North Korea tell stories of people eating grass and bark. Other reports talk of soldiers who are nothing more than skin and bones. Throughout the country, there is starvation to rival the worst found in Africa. Chronic malnutrition has reached the point where many of the effects are irreversible.³⁰

A study of children aged 6 months to 7 years found that 16% suffered from acute malnutrition—this is one of the highest rates of wasting in the world. 3% of the children suffered edema. 62% of the children suffered from chronic malnutrition. 61% were moderately or severely underweight. Chronic malnutrition can lead to irreversible stunting.³¹

Furthermore, malnutrition weakens the immune system, leaving the population even more vulnerable to contagions. And the lack of fuel for boiling water has led to a rise in water-borne diseases. Without electricity and coal, hospitals and clinics have become harbors of despair, where only the hopeless go for treatment.³²

The situation in DPRK has rendered the country even more vulnerable to natural disasters. The country lacks the energy reserves to recover from the natural disasters of 1995-1997, much less withstand future ones. The infrastructure is fragmented and in disrepair. There is a very real threat that portions of the infrastructure, such as the electrical grid, may fail altogether. Complete electrical grid failure would result in a near-complete crop loss.³³

So far, the people of DPRK have faced this crisis together. But continued deprivation may very well lead to rivalry, regional fragmentation, social breakdown and internecine fighting. Rural society is currently faring better than the urban population, and it is actually absorbing urban workers to help meet the rising labor demands of agriculture. But worsening conditions and widespread flight from the cities could lead to violent confrontations. It is even possible that rural instability could eventually result in civil war.

A Model for Disaster

The history of DPRK through the 1990s demonstrates how an energy crisis in an industrialized nation can lead to complete systemic breakdown. Of particular note is how the energy crisis sends ripples throughout the entire structure of society, and how various problems act to reinforce each other and drag the system further down. The most serious consequence for the people is found in the failure of modern agriculture and the resulting malnutrition. The collapse of infrastructure not only makes it more difficult to deal with the decline of agriculture and other immediate disasters, but also acts to amplify the crisis and leads to further social disintegration.

The various far-flung impacts and the numerous interlinking problems render the crisis nearly impossible to remedy. Even with a healthy economy, it is doubtful that North Korea could repair its degenerated society. Though the original problem may have been a lack of fuel, it cannot be corrected now by a simple increase in fuel supply. At this time, it will take an international effort to save the people of North Korea. And given the current political animosity between DPRK and the U.S., it is doubtful that this effort will take place.

The painful experiences of DPRK point out that dealing with an energy crisis is not just a matter of finding an alternative mode of transportation, an alternative energy source, or a return to organic agriculture. We are talking about the collapse of a complex system, in this case a social system that evolved gradually from a labor-intensive agrarian society to a fossil fuel-supported industrial/ technological society. It simply is not possible to step back to an agrarian society all at once, or to take a leap forward into some unknown high-tech society. Complex systems change gradually, bit by bit. Faced with immediate change, a complex system tends to collapse.

For a world facing the end of growing energy production, this means that the changes should have begun decades ago, giving time for a gradual transition. We had our warning back in the 1970s, when there might have been time to make a transition to a society independent of fossil fuels. Now it is simply too late. It is a waste of our time talking about a hydrogen future, or zero point energy, or a breakthrough in fusion. Even if we could find a technological quick fix, there is no time left to make the transition.

This is not to say that our future has to be bleak. We might be able to make a transition into a simpler society. In fact, if we can concentrate our efforts on easing the decline and on building an equitable and democratic social system, we might manage to provide a comfortable existence for ourselves and for the generations to come.

In part two of this article, the author will look at how Cuba has handled its own energy crisis, and will use this positive example to list some ways in which industrial civilization could handle the transition from fossil fuel dependent agriculture.

-------------

¹ Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, William, James H., Von Hippel, David, Hayes, Peter. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper  46, 2000. http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi/article=1028&context=igcc

² Demand and Supply of Electricity and Other Fuels in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Von Hippel, D.F., and Hayes, Peter. Nautilus Institute, 1997.

³ Op. Cit. See note 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Causes and Lessons of the “North Korean Food Crisis”, Boys, Tony. Ibaraka Christian University Junior College, 2000. http://www9.ocn.ne.jp/%7Easlan/dprke.pdf

⁶ Op. Cit. See note 1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Op. Cit. See note 5.

⁹ Modelling future oil production, population and the economy, Laherrère, Jean. ASPO Second international workshop on oil & gas, Paris, May 26-27 2003. http://www.oilcrisis.com/laherrere/aspoParis.pdf

¹⁰ DPR Korea: Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) Program, Identification of Investment Opportunities, Vol. 2: Working Papers 1-3. United Nations Development Programme And the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1998.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Op. Cit. See note 2.

¹³ Op. Cit. See note 1.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ “…the energy cost of ammonia synthesis even in large modern plants averages over 40 GJ/tN, of which 60 percent is feedstock and 40 percent is process energy. It is unlikely that the DPRK fertilizer factories can produce ammonia for less than 50GJ/tN. Further, because ammonia requires special storage and application, most of it is converted to liquid or solid fertilizer (e.g. urea) for easy shipping and application. The conversion of ammonia to urea requires an additional 25 GJ/tN. Since one barrel of oil represents approximately 6GJ of energy, and one ton of nitrogen in urea requires 75 GJ (or more) to produce, to run the DPRK's (three) fertilizer factories at capacity for a year would require:

(75 ÷ 6 = 12.5) × 400,000 = 5,000,000

…or at least 5 million barrels of oil, roughly a quarter of the amount of oil imported annually into the DPRK in recent years.”

Op. Cit. See note 5.

¹⁶ Op. Cit. See note 10.

¹⁷ Op. Cit. See note 2.

¹⁸ Op. Cit. See note 1.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. FAO, Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture, World Food Programme, November 12, 1998. http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/economic/giews/english/alertes/1998/srdrk981.htm

²¹ Ibid.

²² Op. Cit. See note 2.

²³ Op. Cit. See note 1.

²⁴ Op. Cit. See note 10.

²⁵ Op. Cit. See note 1.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Op Cit. See note 20.

²⁹ Op. Cit. See note 1.

³⁰ Op. Cit. See note 5.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Op. Cit. See note 1.

³³ Ibid.

The Agricultural Crises in North Korea and Cuba - Pt. 2

Cuba-A Hope

by Dale Allen Pfeiffer - FTW Energy Editor

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)

[The day FTW published Part I of this important series we began to receive many messages deriding what was described as our propaganda on behalf of Fidel Castro. Patiently, I replied that this series had nothing to do with Castro or with "Communism". Both Korea and Cuba are "Communist" countries yet the Cubans are eating while the North Koreans are starving. That, I said, was the point - the only point.

As the effects of Peak Oil and Gas are making themselves felt, even sooner than anticipated, the world stands on the brink of unimaginable global famine. Please see http://fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/112103_china_food.html, and

http://fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/100303_eating_oil_summary.html.

 These issues are coming to center stage about a decade before "experts" had predicted they would and the problems they pose are being exacerbated by a global economic system which has found that "it may not be profitable to slow decline."

Into this mix, we find that "Cuba has disproved the myth that organic agriculture cannot support a modern nation." And in terms of locally privatized agriculture we find a pure form of capitalism advocated by Catherine Austin Fitts (www.solari.com) that centers around neighborhood ownership, place-based financing and decentralized control. Further, the Cuban data shows that privately owned co-op farms are outproducing state-owned ventures. "The CCSs, made up of small, independent farmers, have outperformed the CPAs, the UBPC cooperatives and the state farms."

I have been approached about going personally to Cuba next spring to view these developments for myself. I pray that this opportunity becomes realized. When I go, I will take with me all the protestations I have herd about how the Cuban people suffer under Castro, how unhappy the reportedly are, and how much they live without and I will balance these charges against the fact that the Cuban people are, healthy, educated, eating and surviving in a world we may all soon have to face. Recently CNN's Lou Dobbs broadcast a series showing that American food production is shrinking, while our population is increasing. Soon to end is the ability of the US and Canada (the only two nations to do so) to continue exporting grain to a hungry world.

Happiness, in human terms, is a relative condition. The Cuban people may indeed be in despair because they lack TVs, "good" clothing, new cars and consumer goods. There may be, by comparison, conditions unthinkable to a present-day American or Brit. But I submit that, as global famine caused by Peak Oil and Gas  becomes a reality, the possibility exists that what Cubans have today  might - in a decade or less--look to much of the world like undreamed of abundance. - MCR]

December 1, 2003, 1600 PDT, (FTW) --The story of Cuba begins in much the same vein as the story of North Korea. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought the loss of oil imports as well as the loss of their major trading partner. And U.S. sanctions kept the country isolated from the rest of the world.

However, there are some very important differences between Cuba and DPRK. For one thing, Cuba has a much warmer climate, with a longer growing season. Cuba also has a better ratio of population to arable land, though most of the arable land is not of the best quality.¹ Cuba has a large percentage of scientists, engineers and doctors in its population. With only 2% of the population of Latin America, Cuba holds 11% of the scientists in all of Latin America.² Even before the crisis provoked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuban scientists had begun exploring alternatives to fossil fuel-based agriculture. Research into ecological agriculture began back in the 1980s. By the time of the crisis, a system of regional research institutes, training centers and extension services was in place to quickly disseminate information to farmers.³ And finally, the Cuban government had social programs in place to support farmers and the population through the crisis and the transition into ecological agriculture.

Before looking at the crisis and the Cuban response, it is necessary to look briefly at Cuban society before the crisis, particularly rural society and the agrarian reforms of past decades. It is here that the groundwork was laid for a successful transition.

A Short History

Prior to the 1959 revolution, there was one word to describe Cuba: inequity. Only 8% of the farmers controlled 70% of the land. U.S. interests controlled most of the Cuban economy, including most of the large plantations, a controlling interest in the sugar production, the mining industry, oil refineries, electrical utilities, the communications system, and many of the banks.⁴

The majority of the rural labor force consisted of landless, seasonal workers without schooling, healthcare, electricity or running water. They earned their living during only three months of the year, at planting time and at harvest. Rural workers were lucky to earn one-quarter of the national income.⁵

At the time of the revolution, most of the wealthy landowners fled to the United States. Their former holdings were expropriated and given over to the laborers. Minor Sinclair and Martha Thompson provide a vivid illustration of this transformation in their portrait of Ciego de Avila.⁶

The province of Ciego de Avila encompasses what was formerly the Las Navajas  estate. The estate had been owned by Alfredo and Horacia Arbutio, two brothers who ran their holdings with an iron fist. The brothers ruled over the local peasantry, and meted out a very harsh justice that included beatings and punishment for those who collected firewood on the estate. The peasantry had no schools, no healthcare, and no electricity. There weren't even roads to bring them these amenities. They were starved and sick.

The Arbutio brothers fled to the U.S. at the time of the revolution. Alfredo became a founding member of the Cuban-American National Foundation. The former sharecroppers, 62 families, expropriated the land. They formed the Jose Marti Cooperative, and the new government provided them with technical training, supplies, guaranteed markets, and crop insurance.⁷

Members of the cooperative--sons and daughters of former sharecroppers--have university degrees in agriculture, computers, teaching, engineering and other subjects. The cooperative now supports a school, a clinic and a pharmacy. In the next generation, many children have plans to become doctors and nurses. And, considering that Cuba's medical training program is among the best in the world, it is highly likely that these plans will come to fruition.

The Cuban revolution has been followed by three periods of agrarian reform, first in 1959, secondly in 1963, and finally the current land reform of the 1990s. The first reform limited private land owning to 1,000 acres. This resulted in a tripling of the number of small farmers and in the establishment of state farms to replace the large plantations. The second agrarian reform further limited private land ownership to 165 acres per person.⁸ The land reform of the 1990s would be more properly called a controlled privatization. We will discuss that later.

By 1965, state farms controlled 63% of the arable land, and over 160,000 small farmers owned and worked an additional 20% of the arable land.⁹ The small farmers joined farmer associations, Credit and Service Cooperatives (CCSs) and Agricultural Production Cooperatives (CPAs), which together controlled 22% of the arable land. The CCSs and CPAs are, in turn, confederated in the National Association of Small Producers (ANAP), which provides training and a number of services to its members, and negotiates with the government for prices and credit. ANAP members produce 52% of the vegetables grown in Cuba, 67% of the corn, and 85% of the tobacco.¹⁰ Another 20,000 small farmers own their land independently of cooperatives. These unaffiliated private farmers own about 1% of the arable land.¹¹

The agrarian reforms succeeded because the government was truly intent on a redistribution of the wealth and a more equitable society. Farmers and cooperatives were supported with low-interest credit, stabilized prices, a guaranteed market, technological assistance, transport and insurance. The government also enacted laws that prevented the reconcentration of land, effectively preventing former plantation owners from slowly buying back their estates. The revolution took back control of Cuba from the U.S.; laws were enacted to ban foreign ownership of property. Cuba's isolation did, in fact, have some positive benefits in that it allowed them to affect their social transformation without outside intervention. And finally, the population was educated and provided with decent health care.

By the 1980s, Cuba had surpassed most of Latin America in nutrition, life expectancy, education and per capita GNP. The literacy rate was an astonishing 96%, and 95% of the population had access to safe water.¹² Cubans achieved a large degree of equity and industrialization through a trade regime that was highly import-dependent.

From the time of the revolution to the 1980s, Cuban agriculture became more mechanized than any other Latin American country. Despite the fact that Cuba was a highly industrialized country which manufactured everything from pharmaceuticals to computers, sugar was their major export. By the end of the 1980s, state-owned sugar plantations covered three times more farmland than did food crops. Sugar and its derivatives constituted 75% of Cuba's exports, sold almost exclusively to the Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe and China.¹³

However, because Cuban agriculture was overwhelming dedicated to sugar, tobacco and citrus, the country had to import 60% of its food, all from the Soviet bloc. Cuba also imported most of its oil, 48% of its fertilizer, 82% of its pesticides, 36% of its animal feed for livestock, and most of the fuel used to produce sugar.¹⁴ Although this system of imports and exports had allowed Cuba to modernize and raise the standard of living and the quality of life for all residents, its dependence upon the Soviet Union and the agricultural focus on sugar production left the country extremely vulnerable should anything happen to its major trading partner.

Crisis

The first few years after the Soviet Union collapsed had a severe impact upon Cuba. The crisis was compounded by the U.S., which tightened its already stringent economic blockade. The U.S. economic sanctions increased the suffering of the Cuban people. Throughout the worst years of the crisis, 7,500 excess deaths per year can be directly attributed to the U.S. sanctions.¹⁵

Almost overnight, Cuba lost 85% of its trade. Fertilizer, pesticide and animal feed imports were reduced by 80%.¹⁶ Imports of fertilizer dropped from 1.3 million tons per year to 160,000 tons in 2001. Herbicide and pesticide imports dropped from a combined 27,000 tons to 1,900 tons in 2001.¹⁷ And petroleum supplies for agriculture were halved.¹⁸

from World Resources 2000-2001--People and Ecosystems: The fraying web of life.

http://www.wri.org/wr2000/pdf_final/wr2000.zip

Food imports (which had once accounted for 60% of the food consumed in Cuba) were also halved.¹⁹ And by 1994, agricultural production had dropped to 55% of the 1990 level.²⁰ Per capita daily caloric intake dropped from 2,908 calories in 1989 to 1,863 calories in 1995, a decrease of 36%. Protein intake decreased by 40%,²¹ and dietary fats dropped 65%.²² There are estimates that the average Cuban lost 20 pounds by 1994.²³ Undernourishment jumped from less than 5% to over 20%, the largest increase in undernourished people in all of Latin America during the 1990s.²⁴

Two government policies are credited with preventing the crisis from reaching emergency levels: food programs targeting particularly vulnerable populations (the elderly, children, and pregnant and lactating mothers), and the food distribution ration card which guaranteed a minimum food provision for every citizen (albeit greatly reduced from former levels). This government-maintained safety net kept the crisis from reaching depths comparable to North Korea, while giving the country breathing space to redesign its agricultural sector to meet the challenge.

The agrarian reforms of the mid-1990s were the key to recovering from the food crisis, but they could not have worked without the earlier agrarian reforms and without an educated and modernized peasantry unique in Latin America. The Cuban miracle is the product of a people with vision and solidarity.

The Cuban Miracle

The Cuban economy had to recover from the loss of its closest trading partner, the Soviet Union.

Cuban GNP has grown every year since 1995. There have been solid gains in employment, productivity and exports. Fruit production has returned to its 1989 level (and even surpassed it in the case of plantains). Vegetables and tubers for domestic consumption have seen a prodigious increase in production. Food intake has climbed to 2,473 calories and 51.6 grams per person, a 33% increase over caloric intake in 1994.²⁵ Observers the world over have pronounced the Cuban efforts a success. Single handedly, without help from either the World Bank or the IMF (and in total contrast to the normal World Bank and IMF reform policy), Cuba has disproved the myth that organic agriculture cannot support a modern nation. Agrarian reform in the 1990s centered on a new system of sustainable agriculture, the development of healthy markets, and the privatization and cooperatization of the unwieldy state farms.

For decades, scientists had been aware of the negative effects of industrialized agriculture. Soil erosion and mineral depletion had been a marked problem in Cuba. Before the crisis of the 1990s took place, scientists had already developed organic and ecological methods of farming. Following the crisis, the Cuban government embraced these new methods and promoted them with new agrarian policies.

The task was to convert the nation's agriculture from high input, fossil fuel-dependent farming, to low input, self-reliant farming. Farmers did this by first remembering the techniques that their ancestors had used before the advent of industrial agriculture--techniques like intercropping and manuring. Secondly, farmers used new environmental technologies offered as the result of scientific development--technologies such as biopesticides and biofertilizers. Biopesticides developed the use of microbes and natural enemies to combat pests, along with resistant plant varieties, crop rotation, and cover cropping to suppress weeds. Biofertilizers were developed using earthworms, compost, natural rock phosphate, animal manure and green manures, and the integration of grazing animals. To replace tractors, there was a return to animal traction.²⁶

Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPCs)

The large state farms were incompatible with this new paradigm. Agroecological farming simply does not work on a large farm. In industrial farming, a single technician can manage thousands of acres without intimate knowledge of the land he is overseeing. A few random observations will provide him with all the input he needs to write out instructions for the application of a particular fertilizer formula or pesticide to be applied with machinery over the entire area. However, in agroecological farming, the farmer must be intimately familiar with every patch of soil. The farmer must know where to add fertilizer, and where pests are harboring or entering the field. Smaller farms were easier to manage, and more compatible with sustainable agriculture.

In September 1993, the government instituted a new program to restructure state farms as private cooperatives owned and managed by the workers. These new cooperatives were called Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPCs). The new program transferred 41.2% of the arable land--most of the state farms in the country--into 2,007 new cooperatives with a membership totaling 122,000 people.²⁷ To link the workers to the land, the cooperative owned the production and a member's earnings were based on his or her share of the cooperative's income. Members are compensated based on their productivity, not their timesheet. This provides a greater incentive within the cooperative, yet allows the larger economies of scale, mechanization and collectivist spirit which the cooperatives offer.²⁸

Landholding in Rural Cuba in 1992 and 1997

from Cuba, Going Against the Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation; Chapter 3, Reforming Cuban Agriculture. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/cuba/reformingag.pdf

Although the government retains ownership of the land, the UBPCs are granted a free lease to the land. The government then contracts with the UBPCs on which crops to grow and the amounts. On the basis of these contracts, the government sells the necessary agricultural inputs to the UBPCs.

The new system has not been enacted without problems. Most notably, there is friction between the UBPCs and the local officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, who still behave as though they are in control of the cooperatives. However, the trend is clearly heading toward greater autonomy for the cooperatives.

Private Farming

The holdings of private farmers have also grown in the last decade. Since 1989, the government has turned over nearly 170,000 hectares of land to private farmers.²⁹ Although the government retains title to the land, private farmers and CPAs can farm the land rent-free for an indefinite period of time. Many Cubans now view farming as an opportunity. Many families have left the cities to become farmers. The ANAP claims that its membership expanded by 35,000 from 1997 to 2000.³⁰ The new farmers tend to be young families (many of them college educated), early retirees, or workers with a farming background.

The CCSs, made up of small, independent farmers, have outperformed the CPAs, the UBPC cooperatives and the state farms. And this achievement has come despite limited credit. As a result, the ANAP began a program in 1998 to strengthen the business side of the CCSs. CCS cooperatives are now allowed to open bank accounts, hire market representatives, and plan collectively. Once qualified as strengthened, a CCS gains the ownership of machinery and the ability to collectively market the goods of its members.³¹

Urban Agriculture

Another bright spot in the reforms is urban agriculture, though this originated as a spontaneous development that was later backed by official policy. Today, half of the produce consumed in Havana is grown in urban gardens. And urban gardens produce 60% of the vegetables consumed in all of Cuba. Urban gardens provide 215 grams of vegetables per day per person for the entire population.³²

Neighborhood gardens and community horticultural groups not only produce food for their members, they donate produce to schools, clinics and senior centers, and still have enough excess produce to sell in the neighborhood. Neighborhood markets sell produce at well below the cost of the larger community markets, providing fresh vegetables for those who cannot afford the higher prices. By the beginning of the year 2000, there were 505 vegetable stands functioning, with prices from 30% to 50% of the prices at farmers' markets.

Recognizing the potential of urban agriculture, in 1994 the government created an urban department in the ministry of Agriculture. The Urban Agriculture department formalized growers' claims upon vacant lots and legalized the growers' rights to sell their produce. The department has acted to support and promote urban agriculture without attempting to impose its authority upon the movement. Laws require that urban produce be completely organic, and ban the raising of livestock in urban areas. Resolution 527/97 provides all residents with up to one-third of an acre of vacant land on the edge of the major cities. By the beginning of the year 2000, more than 190,000 people had applied for and received these personal lots.³³ The government has also opened a number of neighborhood agricultural stores to supply organic inputs and extension services.

Gardeners are empowered by their efforts while working to provide food for themselves and their neighbors. As one urban gardener said, "We don't have to wait for a paternalistic state to do things for us. We can do it for ourselves."³⁴

There are many diverse forms of gardening, referred to collectively as urban gardening. The most common are organóponicos, which farm raised beds of organic material, utilizing biological pest control and organic fertilizer. Some organóponicos even have micro-jet irrigation and mesh shading. Organóponicos are highly productive, yielding anywhere from 6 to 30 kilograms of produce per square meter.³⁵

Agricultural Markets

In the month of October, 1994, the Cuban government opened 121 agricultural markets throughout the country.³⁶ An immediate consequence was that the black market in basic food items virtually disappeared. Food prices in the open market were a good deal less than the black market. The free markets also quickly demonstrated that they led to increased production and spurred higher quality and greater diversity in produce.

However, over time, supply and demand pricing did result in rising food prices. By the year 2000, food purchases could take up as much as 60% of the average Cuban salary. The poor and the elderly turned to urban vegetable stands offering produce from urban gardens.

Studies have shown that the major culprits in rising market prices were the distributors. The lack of fuel in Cuba has resulted in severe transportation shortages. The few people who did own trucks colluded to pay little to the farmers, and then charge high prices to the vendors. Some distributors have gained profits of as much as 75%.³⁷

To combat this problem, the Ministry of Agriculture is giving used trucks to private cooperatives to allow them to bypass the distributors and ship their goods directly to market. The remaining state farms are also selling their produce at low prices in state agricultural markets, in an effort to drive down prices. The experiment in free agricultural markets has shown that there must be some government controls on price gouging and collusion.

Results

Though caloric intake has not yet reached the levels of the 1980s, few would dispute that domestic food production in Cuba has made a remarkable recovery. During the 1996-1997 growing season, Cuba attained its highest ever production level for ten of the thirteen basic items in the Cuban diet.³⁸ And in 1999, agriculture production increased by 21% over the previous year.³⁹

·      Production of tubers and plantains more than tripled from 1994 to 1999.

·      Vegetable production doubled from 1994 to 1998, and then doubled again in 1999.

·      Potato production increased 175% from 1994 to 1998.

·      Cereal production rose 183% from 1994 to 1998.

·      Bean yields increased 60% from 1994 to 1999.

·      Citrus production increased 110% from 1994 to 1999.⁴⁰

Comparing food production to 1989 levels is not quite so favorable, but still impressive.

from Cuba, Going Against the Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation

http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/cuba/newmodel.pdf

Animal protein production still remains close to depressed 1994 levels. This is partially because the market reforms do not apply to meat, eggs and milk, which are not easily sold in farmers' markets. Likewise, the agroecological model is not so easily applied to animal production. But the biggest factor keeping animal protein production down is the fact that the transition from industrial animal breeding to sustainable, ecologically feasible animal breeding must proceed at a much slower pace than the similar transition in agriculture.

Exports are still considerably lower than 1989 levels. Only citrus exports have reached the 1989 level. Coffee and tobacco exports still lag behind, and sugar exports are only a fraction of 1989 levels.⁴¹ In the case of sugar production, U.S. embargoes and the low price of sugar on the world market are acting to keep sugar production depressed. But the Cuban government is formulating plans to increase sugar exports in the effort of bringing in much needed foreign revenue and investment.

Aside from restoring export levels and animal protein production, the future of the new Cuban agricultural model faces three challenges: reconciling price distortions between the U.S. dollar and the Cuban peso, reconciling state control and private initiatives, and overcoming limits to the ecological model. Concerning this latter challenge, agroecological farming requires more land and more labor than industrial farming. While Cuba does have the land base to continue agricultural expansion, rural areas have experienced a labor shortage. Only 15% of the Cuban population lives in the countryside.⁴² The agricultural sector has been able to reverse the rural-to-urban migration and attract the necessary workforce, but nobody is certain how long this reversal will continue. And then there is the uncertain balance between farm labor requirements, the higher caloric intake necessary for busy farmhands, and agricultural production.

The new Cuban model of agriculture faces many challenges, both internally and externally, but that does not diminish its current success. And there are many analysts who feel that the Cuban experiment may hold many of the keys to the future survival of civilization.

Conclusion

The World Bank has reported that Cuba is leading nearly every other developing nation in human development performance. Because Cuba's agricultural model goes against the grain of orthodox economic thought, the World Bank has called Cuba the "anti-model." Senior World Bank officials have even suggested that other developing countries should take a closer look at Cuba.⁴³ This despite that fact that the Cuban model flies in the face of the neoliberal reforms prescribed by both the World Bank and the IMF.

Indeed, currently the fastest growing Cuban export is that of ideas. Cuba now hosts a number of visiting farmers and agricultural technicians from throughout the Americas (excluding the U.S.), and elsewhere. Cuban agriculture experts are currently teaching agroecological farming methods to Haitian farmers. Ecologists as well as agricultural specialists are finding great promise in the idea that biodiversity is not just a conservation strategy, but production strategy.

As declining fossil fuel production impacts civilization, Cuba may find itself in a position to help lead the world into sustainable agriculture. Currently, few countries are willing to invest in human capital and infrastructure the way that Cuba has, but hopefully this will change in the years ahead.

Resistance to Cuban-style agricultural reform would be particularly stiff in the United States. Agribusiness will not allow all of its holdings and power to be expropriated. Nor is the U.S. government interested in small farms and organic agriculture. The direction of U.S. agriculture is currently towards more advanced technology, greater fossil fuel dependency, and less sustainability. The ability of small farmers and urban gardens to turn a profit is effectively drowned out by the overproduction of agribusiness.

However, now is the time for people to study agroecology (and permaculture as well), with an eye towards implementing this technology, once declining fossil fuel production sparks a crisis in industrial agriculture. Our survival will depend upon our ability to implement these ideas once the current technology has failed. The North Korean example shows that the alternative is unthinkable.

--------

¹ Cuba, Going Against the Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation; Chapter 3, Reforming Cuban Agriculture, Sinclair, M., and Thompson, M. Oxfam America Report, June 2001. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/cuba/reformingag.pdf

² Cuba: a Successful Case Study of Sustainable Agriculture, Rosset, P. M. Chapter 12, pp 203-213, in Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment. Editors: Magdoff, F., et. al. Monthly Press Review, 2000. http://www.foodfirst.org/cuba/success.html

³ Op. Cit. See note 1.

⁴ Cuba, Going Against the Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation; Chapter 2, Cuba's Distinction: Land Reform and a Modernized Peasantry, Sinclair, M., and Thompson, M. Oxfam America Report, June 2001. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/cuba/distinction.pdf

⁵ Household Incomes in Cuban Agriculture: A Comparison of the State, Co-operative and Peasant Sectors, Deer, C. D., et al. In Development and Change, Vol. 26. Blackwell Publishers, 1995.

⁶ Op. Cit. See note 4.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² World Resources 2000-2001--People and Ecosystems: The fraying web of life. Prepared by The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The World Bank, and The World Resources Institute. UNDP, September 2000. http://www.wri.org/wr2000/pdf_final/wr2000.zip

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Cuba, Going Against the Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation; Chapter 1, The Food Crisis in Cuba, Sinclair, M., and Thompson, M. Oxfam America Report, June 2001. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/cuba/foodcrisis.pdf

¹⁶ Op. Cit. See note 12.

¹⁷ Op. Cit. See note 15.

¹⁸ Op. Cit. See note 12.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Op. Cit. See note 15.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Op. Cit. See note 12.

²³ Op. Cit. See note 15.

²⁴ Op. Cit. See note 12.

²⁵ Cuba, Going Against the Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation; Chapter 3, Reforming Cuban Agriculture, Sinclair, M., and Thompson, M. Oxfam America Report, June 2001. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/cuba/reformingag.pdf

²⁶ Op Cit. See note 12.

²⁷ Op. Cit. See note 25.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Op. Cit. See note 12.

³⁹ Cuba, Going Against the Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation; Chapter 4, a New Model of Cuban Agriculture, Sinclair, M., and Thompson, M. Oxfam America Report, June 2001. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/cuba/newmodel.pdf

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ "Learn from Cuba," Says the World Bank. Interpress Service, 5/1/2001.

 

 

 

Hauliers plan Grangemouth protest
Lorry drivers in Scotland plan to stage a protest over fuel costs outside the Grangemouth oil refinery. The Road Haulage Association (RHA) said the demonstration, which is expected to take place before the weekend, would be "entirely lawful". "We do not condone the blockading of any oil refinery," said RHA chief executive Roger King. Almost five years ago blockades were set up around oil refineries in protest at the high cost of fuel. The RHA said global prices had risen and the UK's fuel duty levels remained exceptionally high. Hauliers are also worried about the European road transport directive which came into effect this month. This limits the amount of time they can work. They claim it is putting too much pressure on them because they cannot complete their jobs within the time constraints. Lorry drivers said it was especially difficult for Scottish hauliers, who are further away from European markets, to meet deadlines. This factor could lead to companies relocating to England, they warned. The decision to go ahead with a picket outside Grangemouth was taken at a meeting on Tuesday evening. 'Verge of collapse' RHA senior vice-chairman Willie Oliver said: "There was a lot of anger present in that room. "There were a lot of hauliers who see their businesses on the verge of collapse." Mr King said that RHA members would be contacted on Wednesday about the planned protest. "We do not want to see trucks used in this particular case - only individuals," he said. "It is our lawful right to highlight in as many ways as we can the particular situation facing road hauliers in the UK." He also urged the Scottish Parliament to set up a commission to report on the state of Scotland's road haulage industry. CBI Scotland said it was sympathetic, but warned against blockades. Director Iain MacMillan said: "If goods can't get to our supermarkets and the supply chain grinds to a halt that would cause the business community in Scotland and the public very considerable harm." The chairman of Transform Scotland, which campaigns for sustainable transport policies, said the hauliers' complaints were a "red herring". David Spaven said: "If you look at the tax burden as a whole Britain is not a lot different from the rest of Europe." He said he felt sorry for the hauliers - but that he did not have a great deal of sympathy for a fuel price protest. "We are effectively leaving the era of cheap oil and entering the era of expensive oil," he added. "That is a global phenomenon and mucking around with a few taxes here and there will not confront the really big problems coming up. We need drastic action."

 

THE TIMES Tuesday

 

 

 

Race for pumps as fuel protesters take to road By Valerie Elliott, Consumer Editor

A PICKET of more than 50 vehicles was positioned outside two oil refineries in West Wales last night to protest against high fuel prices. Alan Greene, the chairman of the South West Wales Road Hauliers Association, said that he was hoping that the protest would last for a couple of days. “It’s a not a flash in the pan,” he said after arriving at the Texaco refinery in Pembroke. Other protesters were making for the Elf refinery at Milford Haven. “We’re going to park up and we’re going to talk to the tanker drivers and see if they will talk to us,” he said. Protesters were “independent people who are struggling to keep their taxis and their coaches on the road”, he said, and there had been support from members of the public as he had driven past them. Dyfed-Powys Police said that the drivers of 35 lorries and about 12 cars had congregated at Cross Hands at the end of the M4 before heading west. Hardliners at the meeting pressed for protests outside food distribution centres but were voted down. A separate group of Welsh hauliers is planning to park vehicles outside the main oil distribution plant in Cardiff. Motorists in Hampshire plan to join the protest with a go-slow to coincide with the rush hour early this morning. Three separate convoys will slow down to 40 mph on minor routes and 50 mph on the M27 motorway. In other parts of the country motorists were rushing to fill their tanks last night as fears grew of a new protest similar to the one that threatened to bring the country to a standstill five years ago. In Cheshire militant farmers gathered at the Stanlow oil refinery and other hauliers took sporadic action across the country. The Road Haulage Association reported that some hauliers had said that protests were likely at the Fawley refinery near Southampton and a fuel distribution centre at Purfleet, Essex. Some farmers in Somerset were also reported to be heading for Avonmouth, and Scottish haulage and construction workers were planning to gather at Grangemouth. There is anger among small and medium-size haulage firms that the leading supermarkets, which own fleets of vehicles, have failed to use their influence to lobby the Government over the high duty on fuel. The action coincided with a further rise in the price of a barrel of crude oil, to $55.82 (£29.21), in New York, though that figure is below the record $58.28 a barrel recorded at the beginning of the month. The average cost of petrol at British forecourts rose 4p a litre over the past month to stand at 85.92p a litre yesterday, according to the AA. Diesel was 90.03p a litre — well above the 84.2p level that sparked the last fuel protests of five years ago. The organisation appealed to motorists to stay calm and not to repeat the panic buying of petrol of five years ago. The Department of Trade and Industry confirmed that it was monitoring the situation but that ministers had not signed emergency measures to call in troops to drive tankers, to give priority for petrol to key workers such as doctors and nurses, or for other motorists to be subject to petrol rationing. Leading figures in the haulage industry insisted that they had no intention of holding the country to ransom or of interrupting petrol supplies and bringing chaos to the nation. Sources confirmed, however, that the decision by the farmers’ group to protest at Stanlow and park heavy farm equipment and tractors near the Shell plant had changed the mood among some people. The original plan by hauliers was to await the outcome of an emergency meeting of the hauliers’ association in Edinburgh tonight, where leading members and officials are to approve a plan of action. One option under discussion is to liaise with police to organise peaceful demonstrations and convoys of lorries in town centres, or for small groups of protesters to mount pickets outside refineries. Roger King, the association’s chief executive, said: “We are asking the political parties to introduce a new fuel duty regulator, so that if world prices go up duty is reduced. We would like to see 4p or 5p off the cost of a litre.” Last night about 20 farmers were still outside Stanlow after starting their action at 5am.

 

 

Times Saturday

 

Troops ready to keep fuel flowing if protests start By Valerie Elliott and Gary Duncan

MILITARY drivers are on standby to move into refineries and keep fuel flowing in the event of oil workers or tanker drivers joining any new protests over the price of fuel. Ministers and senior officials in Whitehall are on an emergency footing in case of trouble and are monitoring the latest threats of protest from hauliers, farmers and ordinary motorists. Police and oil industry figures are also on alert for a stand-off at main refineries. About 1,000 soldiers were taught to drive tankers five years ago during the last fuel protests and can be deployed if necessary. A spokesman for the Department of Trade and Industry confirmed that the Government, police and oil industry were on alert to cope with the possible resumption of fuel protests. Officials have dusted down the contingency plan to deal with fuel protests as it emerged yesterday that British petrol prices recorded their highest market-driven increase in recent history, rising 4p between March and April to an average 86 pence per litre. Diesel fuel rose by 3.5p a litre to a monthly average of 90.1p a litre, equivalent to nearly £4.10 a gallon, according to the AA Motoring Trust. These prices are higher than those at the time of the fuel protests of 2000. Road haulage industry sources said last night that protesters did not wish to start blockades or hold the country to ransom. The aim is to drive home to ministers the high cost of diesel in this country compared with the Continent and the fact that many firms are on the brink of collapse. Meetings are being sought with treasury and transport ministers and a national petition is being drawn up on a website — www.findcheappetrol.com — to be handed to Tony Blair, Michael Howard and Charles Kennedy, the main party leaders, on May 3. The haulage industry wants a cut of at least 17p on the duty of a litre of unleaded petrol and 26p off a litre of diesel to bring British prices in line with the Continent. More than 230 people met in Stirling last night to decide on precise action. Speaking after the event at a hotel in Bannockburn, Road Haulage Association member Jim Macauley said there would be no militant action. “One of the proposals involves protesting during the G8 Summit,” he said. Further meetings are planned next week and a firm decision on a form of protest may be announced on Tuesday. One suggestion is for the entire industry to down tools for a day. Hauliers are also attempting to gain support from tanker drivers, of which 3,000 are members of the Transport and General Workers’ Union. A union spokesman denied last night that any contact had been made between the union and the fuel protesters. He said that many union members who drove tankers still had bitter memories from the 2000 protest, when they were vilified and abused by protesters. The union accepted that there was a groundswell of opinion among many individual lorry owners and drivers that fuel prices were too high. The AA Motoring Trust is backing the campaign for lower duties on fuel. The surge in petrol prices is also inflaming concerns over the economy. The price gains come on the back of the leap in the cost of crude oil, which presently stands just below the record levels set at the start of this month.

 

Just something I came across relating to below.

 

‘Knowledge it’s self may not be degradable but the ability to apply that knowledge in practice will.’

 

Norman

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Tooke [mailto:mike.tooke@...]
Sent: 06 April 2005 09:22
To: Entropy-UK@...
Subject: Re: [Entropy-UK] Re: Life after Oil

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Norman

To: Entropy-UK@...

Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2005 6:08 PM

Subject: RE: [Entropy-UK] Re: Life after Oil

 

I must agree with you Mike.

I only add one comment in relation to knowledge.

 

That is the time equation with regard to the sharing and learning of that knowledge. Even if stored in books, it not only takes time to read and digest, then to practice and learn. This obviously equates with teaching which would probably be lost, to what degree we do not know, with the on set of a dark age. Also the problem of storage of such books to stop deterioration of the books. On top of this the need to teach the three ‘R’s’  plus of course a whole load of new survival skills, and I am not talking about ‘Rambo’ stuff.

 

Norman

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Tooke [mailto:mike.tooke@...]
Sent: 05 April 2005 09:28
To: Entropy-UK@...
Subject: Re: [Entropy-UK] Re: Life after Oil

 

The difficulty of these forward projections is that it is not possible to predict what technology will be in use in the future.  If we experience wholesale collapse of the entire culture, economic systems, political systems etc then there would probably be a new 'dark ages' during which time a very large proportion of current knowledge would be lost.  Not just because knowledge is now held in electronic forms - but also because knowledge is in people's heads, in the business and organisational systems that currently exist, and all require the culture and society to support the means of passing that knowledge on.

 

However this is the worst case.  A collapse would result in the loss of knowledge - that is inevitable.  But it doesn't necessarily mean the loss of everything.  Whether the ability to continue with fusion research (at least the hugely expensive ITER project) would remain is a moot point.  However it seems likely that of the immense amount of skill and knowledge in the World today something is going to survive.  The more that survives the higher the carrying capacity of the World (within reason).

 

For example the knowledge about how to get the most out of organic farming methods, how to build (say) Sterling Engines, herbal medicine and basic essential medical techniques, essential health information, basic issues on abstracting and treating both drinking water and handling waste water.  It is possible to envisage a set of pretty basic technologies that would allow a higher level of sustainance.  If, by some miracle, someone develops a form of fusion in the next 50 years then it is very difficult to make any projections.  I rather hope to live to see this happen but am rather afraid I won't !

 

Mike

----- Original Message -----

From: shimei123

To: Entropy-UK@...

Sent: Monday, April 04, 2005 11:04 PM

Subject: [Entropy-UK] Re: Life after Oil

 

--- In Entropy-UK@..., "Norman" <norman@n...> wrote:
> This item from ASPO's latest newsletter #52 (now available at
> http://peakoil.net/) caught my attention.
>
> Note how pre-industrial England had a population of SIX million, and
> that whilst it did occasionally rise in good times, it alway fell
> back to that number whenthings got worse. This leads me to think it
is
> probably the 'natural' carrying capacity.... and certainly NOT the
> current 60 million. 
>
> 

By 2150, I think other talked about sources of energy should be
online such as nuclear fusion rednering this scenario less likely.

Roland.

www.newerainvestor.com for peak oil investing