WHY THE WORLD HATES AMERICA
THE CURRENT STATE AMERICA
Circuit Judge Roberts, who reviewed issues in these matters, and later sat on the United States Circuit Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia, later yet sits
today on the United States Supreme Court is very revealing, regardless of the details of the quaint rationale, and logic which was used as an excuse to justify his mindset which is so typical of tyrants, and dictators.
The American courts which expects a certain measure of comity, in regards to American law, they base on it grand sense of "logic", that (1) directly affects the jurisprudence of all countries on major issues of the day, which that judge and American Jurisprudence most often has decided with the most senseless, brainless, naive, stupid, pretentious, improper of means:
That the world most often can clearly see as the travesty it is when America's system of justice, and leaders are judged by what they decide on the most basic levels, where most often there is no money available to represent the poor, the under-privileged, and the lower economic classes of a society at war with a world, that begins by claiming it is always better, gentler, kinder, most just, most fair, and of course best country in the world:
When from those decisions insight is derived into how the American "leadership (sic) Democrat, and Republican, will decide the larger greater issues of war, peace, progress, heaven, hell, language, truth, and justice.
Typical people before the courts in the US
- infringe on the dignity of the court
- act in contempt of court
Typical courts are supposed to have
the appearances of propriety that allows decisions of those courts to stand as dignified impartial bodies, which can be depended upon as being fair, just, and good, based on some measure of truth and fairness.
What Justice Roberts starts with what I describe as insincere "crocodile tears” in his saying:
“No one is very happy about the events that led to this litigation. A twelve-year-old girl was arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were removed, and she was transported in the windowless rear compartment of a police vehicle to a juvenile processing center, where she was booked, fingerprinted, and detained until released to her mother some three hours later — all for eating a single French fry in a Metrorail station. The child was frightened, embarrassed, and crying throughout the or-deal. The district court described the policies that led to her arrest as ‘‘foolish,’’ and indeed the policies were changed after those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for adults who make young girls cry. The question before us, however, is not whether these policies were a bad idea, but whether they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Like the district court,
we conclude that hey did not, and accordingly we affirm.”
The full body of the decision of that court:
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Argued September 17, 2004
Decided October 26, 2004
No. 03-7149
T
RACEY
V. H
EDGEPETH, AS THE NEXT FRIEND TO
A
NSCHE
H
EDGEPETH,
A
PPELLANT
v.
W
ASHINGTON
M
ETROPOLITAN
A
REA
T
RANSIT
A
UTHORITY, ET AL.,
A
PPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 01cv00759)
Brian C. Duffy argued the cause for appellant. With him
on the briefs were Randal M. Shaheen and Jonathan S.
Batten.
Donna M. Murasky, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of
Attorney General for the District of Columbia
cause for appellee the District of Columbia
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
brief were Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General, and
Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General.
Gerard J. Stief, Associate General Counsel , Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, argued the cause for
appellees Washington
et al. With him on the brief were Cheryl C. Burke, General
Counsel, and Mark F. Sullivan, Deputy General Counsel.
Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General Counsel, entered an appear-
ance.
Before: H
ENDERSON
and R
OBERTS
, Circuit Judges, and
W
ILLIAMS
, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge R
OBERTS
.
R
OBERTS
, Circuit Judge: No one is very happy about the
events that led to this litigation. A twelve-year-old girl was
arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were
removed, and she was transported in the
windowless rear
compartment of a police vehicle to a juvenile processing
center, where she was booked, fingerprinted, and detained
until released to her mother some three hours later — all for
eating a single french fry in a Metrorail station. The child
was frightened, embarrassed, and crying throughout the or-
deal. The district court described the policies that led to her
arrest as ‘‘foolish,’’ and indeed the policies were changed after
those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for
adults who make young girls cry. The
question before us,
however, is not whether these policies were a bad idea, but
whether they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution. Like the district court, we conclude that
they did not, and accordingly we affirm.
I.
It was the start of another school year and the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) was once
again getting complaints about bad behavior by students
using the Tenleytown/American University Metrorail station.
In response WMATA embarked on a week-long undercover
operation to enforce a ‘‘zero-tolerance’’ policy with respect to
3
violations of certain ordinances, including one that makes it
unlawful for any person to eat or drink in a Metrorail station.
D.C. C
ODE
§ 35-251(b) (2001). ‘‘Zero tolerance’’ had more
fateful consequences for children than for adults. Adults who
violate § 35-251(b) typically receive a citation subjecting them
to a fine of $10 to $50. Id. District of
Columbia
law, however, does not provide for the issuance of citations
for non-traffic offenses to those under eighteen years of age.
Instead, a minor who has committed what an officer has
reasonable grounds to believe is a ‘‘delinquent act’’ ‘‘may
be
taken into custody.’’ Id.
offense under District of Columbia
Metrorail station, constitutes a ‘‘delinquent act.’’ Id.
2301(7). The upshot of all this is that zero-tolerance enforce-
ment of § 35-251(b) entailed the arrest of every offending
minor but not every offending adult.
The undercover operation was in effect on October 23,
2000, when twelve-year-old Ansche Hedgepeth and a class-
mate entered the Tenleytown/AU station on their way home
from school. Ansche had stopped at a fast-food restaurant
on
the way and ordered a bag of french fries — to go. While
waiting for her companion to purchase a fare-card, Ansche
removed and ate a french fry from the take-out bag she was
holding. After proceeding through the fare-gate, Ansche was
stopped by a plainclothed Metro Transit Police officer, who
identified himself and informed her that he was arresting her
for eating in the Metrorail station. The officer then hand-
cuffed Ansche behind her back while another officer searched
her and her backpack. Pursuant to established
procedure,
her shoelaces were removed. Upset and crying, Ansche was
transported to the District of Columbia
Center some distance away, where she was fingerprinted and
processed before being released into the custody of her
mother three hours later.
The no-citation policy was not, it turned out, carved in
stone. The negative publicity surrounding Ansche’s arrest
prompted WMATA to adopt a new policy effective January
31, 2001, allowing WMATA officers to issue citations to
juveniles violating § 35-251(b). See Deposition of Capt. Mi-
4
chael Taborn at 28, 55. Zero tolerance was also not a policy
for the ages. Effective May 8,
2001 , WMATA adopted a new
Written Warning Notice Program, under which juveniles
eating in the Metro are neither arrested nor issued citations,
but instead given written warnings, with a letter notifying
their parents and school. Only after the third infraction
over
the course of a year may a juvenile be formally prosecuted.
WMATA Written Notice Memorandum at 1–4.
On April 9, 2001 , Ansche’s mother Tracey Hedgepeth
brought this action as Ansche’s next friend in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia
complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and named
WMATA, its General Manager, the arresting officer, and
the
arrest violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment, because adults eating in the Metro were not
arrested. The complaint also alleged that the arrest was
an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
enforcement policies leading to Ansche’s arrest, and expunge-
ment of Ansche’s arrest record.
1
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
ruled in favor of the defendants. Hedgepeth v. Washington
Metro Area Transit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (D.D.C. 2003).
Addressing the equal protection claim, the court applied ‘‘the
highly deferential rational basis test,’’ id. at 156, because it
found that age is not a suspect class, id. at 152–53, and that
there is no fundamental right to be free from physical re-
straint when there is probable cause for arrest. Id.
The court then ruled that both the District’s no-citation policy
for minors and WMATA’s zero-tolerance policy survived ra-
tional basis review. Id.
rejected Ansche’s Fourth Amendment claim, relying on Atwa-
ter v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), for the
1
The complaint also sought damages from the arresting officer in
his individual capacity. That claim has been dismissed and is not
before us on appeal.
5
proposition that ‘‘ ‘[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender.’ ’’ 284 F. Supp. 2d at 160
(quoting Atwater U.S.
puted that Ansche had committed the offense in the presence
of the arresting officer, the district court concluded it was
‘‘without discretion or authority to reject the standards enun-
ciated’’ in Atwater
and the harshness of the response. 284 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
Hedgepeth now appeals.
II.
We are confronted at the outset with two jurisdictional
objections.
First, Ansche’s complaint seeks only prospective
relief,
2
and — even in the absence of WMATA’s change in
policy — we are not willing to indulge the assumption that
she will violate D.C. C
ODE
§ 35-251(b) in the future and
thereby again be subject to the policies about which she
complains. This suggests the lack of an ongoing case or
controversy under Article III. See City Los Angeles
procedure lacked standing to seek prospective relief because
2
At several points in the proceedings, plaintiff’s counsel referred
to a request for damages from the District. See, e.g., Transcript of
Second Amended Complaint, however, contains no such demand.
While that complaint concludes with the standard request for ‘‘such
other relief TTT as this Court deems just and proper,’’ id. at 7,
and
while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides that a court
shall award a party relief to which it is entitled even if the party has
not demanded it, the law is settled in this circuit that ‘‘Rule 54(c)
‘comes into play only after the court determines
it has jurisdic-
tion.’ ’’ NAACP, Jefferson County Branch United States
Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Dellums v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 863 F.2d 968, 975 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). Accordingly, even if damages could be awarded pursuant to
judicial discretion under Rule 54(c), the possible availability of such
relief would not establish standing or defeat mootness objections.
6
he made no showing that he was likely to be arrested and
subjected to illegal procedure again); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (‘‘Past exposure to illegal conduct
does not in itself show a present case or controversy regard-
ing injunctive relief’’).
Second, WMATA argues that its new policy for juvenile
offenders renders the case moot. There is no need for the
court to assess the legality of the policy to which Ansche was
subjected, WMATA argues, because that policy — a combina-
tion of a no-citation rule for minors and zero-tolerance en-
forcement — is no longer in effect.
The answer to both objections is found in the precise relief
sought by Ansche. In the complaint, Ansche sought not only
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the no-
citation and zero-tolerance policies, but also the expungement
of her arrest record. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 32(c). She
clarified in her summary judgment papers that this last
request included a judicial declaration deeming her allegedly
unlawful arrest a ‘‘detention.’’ See Memorandum in Support
of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Feb. 21, 2003 ) at 23.
Such an order would relieve Ansche of the burden of having
to respond affirmatively to the familiar question, ‘‘Ever been
arrested?’’ on application, employment, and security forms.
This court has approved such relief in the past. See Carter v.
Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Ansche accordingly has Article III standing, and her effort to
secure such relief has in no way been affected by WMATA’s
policy change.
3
3
WMATA also argues that, as a state-level governmental
entity
with sovereign immunity, it is not a ‘‘person’’ subject to liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S.
a defendant WMATA’s General Manager in his official capacity, and
‘‘[o]f course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued
for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State.’ ’’ Id. Kentucky
Graham, 473
U.S.
7
This action is justiciable with respect to both the District of
other, Ansche alleges that neither defendant’s policies alone
would suffice to cause the alleged violation: but for
WMATA’s zero-tolerance policy, there likely would have been
no enforcement of § 35-251(b) against Ansche; but for the
fact that
District of Columbia
to minors, the zero-tolerance enforcement of § 35-251(b)
would not have required Ansche’s arrest.
4
Cf.
Machesney v.
Larry Bruni, 905 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (D.D.C. 1995) (‘‘ordi-
narily when two tortfeasors jointly contribute to harm to a
plaintiff, both are potentially liable to the injured party for
the entire harm’’) (internal quotation marks omitted).
By the same token, it appears that both WMATA and the
District would be implicated in the relief that confers stand-
ing and defeats mootness. Ansche was arrested by a
WMATA officer and detained and processed in a District
facility. Records concerning the episode have been generat-
ed by both WMATA and the District. See Transit Police
Event Report at J.A. 304–07; Metropolitan Police Dept.
Delinquency Report at J.A. 308–09. If redress in the form of
an order
of expungement and a declaration that Ansche’s
arrest was a detention were appropriate, such an order would
properly run against both WMATA and the District.
III.
Ansche first contends that her arrest violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
Metrorail station during the undercover operation could be,
and almost uniformly were, given citations; similarly situated
4
It would be inaccurate to refer to the District’s law as one of
‘‘mandatory arrest.’’ The statute itself says a minor violating the
law ‘‘may be taken into custody.’’ D.C. C
ODE
§ 16-2309(a)(2) (2001)
(emphasis added). A plain reading of this statute allows an officer
discretion to warn or even to look the other way. The arrest
provision only becomes mandatory when paired with a zero-
tolerance enforcement policy.
8
minors could only be and were subjected to the far more
intrusive invasion of arrest. During zero-tolerance week,
twenty-four adults violating § 35-251(b) at WMATA facilities
were issued citations, whereas fourteen juveniles were arrest-
ed. WMATA’s Answers to Interrogatories at 7.
The first step in analyzing Ansche’s claim that this dispa-
rate treatment violated equal protection is to determine the
proper level of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny demands that classi-
fications be narrowly targeted to serve compelling state inter-
ests and is reserved for suspect classifications or classifica-
tions that burden fundamental rights. Intermediate scrutiny
requires that classifications be substantially related to impor-
tant governmental interests; it is
applied to so-called ‘‘quasi-
suspect’’ classifications. Under rational basis review, a classi-
fication need only be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental interest. See Kimel v. Florida
Ansche argues for heightened scrutiny — strict scrutiny or,
more plausibly, intermediate scrutiny — for two distinct
reasons: first, classifications based on status as a minor
are
‘‘quasi-suspect’’; and second, her arrest burdened her funda-
mental right to be free of physical restraint by the govern-
ment. The district court correctly held that neither theory
supported heightened scrutiny.
A.
Ansche acknowledges that the Supreme Court ‘‘has said
repeatedly that age is not a suspect classification,’’ Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
has analyzed equal protection challenges to age-based classifi-
cations under rational basis review. She argues that those
cases are distinguishable, however, because they concerned
classifications discriminating against the elderly, as
opposed
to the young. Youth, according to Ansche, bears many of the
hallmarks of a suspect classification: a history of discrimina-
tion, immutable characteristics, and political disenfranchise-
ment. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S.
she concludes, there should be heightened scrutiny of distinc-
9
tions burdening the young, even if there generally is not of
distinctions based on age.
This court has noted in passing that youth is not a suspect
classification. See United States
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc); see also Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion). Other circuits have reviewed classifica-
tions based on youth under a rational basis standard. See
Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1990);
Douglas v.
Stallings, 870 F.2d 1242, 1247 (7th Cir. 1989); Williams v.
City of Lewiston
the conclusions of these circuits.
Although Ansche is correct that the Supreme Court cases
applying rational basis review to classifications based on age
all involved classifications burdening the elderly, see Ramos
v.
Town of Vernon
presented us with no persuasive reasons to conclude that
classifications burdening children should be treated different-
ly. Heightened scrutiny is reserved for classifications based
on factors that ‘‘are so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipa-
thy.’’ City of Cleburne
is quite often relevant to valid state concerns, as the Constitu-
tion itself attests. See U.S.
ONST
. art. I, § 2 (minimum age
for House of Representatives); id. § 3 (minimum age for
Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (minimum age for President). Mini-
mum age requirements for voting, marriage, driving, drink-
ing, employment, and the like cannot be dismissed as reflect-
ing ‘‘prejudice and antipathy’’ toward the young. Youth is
not ‘‘so seldom relevant’’ to legitimate state concerns that we
should assume that any law singling out the young is proba-
bly the result of anti-youth animus. Youth is more often
relevant than old age, which we know does not trigger
heightened scrutiny.
Nor are the characteristics that define the young
markedly
more obvious or distinguishing than those that define the old.
10
In fact, the characteristics are simply opposite sides of the
same coin — age. Youth is also far less ‘‘immutable’’ than old
age: minors mature to majority and literally outgrow
their
prior status; the old can but grow more so.
Ansche does point to one relevant difference between old
age and youth: political power. Older Americans can vote;
children cannot. A finding of ‘‘political powerless[ness],’’
Lyng, 477 U.S.
terms of voting rights, is not enough to trigger heightened
scrutiny. Compare City of Cleburne, 473 U.S.
ing rational basis scrutiny to distinctions based on mental
retardation) with id. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (observing that in most states the
mentally retarded cannot vote). Political powerlessness is
also not measured solely in terms of access to the ballot box,
for the broad array of laws and government programs dedi-
cated to protecting and nurturing children — combined with
the large numbers of voters who are parents or otherwise
concerned about children — belies the argument that
children
and their needs cannot attract the attention of the legislature.
See id. at 445. We are rightly skeptical of paternalistic
arguments when it comes to classifications addressing adults,
see, e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982), but the concern that the state not
treat adults like children surely does not prevent it from
treating children like children. WMATA’s haste to abandon
its challenged policy in the wake of adverse publicity confirms
that the interests of children are not lightly ignored by the
political process.
For all these reasons, we conclude that classifications based
on youth — like those based on age in general — do not
trigger heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes.
B.
Ansche alternatively argues that her equal protection claim
is subject to heightened scrutiny because the challenged
classification burdens a fundamental right. It has been point-
ed out often enough that, in considering such a claim,
much
11
turns on the level of generality at which the asserted funda-
mental right is defined. Compare Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538
(plurality opinion) (‘‘We think that juveniles do not have a
fundamental right to be on the streets at night without
adult
supervision.’’) with id. at 557 (Rogers, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (‘‘the contested right should be de-
fined more abstractly TTT first without regard to age, and
second without regard to the manner in which it is exer-
cised’’).
Ansche defines the right at issue as the right to freedom
from restraint, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
(2001) and Foucha v. Louisiana U.S.
(plurality opinion), a right burdened by the defendants’ poli-
cies compelling the arrest of minors for trivial offenses. The
defendants, not
surprisingly, define the right at issue far
more narrowly: for the defendants, the asserted right is the
right of a minor to be free from arrest when there is probable
cause, if the arrest is pursuant to a policy that precludes less
intrusive enforcement options. See
District Br.
id. at 12 (alternatively defining right as the right to eat within
the public transit
system).
We think the proper degree of generality lies somewhere
between the two extremes offered by the parties. Like the
district court, we think the right at issue in this case is the
right of freedom of movement when there is probable cause
for arrest. Unlike the defendants’ proposal, this definition
does not depend on the challenged classification — minority
status — itself. Unlike the plaintiff’s proposal, it does not
ignore the plainly pertinent fact that we are dealing with a
conceded violation of a valid law, a fact that
historically has
carried implications for the asserted right of free movement.
The plaintiff goes so far as to cite the Magna Carta in
claiming the fundamental freedom against ‘‘being taken [or]
imprisoned,’’ see Reply Br. 6 (quoting M
AGNA
C
ARTA
, ch. 39),
but the very same provision of that historic charter recog-
nized an exception when the restraint on freedom was pursu-
ant to ‘‘the law of the land.’’ M
AGNA
C
ARTA
, ch. 39.
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