THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONSTRUCTIVISM: A CALL FOR YOUR OPINIONS
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�gNot only the ways and means of problem
solutions are subject to the scientific
style, but also, and to an ever greater
extent, the choice of problems.�h
L. Fleck(*)


So I wonder: is the answer of a problem subject
to the scientific style too?


I have done some reading on the epistemology of constructivism and
now have some uncertainties regarding the validity of the theory in
question, both as a philosophical construct and a learning theory.
More precisely, I would like to discuss the epistemological
background of constructivism in order to illustrate that
philosophical claims are often made in education without an
intellectual support of their validity in the actual teaching act.

I realised that I had some very misleading conceptions in terms of
the constructivist practice in education and almost no awareness of
its epistemological groundwork. Almost all the didactics courses
during my Bachelor�fs Degree referred to constructivism without any
explicit epistemological examination, and without any mention of the
heated debate around it. On the contrary, constructivism was oft-
portrayed as a highly moral learning theory that takes into
consideration the individual differences and interests, the
students�f prior knowledge, cares for ideas and personal theories,
self-esteem, and is overall a very democratic teaching approach. Is
it possible that we had been taught a distorted form
of �gconstructivism�h, in such a way so as not to cast shadows of
confusion and doubt upon us, the young teachers?

Through my independent studies I learned that constructivism is the
combination of two Kantian ideas. First, that we make the known
world by imposing concepts and; second, that the independent world
is ever-beyond our ken. The equivalent pedagogical notions are the
non-transferability of knowledge, and the subjectivity of knowledge.
In other words, knowledge is not the representation of an observer-
independent world-in-itself, and therefore cannot and should not be
transferred from the teacher to the student. This is the sine qua
none of constructivism. Obviously, I am not the only one who
acknowledged some intrinsic discrepancies in this theory:

The non-reflexibility issue
Firstly, if there are no-context independent truths, why should the
constructivist account of learning be truer than that of other
learning theories? In other words, since in the context of
constructivism knowledge cannot be subject-independent, then how can
constructivists expect their theory to be generally applicable?

The teaching-science-problem
I have read a very enlightening example: the chief learning
declaration of the New Zealand National Curriculum in Science
is �gMaking sense�h of the Living World, the Solar System, etc,
instead of �gFinding out�h about the Living World, the Solar System
etc. The �gMaking sense�h constructivists�f approach has no
epistemological coherence because things can indeed make perfect
sense without being true, and an increase in the sense they make
does not imply an increase of the truth content. The latter, being a
realist�fs approach, has both epistemological and referential
coherence. In the New Zealand example, a teacher�fs role is to help
students how to learn, be a facilitator in the learning environment.
That is perfectly proper from a pedagogical and ethical perspective.
Note, however, that being consistent to the constructivism notions,
the declaration does not bring up anything about knowing the subject
to be taught and being able to teach it in an understandable manner.

In a simple (though a little radical) example, some students in a
classroom of a constructivism-oriented teacher are conducting an
experiment so as to determine the mathematical relationship between
a pendulum�fs period (T) and the string�fs length (L). As we know, T
is proportional to �ãL. Many of the students, nevertheless, may find
out that T is proportional to L. Now, according to constructivism,
truth and error are social and negotiable constructions
(conventions). As some versions of constructivism consider science
to be socially or culturally constructed in the sense that
scientific knowledge originates in the social world and not the
natural world, the constructivist teacher is obliged to evaluate
the "T is proportional to L" and the "T is proportional to �ãL" as
equally correct. The teacher cannot argue that "T is proportional to
L" is in disagreement with nature, because under the appropriate
social circumstances, "T is proportional to L" can be a true
relationship.

What discriminates Natural Sciences from other disciplines such as
the Humanities is the fact that multiple truths cannot coexist in
the natural world. For example, in the same circumstances,
gravitational force is applied on both persons A and B. Knowledge in
natural sciences is derived from our interplay with nature which,
being most fair, does never make any social or cultural
discrimination. Person A, however, may �gmake sense�h of gravity
differently than person B. The question is: If this is acceptable in
the outside world, then should it be acceptable in a classroom
setting too? If we want to be consistent with constructivism, then
the answer is yes, because a classroom is a microcosm of the outside
world. In short, if error loses its objectivity, then how can
physics be taught at all? This would mean the catastrophe of
science, paradoxically all because of Science Education. To be fair
with constructivism, however, its willingness to be tolerant may
also lead to some unexpected discoveries.

First of all, I wonder whether I have somehow misinterpreted
constructivism. As long as we deliberately omit some raw
philosophical syllogisms, constructivism does explain a lot and
seems to be very prolific. Should we deliberately skip these
epistemological issues that cause inherent inconsistencies, and
therefore risk the theory�fs decency (in accordance to Piaget�fs words
that every descent learning theory must be established on solid
epistemological bedrocks)? Or, should we attempt to merge realism
and constructivism? We Science Educators must examine this matter
deeply, because constructivism seems to cast long shadows on Natural
Sciences. I would be most interested to hear your opinions.

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Andreas Georgiou
Andre.georgiou@...
http://www.netfirms.georgiou.com

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(*) FLECK, L. (1929) Zur Krise der �gWirklichkeit�h. Die
Naturwissenschaften, 17(23), 425-430. (The excerpt was translated by
E. v. Glasersfeld.)