Hi All,

I have read the comments on constructivism so far and I must say the
opinions are very interesting and 'thought provoking'; I hope the
discussion expands to include both sides of the issue, or more if
there are. I believe Andreas Georgiou's reflections on the matter
ought to be regarded as an important and stimulating opportunity for
others to follow suit. I generally agree with his critical view on the
epistemological status of constructivism, which I believe to be
lacking in substance as a referent. However, its usefulness for
science instruction cannot be denied and this area is fertile ground
for ideas and approaches to improve science education. I wouldn't
claim to possess as thorough a command of the topic as that apparently
exhibited by David Geelan, whose observation in #4 of his response
contains the distinction that must be made in science education.

I believe that what students are constructing is an internal
representation of concepts and ideas that must be consistent sooner or
later, with the scientifically accepted ones; in other words, with the
proper established 'knowledge'. The difficulty for science instructors
presented by the obstinate role of misconceptions makes a
constructivistic approach essential for long-term concept retention,
and hopefully a change towards the scientific view.

There is an undeniable value of the kinesthetic aspects of
manipulating instruments and developing confidence in one's own
abilities afforded by the hands-on aspects of inquiry in science
education. It is perhaps this feature of learning about the natural
world that makes constructivistic methods so much more relevant to
science, as compared to other disciplines. Nevertheless, I believe the
problem lies not in the inadequacy of traditional didactic approaches
to teaching science, something that constructivism has made
appallingly obvious. The problem lies in the lack of a philosophical
perspective on scientific knowledge and practice, exhibited by many
teachers and students alike.

I believe a solution may be found by making a course in philosophy
required of all high school students, or at the very least, of all
science teachers at some point in their education. Why would I insist
on this? Andreas Georgiou's analogy between Kant's views and his
(Georgiou's) understanding of constructivism comes dangerously close
to conflating an ontological issue with an epistemological one. If I
understand his position, it appears to share a feature found in many
supporters of constructivism as a theory, the confusion of the objects
of the discourse with the statements of it.

We need a continuous exchange between correspondence and coherence if
we are going to benefit from the pedagogical features afforded by
constructivistic methods: An ontological realism (with the tacit
acknowledgment of the limitation of reductionism to take us to the
'true' representation of reality), combined with an epistemological
pluralism where we can discern the better ways to understand science
and nature, from the inferior ones.

PS. Following Geelan's lead as an introduction, I am a South American
from Colombia, the proud husband of Kathy and proud father of
Victoria, Gabriella, Gerard, and Olivia; I have to admit to having
been a high school physics teacher, and a college physics instructor
for over twenty years. For the past six years I have been coordinating
a graduate program in science education at Lehman College, The City
University of New York. I did this after having attempted to reach
students for fifteen years, and deciding that perhaps it would be more
efficacious to attempt to reach teachers.