1917 AND ALL THAT: THE UNTAUGHT SYLLABUS.
In Their Own Words: A Political History Of The Cold War 1917-1983.
By Brian Mitchell.

Chapters 19-23 of 50.

Chapter 19

THE WEST REJECTS THE ONLY ALLIANCE THAT CAN PREVENT WAR.
The bourgeois press early in 1939 declared:

"No war this year" and "Will there be a war? Not now."

(Daily Express.)

And:

"Believe me, there is going to be no war."

(Daily Express May 17 1939.)

Only the working class press such as the Daily Worker (now the Morning Star)
gave credence to Stalin's warning of March 10 1939 that the capitalist's "big
and dangerous political game which the adherents of the policy of
non-intervention have started, may end in a serious fiasco for themselves." A
year later British troops at Dunkirk learnt what this fiasco was to mean.

Whereas the British Government kept the British people blissfully unaware of the
approaching crisis lest they learn a political lesson from it; the Soviet
leaders had been educating and fully informing the Soviet people so that they
were fully aware of the world situation long before the outbreak of actual
hostilities against them:

"The question of imperialist wars - that question has been the keystone of all
policy in all the countries of the globe... It is a question of life or death
for millions upon millions of people. It is a question of whether 20,000,000
people are to be slaughtered in the next imperialist war, which the bourgeoisie
are preparing, and which is growing out of capitalism before our very eyes."

(Lenin, in 1921.)

"Stalin continued to cling firmly to the view that despite the cleavage between
the capitalist Powers, they would sooner or later converge into a united bloc
for war on the Soviets. He could not help remembering that only a few short
years ago, enemies had become co-belligerents in an almost universal capitalist
combination to destroy the infant Bolshevik State."

(J.T.Murphy, in his biography of Stalin.) (1)

"We cannot fail to realise that at present the world is transformed into an
armed camp. The flames of war are blazing in two continents, while our numerous
enemies, attempting in every way to undermine our constructive work from within,
prepare open war against us... With ten-fold energy, without wasting an hour, we
must work consistently on perfecting the fighting capacity of the Red Army."

(Marshal Voroshilov, May 1st 1938.) (2)

For the second time in their short history the Soviet people had to prepare
themselves to fight or be exterminated.

In 1931, ten years before Hitler's blitzkrieg against the USSR, Stalin made a
historically prophetic speech warning the 180 million Soviet people:

"We are now a hundred years behind the the advanced countries... We must make
good this distance in ten years or they crush us."

(Stalin, 1931.)

(1)J.T.Murphy "Stalin." The Bodley Head. London 1945.

(2)See:Pat and Zelda Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Lawrence and
Wishart. London 1944.

Exactly ten years after that speech, Hitler's armies, backed by international
finance capital and all the industry of Europe, were flung against the USSR.

Thus we were already in debt to the Soviet people. For if it wasn't for the
success of the early days of the Russian revolution and its very survival
through the Wars of Intervention and counter-revolution, and the heavy
sacrifices and achievements of the Soviet people's rapid industrialisation of
the 1920s and 30s, the outcome of Hitler's war would have been catastrophic for
not only the whole of Europe but for the rest of the world. Hitler's thousand
year Reich may well have become a reality. Britain and the US - the only other
major industrialised nations in the world - did not have the productive capacity
or resources to stand up to the Nazis, not even by the end of 1943. Yet the
Soviets alone had the capacity. As we shall see later, this was to be admitted
in a secret US war document of August 1943 and by a number of Western
politicians.

The following figures show the lies of the Western politicians and historians
who treacherously tried to create an impression of Soviet industrial and
military inadequacy in order to sabotage the Moscow talks of 1939 regarding a
military convention and joint security against the German fascists.:

Divisions Aircraft Tanks
Heavy guns

USSR 136 5,500 10,000
5,000

France 110 2,000 3,000
3,000

Britain 16 3,000 1,500
1,000

Poland 49 1,200 900
600

Total = 311 11,700 15,400
9,600

Germany 103 4,700 8,300
4,000

Italy 65 3,000 100
350

Total = 168 7,700 8,400
4,350

As these figures show, the Soviets alone did not have enough in divisions or
aircraft to defeat the Fascist axis. And Britain, France and Poland alone could
certainly never have withstood the Nazi powers. But an alliance of the USSR,
France, Britain and Poland had the overwhelming power to stop German militarism
in its tracks.

The figures also indicate that the USSR was thoroughly adequate in terms of
material. But the USSR has a long land border to defend against the Fascist
bloc, which would stretch manpower to its limits. As the figures, and as history
was to prove; it was the Western powers that were thoroughly inadequate.

Even Churchill acknowledged that:

"There was no military organism, nor could there have been for several years,
which could ever have given the blows which Russia has given or survived the
losses which Russia has borne."

(Winston Churchill.)

And:

"...There was no force in the world which could have been called into being,
except after several more years, that would have been able to maul and break the
German army..."

(Winston Churchill, House of Commons, Aug 2 1944.)

Only the inclusion of the USSR into a Western alliance had the power to stop
Hitler. The USSR had already on more than one occasion called for a conference
of all nations for collective security against Nazi Germany in 1939. But the
British Tories were so hostile towards communism that they betrayed the chance
of this alliance which would have prevented the war; as was admitted later:

"I felicitate the Prime Minister and the Foreign Service and the Government upon
the accomplishment of this treaty [of alliance with the USSR B.M.]. Had it been
a fact some years ago many grave blunders in foreign policy would have been
avoided. Not only that, this war could never have occurred."

(Lloyd George, House of Commons, June 11 1942, in a complete turn around from
his 1930s tune.)

"If we had accepted the Soviet proposals at the time we would have been spared
World War Two."

(British Prime Minister Attlee, 1945.) (1)

"Can anyone doubt that, if we had in 1939 the unity between Russia, this country
and the United States that we cemented at Yalta, there would not have been the
present war? I go further. Can anyone doubt that, so long as we hold that unity,
there will not be another war?"

(British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, House of Commons, Feb 28 1945.)

The Soviet Government had made it quite clear to representatives of the British
Government that only an alliance between them in a collective security of
European states against fascism could prevent the Germans from unleashing a new
war.

But the British Tories did not intend an alliance against Germany:

"We cannot afford to pursue any policy which would bring us into conflict with
Germany, Italy and Japan. We should therefore avoid any step which tied us
closely with Russia."

(British Tory L.C.Amery M.P. Daily Mail July 19 1937.)

On March 29 1935, just after the re-introduction of conscription in Germany,
which was in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden, after talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow, indicating the USSR on
a map on the wall, said:

Eden:"What a beautiful map and what a big country."

Stalin:"It's a big country alright, but it has difficulties."

Eden:"As for Britain, it's just a little island."

Stalin:"Yes, it's a little island, but a great deal depends on it. And if this
little island said to Germany: 'I won't give you money, raw materials or metal,'
peace in Europe would be ensured."

Eden said nothing. (2)

Litvinov also warned Eden in March 1935 that:

(1)"The Struggle Against Fascism and War - Past and Present" Panorama DDR 1975

(2)Igor Ovsyany "The Origins of World War Two." Novosti. Moscow 1984.

"It is perfectly possible, indeed, even probable, that the first strike will be
directed not against the USSR... Germany knows full well the strength of the Red
Army. Germany has not forgotten the lessons of history, showing that although
one may sometimes succeed in invading our country, it is not so easy to remain
there or get out without damage... Indeed, Hitler, putting Eastern expansion to
the fore nowadays, wants to catch out Western states and secure their go ahead
for his armaments drive. When these armaments reach the level desired by Hitler,
the guns may start firing in quite a different direction."

(Maxim Litvinov, to Anthony Eden, March 1935.) (1)

Just as today the weaker capitalist powers line up behind the US as a modern
"bulwark against bolshevism", the "miserable worms" of Europe in 1939 lined up
behind Nazi Germany. They all hoped for a slice of the riches of Soviet
territory for themselves. Germany had its Plan Gelb for invasion and takeover of
Soviet territory, France had its Plan Baku for taking of the oil rich
territories of the Baku region, and Britain had its plans to use the
Soviet-Finnish conflict as a springboard to invade and take over Soviet
territories. All treaties and commitments these countries had with the Soviet
Union were dispensed with and new alliances with Germany were negotiated:

"Tell your government that I am always ready to abrogate the Franco-Soviet pact
in order to conclude a broad based Franco-German pact."

(French Foreign Minister Pierre Lavalle to the German Ambassador in Paris.) (2)

#?Britain had effectively signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in September
1938 when it signed the the Munich agreement. France signed a similar pact with
Germany in December 1938. Frenchmen named Lavalle "the grave digger of France".

"Leave us our colonial empire and we'll let you have the Ukraine."

(French minister Bonnet to Ribbentrop.) (3)

The Masaryk - Benes government of Czechoslovakia joined the British and French
"worms" in betraying their countries. The Soviets had been in position ready to
come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if Czechoslovakia resisted Germany, even if
Britain did not honour its treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia:

"Subsequent memoirs have revealed that the Soviet forces and planes were poised
and ready to act at once and decisively to stand by Czechoslovakia if Hitler
should attack and Czechoslovakia resist, even though Britain and France should
stand aside. This message was conveyed through Gottwald to Benes. But the
Benes-Masaryk regime, tied by their links to Western imperialism, preferred to
surrender to the Anglo-French dictat rather than save Czechoslovak independence
by the aid of the Soviet Union. The strategic gates of Europe were opened to
Hitler without a struggle."

(R. Palme Dutt "Notes of the Month." Labour Monthly, Oct 1968.)

"France could have stopped Hitler when he started into the Saar. France and
England combined could have prevented the occupation of Austria or even later
stopped the Nazis at Czechoslovakia. The United States, England and France could
have prevented the rape of Poland."

(US Senator, later President, Lyndon Johnson.) (4)

(1)See:Igor Ovsyany "The Origins of World War Two." Novosti. Moscow 1984.

And:Fyodor Volkov "Secrets of Whitehall and Downing Street." Progress. Moscow
1986.

(2)See:Soviet Weekly, London Sept 19 1987.

(3)See:Soviet Weekly, London Sept 19 1987.

(4)See:Congressional Record, Vol. 93, p4695.

On May 7 1939, Britain rejected a triple mutual assistance pact (Britain, Poland
and the USSR) proposed by the USSR on April 16 1939. Poland also refused to
accept it. An Anglo-French-Soviet mutual assistance pact was also rejected by
Britain. Either of these treaties could have stopped Hitler. Hitler, in 1939,
was awaiting the outcome of the Anglo-French-Soviet talks before considering
taking action over Danzig:

"The Fuhrer asked General Keitel, Chief of his General Staff, and Brauchitsch,
Commander-in-Chief of his land forces, their opinion of Germany's chances of
success if a general conflict broke out in the present situation. Both replied
the outcome would depend on whether Russia remained outside the conflict or not.
In the first place Keitel said 'yes' while General Brauchitsch (whose views
carry more weight) replied 'probably'. Both stated that if Germany had to fight
against Russia it would stand little chance of winning the war."

(Information sent by French Ambassador to Berlin, Coulondre, to French Foreign
Minister, Bonnet, on June 1 1939.) (1)

"He (Hitler) has talked to Keitel and Brauchitsch. They tell him that he has a
clear way ahead so long as the British and the Russians don't get together. He
will certainly not move if the Russians come in against us."

(Chief of Staff of German Land Forces, Franz Halder.) (2)

The British wanted the USSR to come to their aid if they were attacked but
wanted no commitments to come to the aid of the USSR:

"It would seem desirable to conclude some agreement whereby the Soviet Union
would come to our assistance if we were attacked in the West, not only to ensure
that Germany would have to fight a war on two fronts, but also perhaps for the
reason... that it was essential, if there must be a war, to try to involve the
Soviet Union in it."

(Secret British Memorandum to France, May 22 1939.) (3)

The rejection of a joint alliance with the Soviet Union, an alliance which would
have ensured the defence of Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France and Britain,
sealed the fate of these countries.

Britain, and other Western powers, did not want an alliance with the Soviet
Union. They rejected the Soviet Union's help in defending them. They all hoped
to move in after German and Soviet armies had destroyed each other. These
British actions were also in line with the 1941 Truman/Moore Brabazon policy of
waiting for the two to destroy each other and leave Britain in a dominating
position over Soviet territory.

They did not sign an Anglo-Soviet treaty until July 12 1941, after Hitler had
occupied Europe and attacked the Soviet Union and they realised Hitler would
have the material resources of the USSR at his disposal and security in his rear
in order to be in a stronger position to now attack Britain. This forced some
more sober thoughts from some:

"Those in this country who dream of Germany being diverted towards Russia - and
therefore away from us - would be repeating in war the cardinal mistake they
made during the years before the war. If Hitler goes East it is only to be in a
materially stronger position to come West."

(Sunday Dispatch, June 22 1941, the day Hitler attacked the USSR.)

(1)See:Igor Ovsyany "The Origins of World War Two." Novosti. Moscow 1984.

(2)See:L.Mosley "On Borrowed Time."

Also"On the Eve of World War II 1933-1939." Novosti. Moscow 1974.

(3)Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol. 5. London
1952.

See:G.Deborin "Secrets of the Second World War." Progress Publishers. Moscow
1971.

Hitler confirmed this:

"The Soviet state must be destroyed... Once Russia is beaten, England's last
hope will vanish. Germany will then be master of Europe and the Balkans. The
conclusion: for this reason Russia must be done away with... The Soviet state
must be destroyed with one stroke."

(Adolf Hitler, in a speech to a meeting of his military leaders, July 31 1940.)
(1)

And:

"Today there is no such thing as an island. I shall land on the shores of
Britain. I shall destroy her towns from the mainland."

(Adolf Hitler.) (2)

(1)See:Max Domarus "Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945." Munchen 1963.

See also:Soviet Weekly May 4 1985.

(2)See:Hermann Rauschning "The Voice of Destruction: Hitler Speaks."

Also:"On the Eve of World War II 1933-1939." Novosti. Moscow 1974.



Chapter 20

MISSION TO MOSCOW:
BRITISH "SLOW BOAT" PHONEY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR
The "phoney war" conducted by the British from September 3 1939, when war was
declared, to Dunkirk, was a war in which nothing serious was intended. Likewise,
the British Government, in order to placate public opinion, conducted phoney
negotiations with the Soviet Government, in which nothing serious was intended.

As late as July and August 1939, World War Two could have been prevented had the
British Government the integrity and morality to ally itself with the Soviet
Union instead of with Hitler.

While conducting secret negotiations with Hitler and refusing an
Anglo-French-Soviet alliance, the British Government accepted Soviet proposals
for military talks on July 25 1939. Diplomatic and military missions were sent
to Moscow. But every delay was put in the way of the progress and conductance of
these talks. On July 10 the British Ambassador to Germany said to the French
Foreign Minister that:

"The negotiations with the Soviets had reached a stage where they lacked a sense
of realities... The important thing was to end negotiations one way or another
as soon as possible."

(British Ambassador to Germany, to the French Foreign Minister, July 10 1939.)
(1)

But they were in no hurry. The Western military mission didn't leave London till
August 5. And they sent only the most junior Foreign Office representative on
the slowest boat they could find:

"...the delegation should... go very slowly with the conversations, watching the
progress of the political negotiations and keeping in very close touch with His
Majesty's Ambassador...

The British Government is unwilling to enter into any detailed commitments which
are likely to tie our hands in all circumstances."

(Instructions to the British mission to Moscow, July 1939.) (2)

(1)See:Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Third Series, Vol.VI,
London 1953.

(2)See:Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol.VI,
p763.

The conduct and attitude of the British Government in its mission to Moscow
showed the Soviet Government their true intentions. Instead of sending a senior
minister with powers to conclude an alliance, a Foreign Office clerk
Mr.W.Strang, with no powers at all was sent. The French delegation had arrived
in London for its departure with the British to Moscow. The Soviet Ambassador
Maisky asked the head of the British delegation Admiral Drax how the Mission
would travel:

Maisky:"Tell me, Admiral, when are you leaving for Moscow?"

Drax:"That hasn't been settled, but in the next few days."

Maisky:"You are flying, of course? Time is precious, the atmosphere in Europe is
extremely tense."

Drax:"Oh no! We of the two delegations, including the technical personnel, are
about 40, and there is the luggage... It would be inconvenient to fly."

Maisky:"If flying is unsuitable, perhaps you'll go to the Soviet Union in one of
your fast cruisers?... That would be forceful and impressive - military
delegations aboard a warship... Besides, it would not take too long from London
to Leningrad."

Drax:"No, a cruiser won't do either. If all of us were to go aboard a cruiser,
we should have to evict several dozen of its officers and take their place in
their cabins... Why cause inconveniences? No, no, we shan't go by cruiser."

Maisky:"In that case you will probably go by one of your speedy liners?... I
repeat, time is short and you must get to Moscow as quickly as possible".

Drax:"I really can't say... Transportation is in the hands of the Ministry of
Trade... Everything is in its hands. I have no idea what will happen."

(Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to London Ivan Maisky and British
Admiral Reginald Drax.) (1)

The Mission left on August 5 on a thirteen knot boat and reached Moscow a week
later, on August 11.

Questions in parliament regarding an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty brought only
reassurances of "progress" from the Prime Minister Chamberlain, who was more
concerned with saving the British Empire than saving millions of European
people, including British, from a war which he hoped would destroy the USSR.

An Anglo-Polish-Soviet treaty was likewise rejected. Even the practical carrying
out of any alliance was thwarted by the Polish Government, who refused to let
the Red Army, in response to British and French questions on what it could give
Poland in the event of a German attack, cross Poland and jointly with the Polish
Army defend the Polish frontier.

The German Government was following these proceedings and expressed its
willingness to sign a Non Aggression Pact with the USSR on several occasions,
and, as it was known in Britain, the Soviet Government refused this until the
Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations had failed on August 21. The Soviet-German Non
Aggression Pact was signed on August 23. The British and French even refused a
similar Non Aggression Pact with the USSR.

No Anglo-Soviet treaty was signed. The Mission left Moscow on August 26 and
Hitler's armies entered Poland on September 1 1939. The result was a year later
British and French troops were paying the cost at Dunkirk when the 'Phoney War'
ended.

"Sometimes I wonder whether, even now, the Cabinet are really in earnest or
whether these negotiations are not merely another sop to public opinion."

(Lord Davies, House of Lords, June 8 1939.) (2)

"Why send only a Foreign Office bureaucrat to represent us in an infinitely more
powerful country which was offering to come to our aid?

There is only one answer. Mr.Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Sir John
Simon do not want any association with Russia."

(Lloyd George, Sunday Express, July 23 1939.) (3)

"Mr.Chamberlain negotiated directly with Hitler. He went to Germany to see him.
He and Lord Halifax made visits to Rome. They went to Rome, drank to Mussolini's
health and told him what a fine fellow he was. But whom have they sent to
Russia? They have not even sent the lowest in rank of a Cabinet minister; they
have sent a clerk in the Foreign Office. It is an insult... They have no sense
of proportion or of the gravity of the whole situation when the world is
trembling on the brink of a great precipice."

(Lloyd George, July 29 1939.) (4)

(1)See:Ivan Maisky "Who Helped Hitler?" Moscow 1962.

See also:Pat and Zelda Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Lawrence
and Wishart. London 1944.

(2)See:Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn "The Great Conspiracy - Against Soviet
Russia." Boni and Gaer. NY 1946, and Red Star Press. London 1975.

(3)See:Pat and Zelda Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Lawrence and
Wishart. London 1944.

(4)See:Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn "The Great Conspiracy - Against Soviet
Russia." Boni and Gaer. NY 1946, and Red Star Press. London 1975.

If Liberals are naive and confused about why things are done, capitalist
die-hards have no illusions:

"...the negotiations with the USSR were not conducted with the intention of
agreeing on fundamental cooperation with it."

(British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax to the British Ambassador in Washington,
March 28 1939.) (1)

Quoted in: "The Struggle Against Fascism and War - Past and Present." Panorama
DDR 1975.



Chapter 21

BRITAIN CONDUCTS "OTHER NEGOTIATIONS" -
AN ALLIANCE WITH HITLER?
In a poll conducted in April 1939, 87 percent of British people were in favour
of an Anglo-Soviet alliance. (1)

But the British government had other ideas.

The Times commented that:

"A hard and fast alliance with Russia would hamper other negotiations."

# (The Times March 15 1939) (2)

What "other negotiations" were conducted on behalf of the British people by
their government and big business during the years and even weeks leading up to
the Second World War?

On the day Hitler entered Prague the Federation of British Industries was
drawing up agreements with German big business Reichsgruppe Industrie in
Dusseldorf. In July it was revealed that the British Parliamentary Secretary to
the Board of Trade Robert Hudson had been with Hitler's Economics Minister
Helmuth Wohlthat to negotiate a £1,000,000,000 loan to Nazi Germany. (3)

If in the economic field the lives of the millions who were to die in the coming
war were betrayed by capital, over which they have no control; in the diplomatic
and political field they were even more betrayed by their 'democratic' leaders:

"The Premier [Chamberlain B.M.] is contemplating an attempt to reach an
agreement with Germany... He would regard it as a disaster to finally shut the
door leading to an agreement with Germany."

(The Polish Ambassador in London, in a message to the Polish Government, June 8
1939.) (4)

The Germans were meticulous in keeping records of every meeting and
conversation. And the Soviets were fortunate in capturing these records from the
Reichstag, the German Foreign Ministry, and many other sources. One such source
was Herbert von Dirksen, the German Ambassador to Britain 1938-1939. Von Dirksen
did a very careless thing for a diplomat in keeping secret documents and records
at home. The Soviet army in 1945 discovered von Dirksen's private papers in his
estate at Groeditsberg in Germany. Among his papers were typed copies of his
messages from London and messages of the German Foreign Ministry, and secret
talks involving Sir Horace Wilson and Robert Hudson and von Dirksen and
Goering's economics advisor Helmuth Wohlthat. Dirksen's papers show that even at
this late hour, the British Government proposed an agreement with Hitler:

Goering's US educated economist Helmuth Wohlthat met Horace Wilson in July and
August 1939 to discuss Anglo-German cooperation and a non-aggression pact:

(1)See:Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn "The Great Conspiracy - Against Soviet
Russia." Boni and Gaer. NY 1946, and Red Star Press. London 1975.

(2)See:Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn "The Great Conspiracy - Against Soviet
Russia." Boni and Gaer. NY 1946, and Red Star Press. London 1975.

(3)See:Koni Zilliacus "Can the Tories Win the Peace? And How They Lost the Last
One." Victor Gollancz. London 1945.

See also:Igor Ovsyany "The Origins of World War Two." Novosti. Moscow 1984.

(4)See:"On the Eve of World War II 1933-1939." Novosti. Moscow 1974.

"Herr Wohlthat [the name is crossed out and Wilson is written on the original
document B.M.] suggested as the general objective a broad Anglo-German agreement
on all major questions, as had been originally envisaged by the Fuhrer... Sir
Horace Wilson definitely told Herr Wohlthat that the conclusion of

a non-aggression pact would enable Britain to rid herself of her commitments
vis-a-vis Poland."

(Von Dirksen, in a memorandum to the German Foreign Ministry, July 20 1939.) (1)

"There were still three big regions in the world where Germany and England could
find wide opportunities for activity: the British Empire, China and Russia.
England alone could not adequately take care of her vast empire and it would be
quite possible for Germany to be given a rather comprehensive share."

(Robert Hudson to Wohlthat, July 20 1939.) (2)

"The Fuhrer had only to take a sheet of paper and jot down his points; the
British Government would be prepared to discuss them."

(Sir Horace Wilson to Wohlthat, July 20 1939.) (3)

"Agreement with Germany is still Britain's dearest aim."

(Herbert von Dirksen's dispatch to Berlin, July 24 1939.) (4)

"Sir Horace Wilson confirmed that he had suggested to Herr Wohlthat the
following program of negotiations:

1) Conclusion of a treaty of "non-aggression,"...

...he [Wilson B.M.] replied that an Anglo-German agreement... vis-a-vis third
Powers would completely absolve the British Government from the commitments to
which it was now pledged by the guarantees of Poland..."

4) Negotiations regarding Germany's economic interests in the Southeast.

5) Negotiations regarding raw materials. Sir Horace Wilson stressed that this
was to include the colonial question...

6) A non-intervention agreement... The English side would be prepared to make a
declaration of non-intervention in respect to Greater Germany (Greater Reich)."

(Minute of a Conversation between von Dirksen and Sir Horace Wilson, Aug 3
1939.) (5)

"After Wohlthat's visit to London Hitler is convinced that in the event of a
conflict England will remain neutral."

(German Air Attache in Poland, Gerstenberg, in a note of Aug 7 1939.) (6)

Much of these secret negotiations for an alliance with Hitler in the build up to
the war is still kept an official secret from the British people:

(1)See:"Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War,
Vol.II, Dirksen Papers. 1938-1939." Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow
1948.

(2)See:"Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War,
Vol.II, Dirksen Papers. 1938-1939." Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow
1948.

(3)See:"Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War,
Vol.II, Dirksen Papers. 1938-1939." Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow
1948.

(4)See:"Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War,
Vol.II, Dirksen Papers. 1938-1939." Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow
1948.

(5)See:"Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War,
Vol.II, Dirksen Papers. 1938-1939." Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow
1948.

(6)See:"On the Eve of World War II 1933-1939." Novosti. Moscow 1974.

"Public opinion is so inflamed... that if these plans of negotiations with
Germany were to become public they would immediately become torpedoed."

(Von Dirksen's message to Berlin, July 24 1939.) (1)

"If anything about them [the negotiations B.M.] were to leak out there would be
a great scandal, and Chamberlain would probably be forced to resign."

(Horace Wilson to von Dirksen, Aug 3 1939.) (2)

#Meanwhile, a similar storm was being brewed in Hitler's private teahouse:

"This continuous talk about war is nonsense. What is our problem? Only that
Germany needs grain and timber. To have grain I need territory in the East, as
for timber, I want a colony, only one colony. The rest is nonsense. ...I want to
live in peace with Britain and sign a pact on a final settlement with it. I'm
prepared to guarantee its domains around the world and cooperate with London."

(Adolf Hitler to the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig Dr.Carl
Burckhardt at Hitler's Adlerhorst - Eagle's Nest - a converted tea house on a
cliff top above the Berghof villa at Obersalzberg, Aug 10-11 1939. From
Burckhardt's memoirs 1960, parts of whose text is omitted from British Foreign
Office publications of 1953.) (3)

In comparison with its "slow boat" low level mission to Moscow, the British
Government made hurried, high level arrangements with Nazi Germany:

"Even as Ribbentrop prepared to leave for Moscow, Stalin had not completely
abandoned hope of an Anglo-French-Soviet military alliance against Hitler. And
while the English were doing their halfhearted best to consummate this
agreement, they were secretly inviting Goering to England."

(US author John Toland.) (4)

On August 17 1939 the US State Department informed the British Ambassador in
Washington Lindsay that US Intelligence had given them information that German
Ambassador in Moscow von Schulenberg had offered the Soviet Government
negotiations on a German-Soviet treaty. The British Foreign Office received the
telegram from Washington on August 18.

The British Government erupted in frantic activity. On August 19 the British
secret service arranged to bring Goering to Britain. Backed by Chief of British
Intelligence Sir Stewart Menzies and with the consent of Lord Halifax and Prime
Minister Chamberlain, British Intelligence Officer Sydney Cotton flew to Germany
to persuade Goering, who could influence Hitler, to come to Britain. On August
21 London received a message that Goering agreed to come to Britain to talk with
the Prime Minister. It was planned that the plane carrying Goering would land at
some remote airfield in Britain, and Goering would be taken by car to see the
Prime Minister at his country estate at Chequers.

(1)See:"Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War,
Vol.II, Dirksen Papers. 1938-1939." Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow
1948.

(2)See:"Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War,
Vol.II, Dirksen Papers. 1938-1939." Foreign Languages Publishing House. Moscow
1948.

(3)Quoted in:Oleg Rzheshevsky "Operation Overlord. From the History of the
Second Front." Novosti. Moscow 1984.

(4)See:Igor Ovsyany "The Origins of World War Two." Novosti. Moscow 1984.

"It was decided on August 21st to agree, and secret arrangements were made for
23rd August. Nothing further was heard until the Thursday, 24 August, when a
message came to the effect that Hitler did not think that the visit would prove
immediately useful."

(Sir Alexander Cadogan, in his diary.) (1)

Hitler was due to invade Poland.

Three days before Hitler invaded Poland the British Government were still
looking for an agreement with Germany:

"Whatever some people might say, the British people sincerely desired an
understanding with Germany, and no one more so than the Prime Minister... Today
the whole British public was behind the Prime Minister. The recent vote in the
House of Commons was an unmistakable proof of that fact...

At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime
Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with
Germany. I said there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would,
provided Germany cooperated with him. Herr Hitler asked whether England would be
willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said, speaking personally, I did
not exclude such a possibility provided the developments of events justified
it."

(British Ambassador to Germany Sir Nevile Henderson, in a note to Viscount
Halifax describing an interview with Hitler, Aug 28 1939.) (2)

(1)Quoted in:Igor Ovsyany "The Origins of World War Two." Novosti. Moscow 1984.

(2)See:British Government document Cmd 6106. 1939 p130.

Quoted in:Pat and Zelda Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Lawrence
and Wishart. London 1944.

See also:Ernie Trory "Imperialist War." Crabtree Press. Brighton 1977.



Chapter 22

THE SOVIET UNIONS ONLY ALTERNATIVE:
SIGN THE GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT.
So much distortion and lies are written about the Soviet-German Non-Aggression
Pact of August 23 1939 that it must be explained in detail.

Not very intelligent and dishonest and usually Right Wing political and history
hacks often, without any further thought, make the dangerous suggestion that:
"the Soviet Union caused the war by forming an alliance with Hitler." And sadly,
I have heard this lie propagated by certain "peace" activists.

Such ignorant or wilful distortions of history show nothing but hypocrisy and
contempt for the Soviet struggle for joint security since the mid 1930s and the
West's rejection of it. The lack of a Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact would
anyway clearly not have stopped Hitler for a single second. However,
neutralising the Soviet Union for a while would buy time for Germany. Hitler was
worried that British and French negotiators were still in Moscow, and thought
that offering a deal with the Soviets was a way of neutralising them while he
invaded Poland.

It is no exaggeration to say that the capitalist powers, both fascist and
non-fascist, had put the Soviet Union in an emergency situation. After the
betrayal of Czechoslovakia, the immediate question for the Soviet Union was: to
face an immediate attack, or to hold it off for whatever breathing space it
could get. As already shown, the Western powers, individually, or even
collectively, could not possibly have the capacity to stop Hitler's armies
without the inclusion of the USSR. Only in an alliance with the USSR could this
be done. But at this late hour the British continued to reject any form of
alliance with the USSR while secretly negotiating with Hitler. The Soviets
realised that the British Government had no intention of any alliance against
Hitler; and thus isolated, played for time to further industrialise and arm
against the coming war by signing the Non-Aggression Pact offered by the German
Government. It is important to point out that this was a mutual non-aggression
treaty, not an alliance, as some bourgeois historians try to make out.
Furthermore, it was a treaty the Soviets were under no illusions that Hitler
would keep.

It was the West who started the Second World War by building up Hitler and
pushing him East and by then rejecting any mutual assistance treaties with the
Soviet Union. That Hitler had not carried out Britain's expectations and invaded
the Soviet Union frustrated the British plans. The Soviet-German pact frustrated
them even more. The capitalist world having started the war then expected to use
the Soviets as a cat's paw to "pull their hot chestnuts out of the fire" for
them. Having been refused any mutual assistance treaties with the Western
allies, the Soviet Union was not going to fight Germany alone while the British
stood idly by and watched. Continually betrayed, the Soviet Union safeguarded
its own security by signing Germany's non-aggression pact and kept its own
people out of the war for almost two more years.

Also, it is obvious that had the Soviet Union not gained this extra time to arm
itself the outcome of the war would have been quite different. And right up to
the day war was declared, and even at the end of 1943 and again after the war
was finished, powerful leading British circles wanted alliances with Germany to
destroy the USSR. The period of the "Phoney War", Hitler's backing off at
Dunkirk in order to give the British army a chance to escape, and Hess' mission
to Scotland, were further invitations for this, British consideration for which
is still kept secret.

Also; the British had signed a Japanese "Munich" on July 24 1939, and recognised
Japan's seizure of Chinese and Mongolian territories. The Japanese invaded
Manchuria in 1937 and large Japanese forces invaded Mongolia in May 1939. The
Soviets had a treaty with Mongolia, and Soviet troops were fighting the Japanese
there.

If the Soviets had not signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, fighting the
Germans would have meant not only fighting on two fronts but also without any
allies.

Thus is refuted the ridiculous lie that the USSR started the war by forming an
alliance with Hitler and let Britain "go it alone" in 1939-1941. Britain's going
it alone was none other than Britain's own making.

Britain and France had abrogated on their treaties to assist Czechoslovakia
together with the Soviet Union should Czechoslovakia be attacked. And Poland and
Romania refused to allow Soviet troops to cross their territories to aid
Czechoslovakia in accordance with these treaties. This being so, Hitler thought
he could not be resisted from either direction and could make his moves with
impunity.

After the counterfeit "slow boat" talks with the British and French military
missions on August 15-17 1939 it was clear that the British had no intention of
forming any kind of collective security with the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Government finally accepted Germany's persistent offer of a Non Aggression Pact;
especially after the German Ambassador to Moscow von Schulenberg's threat that a
"mutual understanding" with Germany would "guarantee" the security of the USSR.
A telegram from the German Government announced the intention of sending German
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Moscow for talks, which ended with the signing of
a Non Aggression Pact on August 23 1939.

The German-Soviet pact was distorted and vilified in the British press as it is
in British history books today, even by so-called socialists, despite the full
text of the treaty being published in Britain.

"The Soviet-German agreement has been violently attacked in the Anglo-French and
American press, and especially in some 'socialist' papers... Particularly
violent in their denunciations of the agreement are some of the French and
British socialist leaders... These people are determined that the Soviet Union
should fight against Germany on the side of Britain and France...

Under the Soviet-German agreement, the Soviet Union is not obliged to fight
either on the British or the German side. The USSR is pursuing her own policy,
which is determined by the interests of the peoples of the USSR, and by nobody
else.

If these gentlemen have such an irresistible urge to go to war, well then - let
them go to war by themselves, without the Soviet Union. We'll see what kind of
warriors they will make."

(Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov, to the
Supreme Soviet, Aug 31 1939.)

"It may be asked, how could the Soviet Government have consented to conclude a
non-aggression pact with such perfidious people, such monsters, as Hitler and
Ribbentrop? Was this not an error on the part of the Soviet Government? Of
course not! Non-aggression pacts are pacts of peace between two states. It was
such a pact that Germany proposed to us in 1939. Could the Soviet Government
have declined such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving State
could decline a peace agreement with a neighbouring State, even though the
latter were headed by such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. But
that, of course, only on the one indispensable condition - that this peace
agreement did not jeopardize, either directly or indirectly, the territorial
integrity, independence, and honour of the peace-loving State. As is well known,
the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR was precisely such a pact.

What did we gain by concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany? We secured
for our country peace for a year and a half and the possibility of preparing our
forces to repulse Fascist Germany, should she risk an attack on our country
despite the pact. This was a definite advantage for us and a disadvantage for
Fascist Germany.

(Stalin, to the Soviet people, July 3 1941.) (1)

Hitler, of course, was trying to use the non-aggression pact to his own
advantage. He had ordered Ribbentrop to conclude a non-aggression pact with the
USSR because he did not want Germany to have to fight a war on two fronts.

At the beginning of August 1939 at his Eagle's Nest at Obersalzberg, Adolf
Hitler said:

(1)See:D.N.Pritt, QC, MP. "Russia is for Peace." Lawrence and Wishart. London
1951.

"Perhaps something enormously important will happen soon. Even if I should have
to send Goering... But if need be I would even go myself. I am staking
everything on this card."

(Adolf Hitler.) (1)

Just three weeks later on the evening of August 21 during supper a note was
handed to Hitler. Hitler exclaimed:

"I have them! I have them!... We are going to conclude a non-aggression pact
with Russia. Here, read this. A telegram from Stalin."

(Adolf Hitler.)

The telegram briefly acknowledged that an agreement had been reached. Goebbels
had a press conference on August 23. Commenting on the pact, the British
correspondent noted:

"That is the death knell of the British Empire."

That same evening on the terrace of the Berghof, watching the Northern lights,
Hitler said to von Bulow:

"Looks like a great deal of blood. This time we won't bring it off without
violence."

(Adolf Hitler.) (2)

"I was not sure for a long time whether I should first strike in the East and
then in the West... It so happened, of necessity, that the East was left out for
a time... At present Russia is not dangerous... Moreover, we have the treaty
with Russia. But treaties are observed only for as long as they are useful."

(Adolf Hitler to his Commanders in Chief, Nov 23 1939.) (3)

Referring to Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940 Hitler said:

"I therefore decided, as soon as Molotov departed, that I would settle accounts
with Russia as soon as fair weather permitted.

...the raw materials which the Russians were withholding were essential to us.
Despite their obligations their rate of delivery decreased steadily, and there
was a real danger that they might suddenly cease altogether. If they were not
prepared to give us of their own free will the things we had to have, then we
had no alternative but to go and take them, in situ and by force.

...sooner or later Stalin would abandon us and go over to the enemy...

The proposals which Stalin submitted to me after the return of his Minister did
not deceive me. Stalin, that incomparable and imperturbable blackmailer, was
trying to gain time in order to consolidate his advanced basis in Finland and
the Balkans. He was trying to play cat and mouse with us...

If I felt compelled to decide to settle my accounts with Bolshevism by force of
arms, and, indeed, arrived at my decision on the very anniversary of the signing
of the Moscow pact, I have every right to expect that Stalin had come to the
same decision even before he signed the pact."

(Adolf Hitler "The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler-Bormann Documents.
Feb-April 1945.")

(1)See:Albert Speer "Inside the Third Reich." Sphere Books. London 1971.

(2)See:Albert Speer "Inside the Third Reich." Weidenfeld and Nicholson London
1970; MacMillan New York 1970; and Sphere Books. London 1971.

(3)See:Max Domarus "Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945." Munchen 1963.

See also:Peter de Mendelssohn "The Nuremberg Documents."

#L?AlsoD.F. Fleming "The Cold War and its Origins." Doubleday. London 1961.

Stalin had come to his conclusions long ago:

"Stalin tried, ...to get agreement with France and Britain. When it failed he
was not ready himself to take on the Germans. He signed the agreement with
Germany, and immediately production went ahead on a full war basis for the time
when the Russians knew they would have to fight Germany."

(Sir Stafford Cripps, Daily Telegraph, Feb 10 1942.) (1)

"I still believe that for the USSR the solution of the question by way of an
agreement with Germany is but a second way out, or perhaps a means of bringing
pressure to bear so as to speed up the creation of a strong and cohesive
coalition which, I have always felt, is the objective of the Soviet leaders...

The Soviet government would have preferred an agreement with France and Britain
if only its achievement had proved possible."

(French Military Attache in the USSR General Palasse, Aug 13 and 27 1939.) (2)

"The fact that she [the USSR B.M.] was able to withstand the initial onslaught
of the German armies in their surprise attack on June 22, 1941, is evidence of
the good use to which she put it [the non-aggression pact B.M.]."

(British historian J.W.Wheeler Bennett.) (3)

Also the fact that the USSR was able to re-arm behind the treaty kept German
forces in the East even before the USSR was attacked. And the fact that the
Soviets were able to re-arm during this breathing space made it possible for the
Soviet Union to fulfil its obligations to its eventual Western allies.

"Little did any of us realise that even by keeping out of the war Russia's great
strength was a leaden ball on Hitler's foot which prevented him jumping on us."

(Arthur Woodburn MP. 1941.) (4)

The Soviets knew, of course, that as soon as the German armies felt strong
enough they would attack the USSR.

"In 1939, Hitler stole a Russian-German agreement from under the noses of our
negotiators in Moscow."

(Reynolds News, June 22 1941.)

(1)See:Pat and Zelda Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Lawrence and
Wishart. London 1944.

(2)See:"On the Eve of World War II 1933-1939." Novosti. Moscow 1974.

(3)SeeJ.W.Wheeler Bennett "Twenty Years of Russo-German Relations 1919-1939."

Also quoted in:"On the Eve of World War II 1933-1939." Novosti. Moscow 1974.

(4)See:Labour Monthly, Oct 1941.

"From my observations and contacts, since 1936, I believe that outside of the
President of the United States alone no government in the world saw more clearly
the menace of Hitler to peace and the necessity for collective security and
alliance among non-aggressive nations than did the Soviet government. They were
ready to fight for Czechoslovakia. They cancelled their non-aggressive pact with
Poland in advance of Munich because they wished to clear the road for the
passage of their troops through Poland to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia if
necessary to fulfil their treaty obligations. Even after Munich and as late as
the spring of 1939 the Soviet government agreed to join with Britain and France
if Germany should attack Poland or Rumania, but urged that an international
conference of non-aggressor states should be held to determine objectively and
realistically what each could do and then serve notice on Hitler of their
combined resistance... The suggestion was declined by Chamberlain by reason of
the objection of Poland and Rumania to the inclusion of Russia...

During all the spring of 1939 the Soviets tried to bring about a definite
agreement that would assume unity of action and coordination of military plans
to stop Hitler.

Britain... refused to give the same guarantees of protection to Russia with
reference to the Baltic states which Russia was giving to France and Britain in
the event of aggression against Belgium or Holland. The Soviets became
convinced, and with considerable reason, that no effective, direct and
practical, general arrangement could be made with France and Britain. They were
driven to a pact of non-aggression with Hitler."

(Joseph E.Davis, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, in a letter to
President Roosevelt's advisor Harry Hopkins, July 18 1941.) (1)

"The great enemy to British capitalism was thus the ideology of the Russian
Revolution permanently embodied in the successful Government of Soviet Russia.
To fight this ideology must mean hostility to Russia...

...throughout this period the major factor in European politics was the
successive utilisation by Great Britain... largely as the result of Great
Britain's lead, of various fascist governments to check the power and danger of
the rise of communism or socialism... Japan was tacitly encouraged in the east,
Germany on the west of Russia and fascism was reinforced in Italy and Spain...
All this despite the evident and growing danger to British imperialism... It was
then the failure of Britain to conclude a pact with Russia that made the
Russo-German pact and war inevitable."

(Sir Stafford Cripps, Feb 1940.) (2)

"For more than a year the Nazi Government of Germany had been offering terms for
a non-aggression pact. Despite their violent propaganda against the Bolsheviks
and the anti-Comintern pact with Italy and Japan, the Nazis had not abrogated
the Rapallo Treaty of 1922. German capitalists had given better credit terms
than the "democratic" capitalists. In 1938 the Nazi Government had offered a
million Mark loan and still more favourable trade terms. Stalin, fully
understanding the nature of Fascism and the strategy of Hitler, had rejected the
offers, preferring "collective security" with the democratic powers...

He knew, both from his aquaintance with the programmatic statements of Mein
Kampf and the "Rozenberg Plan", and from his knowledge of the economic geography
of Europe, that Germany was not likely to attempt the conquest of the Soviet
Union without first securing complete control of the industrial belt from
Northern France, Belgium, and Luxemburg through the Ruhr to Czecho-Slovakia.

Without these resources the Nazis could not surpass the rapidly growing
productive power of the Soviet Union, which was by this time producing
20,000,000 tons of steel a year. Had the "democratic Powers" found an alliance
with the Soviet Union at this time, their combined steel potential, which is the
basis of military strength, would have been at least double that of Germany. But
those in control of the "democratic Powers" had other things in mind."

(British historian J.T.Murphy, in his biography of Stalin.) (3)

What other things did the "democratic Powers" now have in mind?

(1)See:Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn "The Great Conspiracy - Against Soviet
Russia." Boni and Gaer, NY 1946, and Red Star Press. London 1975.

(2)See:Eric Estorick "Stafford Cripps: Master Statesman." New York 1949.

(3)See:J.T. Murphy "Stalin." The Bodley Head. London 1945.



Chapter 23

ANOTHER "MUNICH" - HITLER'S NEW GIFT: POLAND.
Another lie of bourgeois historians that has been assimilated by the peace
movement is that the Soviet Union in 1939 "invaded" Poland.

What the "democratic Powers" had in mind was another gift for Hitler:

"A second Munich, this time at the expense of Poland, may be in the making."

(US Chargé d' Affaires in France, in a message to the US State Department, June
24 1939.) (1)

Chamberlain offered Hitler another gift as well as Czechoslovakia: Poland. But
the ultimate gift he was really offering was the USSR.

#?Hitler knew that in the absence of an Anglo-Soviet or Polish-Soviet or
French-Soviet treaty Britain and France could not come to Poland's assistance.
Hitler needed the economy of Poland in order to further Germany's imperial
demands and increase its war potential. He explained this at a conference of the
Wehrmacht High Command on August 22 1939. He said that war preparations placed
great strains on the German economy and it was now necessary to act.

On September 1 1939 Hitler invaded Poland. The pretext used for this, codenamed
Operation Himmler, was staged by SS men and criminals dressed in Polish uniforms
attacking a German radio station in Gleiwitz just inside the German border, and
corpses of concentration camp victims dressed in Polish uniforms were left lying
around.

What Britain wanted was for Germany to attack the USSR. Poland was a pawn in the
game.

"All preferred the destruction of Poland to Soviet defence of Poland. All hoped
that the sequel would be a German-Soviet war."

(US historian F.Shuman "Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad.") (2)

"For the men of Munich, Poland was a pawn which they lightly sacrificed in a
dirty game in the hope that after it rapidly overran our country, the Wehrmacht
would come face to face with the Soviet Army. Attempts were continued, by
somewhat different means, to implement the objective underlying the Munich
policy, namely that of pushing the Third Reich against the USSR."

#(Polish leader Wladislav Gomulka.) (3)

The most reactionary bourgeois falsifiers of history and their timid and
dishonest followers on, some of them "socialist", try to blame the Soviet Union
for starting the war by signing a non-aggression pact with Hitler and "invading"
Poland. But it was Britain's failure to agree to collective security and by
standing aside while Hitler prepared to invade Poland, and its failure to honour
its pledge to come to Poland's aid that ensures Hitler's success in Poland.
Leaving aside for a moment the Soviet Union's right to take this chance of
repossessing its own former Byelorussian territory as far as the Curzon Line,
taken by Poland during the Wars of Intervention; it was the Soviet Union who was
the only country to come to the defence of the Polish people:

(1)Foreign Relations of the United States. 1939. Vol 1.

Quoted in:"On the Eve of World War II 1933-1939." Novosti. Moscow 1974.

(2)F.Shuman "Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad." NY. 1967.

(3)Pravda July 22 1959.

"Poland, the victim of Hitler Germany's brazen attack that threatened her
biological existence, counted on the help of her allies, while these allies were
bent on appeasing Hitler Germany and goading her to fight against the Soviet
Union, to fight on Poland's ruins against the only country with a vested
interest in defending Poland's independence, the only country able to deliver
Poland from the nazi yoke."

(Polish historian Zbigniew Zaluski ) (1)

"Russian troops could alone hope to reach the battlefield in time to save the
Polish Army from being crushed by an overwhelming German superiority in men, and
especially in equipment."

(Lloyd George, Sunday Express, July 23 1939.)

"The War Office, I understand, attaches considerable importance to this event.
It had always been a substantial element in German strategy to dominate the
Baltic Sea. Now it is dominated by Soviet Russia."

(News Chronicle military correspondent.) (2)

Like the French, British and other European governments before the war, the
Polish government also refused to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Soviet
Union against Fascist Germany. A militarily weak Polish government persistently
refused entry of the Red Army into Polish territory in order to secure its
borders against the Nazi armies. Only ten days before Hitler invaded Poland the
Polish Foreign Minister made the official statement that:

"Poland is not bound to the Soviets by any military agreement and the Polish
government has no intention of concluding such an agreement."

(Polish Foreign Minister, August 20 1939.)

Four weeks later, on September 16, the Polish government fled and left the
Polish people to their fate.

The Red Army entered Poland only after the Polish Government had collapsed and
ceased to exist and treaties between it and the Soviet Union thereby ceased to
operate.

"The Polish front has collapsed completely."

(The Times Sept 17 1939.)

"Travellers who have crossed the country during last week report that again and
again they have passed motorcars and taxicabs carrying [Polish B.M.] officers
evacuating their families... indication enough of the deplorable lengths to
which the demoralisation of the army has gone."

(The Times, Sept 19 1939.)

By September 17 1939 the Nazi armies were racing across Poland. The Soviet Union
was faced with having to prevent the German capture of Western Ukraine and
Western Byelorussia, which was rightly Soviet territory. The Red Army crossed
the pre-war 1939 Eastern border of Poland and repossessed their own former
territories of Byelorussia and Western Ukraine, annexed by Poland from the USSR
in 1920, before the Nazis could get there.

"On the contrary, the big mistake that Russia made was in her overestimation of
Polish military strength, so that the quickness of the Polish collapse caught
her almost unprepared, and the Soviet Army had to mobilise and march within a
matter of hours to prevent the Nazis being on the Soviet borders."

(The Dean of Canterbury Rev. Hewlett Johnson.) (3)

(1)Zbigniew Zaluski "Przeputska do Historii." Warsaw 1963.

(2)See:Hewlett Johnson "The Socialist Sixth of the World." Victor Gollancz.
London 1947.

(3) Hewlett Johnson "The Socialist Sixth of the World." Victor Gollancz. London
1947.

"Sorry, but frontiers are not immutable, and the British Government realises
this, and has not guaranteed any East-European frontiers. Mr Eden said so the
other day. But with goodwill on both sides, Poland and the Soviet Union will
settle this question, as they settled so many other questions. Moreover, Russia
did not want to 'destroy' Poland, but merely wanted to prevent the Germans from
getting too near Minsk and Kiev."

(Izvestia, August 1939.)

By the end of September 1939 the Soviet Army had reached the Curzon Line, which
was the Soviet-Polish border at the Paris Conference in 1919 and corresponded to
the historical ethnographic border between the Soviet and Polish peoples. This
line was called the "Curzon Line" after Lord Curzon, who agreed it at
Versailles. It was the original Soviet border, which was lost after World War
One to the Germans and fascist Poles as a result of the Brest-Litovsk treaty and
the Wars of Intervention:

"It is perhaps worth recalling that the action of the Soviet Government has been
to advance the Russian boundary to what was substantially the boundary
recommended at the time of the Versailles Conference by Lord Curzon, the Foreign
Secretary."

(Lord Halifax, House of Commons, Oct 26 1939.) (1)

"It must be recognised that White Russia and the Ukraine are a racial part of
the Russian family, and the results of the recent election organised by the
Soviet authorities in those provinces may conform pretty closely with the
natural feelings of the inhabitants."

(The Times, Nov 2 1939.)

"[Stalin]... saved Russia from war, but he had done so without any sacrifice
whatever - or rather, with immense gain. Without firing a shot, he had recovered
for Russia much of the territory which she had lost in the days of her
weakness."

?=(Arnold Toynbee.) (2)

Western propaganda and most history books leave out the fact that in entering
Poland at the beginning of the War the Soviets were retaking their former
territory lost as a result of the Brest-Litovsk treaty and the intervention
wars. They also leave out and distort the situation of the Baltic States. The
Baltic States - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were also former Russian
territories lost as a result of Brest-Litovsk and the allied intervention. But
in 1940 the fascist governments of those countries were overthrown and socialist
governments were elected which applied to be reincorporated as Constituent
Republics into the USSR and were accepted.

Western media propagandists always try to imply that Poland before socialism was
not a bad place to live for the majority of its people.

"As an ex-Polish citizen I left Poland in 1939 as an apprentice on board the SS
Barbara... Whilst at sea we heard of the German invasion and sought refuge in
Great Britain... I recall my youth in Warsaw when I witnessed hunger and
privation of the common people. Some of my family died of TB and I remember
seeing people collapse on the street from hunger. Thousands of people had no
regular employment. It was a fine country for the privileged few but for the
majority of the poor people it was a struggle to exist."

(Letter in the Guardian, Aug 23 1981.)

"The advancing Russian troops are being hailed by the peasants as deliverers.
The German invasion is designed to annex to the Reich provinces where the
decided majority of the population is Polish by race, language and tradition. On
the other hand, the Russian armies marched into territories which are not
Polish, and which were forcibly annexed by Poland after the Great War, in spite
of the fierce protests and the armed resistance of the inhabitants. The
inhabitants of Polish Ukraine are of the same race and language as their
neighbours in the Ukrainian Republic of the Soviet Union.

I felt it was a matter of primary importance to call attention at once to these
salient considerations lest we commit ourselves rashly to war against Russia...
In these circumstances it would be an act of criminal folly to place the Russian
advance in the same category as that of the Germans, although it would suit Herr
Hitler's designs that we should do so."

(Lloyd George, in a letter to the Polish Ambassador in London, Sept 28 1939.)
(1)

"A striking example of the new Soviet regime in eastern Poland is furnished by
the town of Bartshevo, where the local committee which replaced the town council
consists of two landless peasants, a carpenter and a labourer."

(Daily Telegraph Sept 23 1939.)

That the Soviets should advance to their original border was reiterated by the
peoples of these territories who elected free assemblies and requested
reunification with the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Socialist Republics.

The Red Army in Poland, as in the Baltic States, saved millions of Ukrainians,
Byelorussians and Jews from the Nazis, taking large numbers of them to safety in
the Eastern regions of the USSR. Many of them preferring to live there still
after the war.

"Furthermore, Russia's action was necessary if Hitler was to be prevented from
dominating the Balkans through direct contact with Rumania. Russia moved across
Germany's path to the Black Sea...

Finally, Russia's action was necessary if Hitler was not to complete his control
over the Baltic and the Baltic States. Instead, Russia has, in the words of Mr.
Hore-Belisha, inflicted a major defeat on Germany in the Baltic."

(The Dean of Canterbury Rev. Hewlett Johnson.) (2)

"We could have wished that Russian armies should be standing on their present
line as friends and allies of Poland, instead of as invaders. But that the
Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of
Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate the line is there, and an Eastern
front has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare assail. When Herr von
Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last week it was to learn the fact, and to
accept the fact, that the Nazi designs upon the Baltic States and upon the
Ukraine must come to a dead stop."

(Winston Churchill, in a radio broadcast from the House of Commons, Oct 1 1939,
The Times Oct 2 1939.)

(1)See:Hewlett Johnson "The Socialist Sixth of the World." Victor Gollancz.
London 1947.

(2)See:Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946. The Eve of War, 1939.

"We have encouraged Poland to fight by our pledge to support her... the truth,
as we now have to admit, as M. Molotov notes, is that our support has so
entirely failed that the Polish resistance has been wiped out, and with it the
Polish army and the Polish government, leaving Poland derelict to be picked up
and put on by Herr Hitler as a shepherd putteth on his garment.

At this point, we being helpless, Mr. Stalin steps in and says 'Not quite. If
the Ukraine and White Russia [former Russian territories annexed by the Wars of
Intervention and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty BM.] are going begging, Russia will
occupy them, Hitler or no Hitler'. No sooner said than done. The Red Army is in
occupation... The unfortunate Fuhrer is compelled to disgorge half his booty and
to face yet another army saying: 'Thus far and no further'.

And instead of giving three cheers for Stalin we are shrieking that all is
lost."

(George Bernard Shaw, The Times Sept 20 1939.)

How serious were the British about honouring their pledge to Poland at the
urgent moment when the Wehrmacht was racing across Poland? They did send 10,000
old First World War rifles. They did promise more transports in six months time.
And they did see the Polish military mission who arrived in London on September
3 1939. But there was no emergency as far as the British Government was
concerned - they kept the Polish military mission waiting in London a whole week
before they saw them.

How was Britain going to honour its pledge to Poland without actually doing
anything to hinder the Eastward march of the Wehrmacht?

Britain and France flooded Germany with leaflets proposing a new "Munich" deal;
this time with Poland as the "gift" that was already in German hands. This was
their "assistance" to Poland: We'll give you to Germany, or Germany will take
you. Suicide or murder! Hitler refused the new "Munich".

The British gamble had again lost. And Hitler could not do his duty and continue
into the USSR.

The British, in no position to issue ultimatums to anybody, issued an
"ultimatum" to Germany to withdraw. By September 3 there was no reply, so
Britain declared "war" on Germany. The "Phoney War" had begun.

(1)See:Pat and Zelda Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Lawrence and
Wishart. London 1944.

(2)Hewlett Johnson "The Socialist Sixth of the World." Victor Gollancz. London
1947.



School and college history, economics and business studies teaching and books do
not contain any of this information.



All the material and information I have presented here is readily available to
historians, writers, journalists, teachers, educators and syllabus publishers.
Although I have spent many hundreds of hours gathering it all together, I did
not have to look very far to find any of it.



When as a trainee history lecturer, it was suggested I take the class on a trip
to the Tower of London and then set them an essay on what life was like for a
soldier in King Charles' Army centuries ago. Very useful knowledge that! A
sociology of the past perhaps? But certainly not history in its most important
sense; unless history is to mean anything old or 'interesting' that you can do
in evening classes, like antiques, flower arranging or basket weaving. When
instead I taught real history, learning from the past in order to change the
future, the collective life-experience of humanity, I was got rid of. The head
of the history department complained that the students had remarked that I made
them think; which the head of history had probably never done in a lifetime of
teaching. I ended up washing and cleaning and emptying human surgical waste in a
hospital.



Unless teachers learn to be brave and intellectually honest (difficult when they
have a mortgage and bills to pay), future historical, social and economic
education and popular 'knowledge' will also not refer to the US or British
history and continuing complicity in global plunder, exploitation, domination
and control, wars of aggrandisement and acquisition, causing the deaths and
devastation of the homes and lands of millions of people - the thousands of
children under the age of two who will die tonight through simple lack of food,
clean water, medicine and education - the untold millions of unnecessary deaths
among the overwhelming majority of humanity on this incredibly rich and abundant
and ultimately sustainable earth.



From Brian Mitchell. Evolution.



Responses and criticisms welcomed. Reply to my personal e-mail if you prefer. My
replies to criticisms will be posted.








"How long will they steal our profits while we stand around and look?" (Bob
Marley, Redemption song.)

"The most remarkable thing about the world is that you can understand it."
(Einstein.)

"If you can't answer a man's arguments, all is not lost; you can still call him
vile names." (US writer Elbert Hubbard.)

"To thine own self be true, and it must follow, as night the day, that thou
canst not be false to any man." (Shakespeare. Hamlet.)

"And if we were all capable of unity to make our blows stronger and infallible
and so increase the effectiveness of all kinds of support given to the
struggling people - how great and close would the future be." (Che Guevara.)



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