1917 AND ALL THAT: THE UNTAUGHT SYLLABUS.
In Their Own Words: A Political History Of The Cold War 1917-1983.
By Brian Mitchell.

Chapters 31-35 of 50.

Chapter 31

IS THIS THE WAY TO TREAT AN ALLY?
ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE POLITICAL CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
"There is today only one military problem – how to help Russia. Yet on that
issue the Chiefs of Staff content themselves with saying that nothing can be
done. They point out the difficulties but make no suggestions for overcoming
them."

(Lord Beaverbrook, in a letter to Harry Hopkins, Oct 1941.) ()

()See:New Times 1. 1987.

One of Churchill's Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war General Ismay
characterised the British Government's attitude in dealing with a working class
Government during their reluctant war-time alliance with the USSR in his
memoirs:

"It must be admitted that the prospect of being Allies with the Bolsheviks was
repugnant."

(General the Lord Ismay, in his memoirs.) ( )

( )See:"The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay"

Quoted in: V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1970.

"The universal hymn of hate whenever a few Englishmen meet together against the
Russians makes me rather depressed and cross... The whole tradition and bias of
the Foreign Office and diplomatic service is violently and unreasoningly
anti-Russian... It is this atmosphere which has made it impossible ever to have
any reasonable agreement between a Conservative Government in Britain and
Russia."

(Labour MP Sir Stafford Cripps, Ambassador to Moscow 1942.) ( )

( )See:Eric Estorick "Stafford Cripps: Master Statesman." NY 1949.

Quoted in: V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1970.

Talking about British foreign policy in delaying the second front in the war, a
US General who took part in the 1942 talks on the second front said:

"The British were masters in negotiations - particularly were they adept in the
use of phrases or words which were capable of more than one meaning or
interpretation. Here was the setting, with all the trappings of a classical
Machiavellian scene. I am not suggesting that the will to deceive was a personal
characteristic of any of the participants. But when matters of state were
involved, our British opposite numbers had elastic scruples... What I witnessed
was the British power of diplomatic finesse in its finest hour, a power that had
been developed over centuries of successful international intrigue, cajollery,
and tacit compulsions."

(US General Albert C. Wedermayer.) ( )

( )See:Albert C. Wedermayer "Wedermayer Reports." NY 1958.

Quoted in: V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1970.

It is crucial that the British public knows about foreign affairs, which
directly or indirectly affects their peace and well being. When asked by the US
Chargé d' Affaires about British public opinion on relations with the USSR in
1942 a Foreign Office Official replied that:

"Soundings in the House of Commons indicated that sentiment there would be
largely favourable and that certainly in the country's present enthusiastically
pro-Russia mood acceptance would be welcomed by the public at large."

(British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Alexander
Cadogan )

At that time it was feared by the Government that if the British public knew
that the British Government's relations with the USSR were antagonistic, in the
words of a telegram fron Eden to the US in March 1942: "the situation in Great
Britain will be catastrophic." ( )

( )See:V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1970.

Public opinion is very powerful and feared by the government; but it must be
massive and overwhelming in order to force the hand of an intransigent
government.

Halifax voiced the British Government's fears that if they did not affect more
reasonable relations with the USSR:

"Mr. Churchill's Government would probably fall and, in that event, Sir Stafford
Cripps would replace him, with the probability that under such a government a
frankly Communist, pro-Moscow policy would be pursued."

(Lord Halifax, March 1942.) ( )

( )See:Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol.III

Quoted in: V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1970.

The British Tories, rather than foul things right up for themselves and let a
Labour Government in, made concessions in foreign policy to Moscow.

But anti-Soviet propaganda built up over the years had luckily only sank
skin-deep into the minds of the British people who were now facing a dangerous
reality:

"The British people had almost forgotten the hostility towards Russia... in its
place came admiration."

#US?(US historian William McNiell.) ( )

( )William Hardy McNiell ""America, Britain and Russia. Their Co-operation and
Conflict." London 1953.

In a private letter quoted by his biographer Chamberlain wrote on March 26 1939:

"I must confess the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief in their
ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to. And I
distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas
of liberty, and and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears.
Moreover, she is both hated and suspected by many of the smaller States, notably
by Poland, Rumania and Finland."

(Chamberlain, in a private letter, March 26 1939.)

"At first, things went smoothly. Toasts were proposed to the victory of the
Allied forces, to the Russian guests, to the courageous Russiam soldiers. But
gradually the protocol reserve melted... Our hospitable hosts started to drop
hints. For all the polite words, jokes and witticisms, the implication of their
rejoinders was not hard to discern: the right-wing Conservatives were scared to
death of the Russians' victory and of the communist influence in the post-war
world."

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, attached to the Soviet Military Mission in London
during the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

"Some of the trade unionists, including Citrine, were inclined to limit the
meetings arranged for the Soviet delegation by the official protocol. Nothing
came out of it. The Russians were regarded highly in Great Britain. The British
workers and ordinary people in general were enthusiastic about Russia. That is
why our delegates were surrounded by huge crowds of people waving flags and
posters wherever they went... people would pick up the Soviet delegates and
carry them on their shoulders... the atmosphere was warm and friendly. And there
was no conservative trade unionist to prevent it from being so."

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, attached to the Soviet Military Mission in London
during the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

The Soviets insisted that the British should recognise the USSR's western
frontiers existing at the moment Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. But the
British, hoping to gain a territorial advantage for capitalism by the end of the
war, kept putting this issue off until the end of the war.

"I told them that in my experience the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had
never broken an engagement or treaty."

(Churchill, Feb 1 1943.) ( )

( )Correspondence... Vol.1.

"I know of no Government which stands to its obligations, even in its own
despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government."

(Winston Churchill, Feb 27 1945.) ( )

?( )P&ZII p78?

"In fact, on almost every political problem, the Russians made sufficient
concessions for an agreement to be reached."

(US Admiral William D. Leahy, who was present at many wartime talks with the
Soviets.) ( )

( )See:William D. Leahy "I Was There." NY 1950.

Quoted in: V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1970.

"Our navy was short of mine-sweepers. The few mine-sweepers supplied to us by
the United States could not meet our requirements. Therefore, we decided to
place an order for mine-sweepers with Canada. Having drawn up the requisition, I
called on Dudley Pound and asked him to exert all his influence to get our order
through as soon as possible. The First Sea Lord assured me that all the
necessary instructions would be forwarded to the Canadian shipbuilding firms. It
should be recalled that in those years Canada was still a British dominion and
instructions from a member of the metropolitan War Cabinet would never be
without effect.

Some time later I dropped in at the Admiralty on some business, I talked to a
not-too-high-ranking officer whom I had often met before about our requisition
for the mine-sweepers.

"Let me see, Admiral... As far as I know the firm has been instructed to refuse
your order."

"Who could have issued such an instruction? The First Sea Lord assured me..."

"Excuse me, sir. There must be some misunderstanding. It was Lord Pound who
signed the letter instructing the Canadian shipbuilders..."

Surely not!" I exclaimed.

The officer... handed me a copy of the letter in question... The letter was
signed by Pound. Although I knew that the First Sea Lord was not a friend of
ours, I never thought he was capable of perfidy...

Next time I saw Pound I asked him: "What about our Canadian order, Admiral?"

"As far as I know, everything is all right, Admiral."

I then took the copy of the letter out of my folder and handed it to the First
Sea Lord. Pound had never been eloquent. He spoke as if he was chewing an
endless rope. This time he did not even chew on his words, growing red he choked
on them and kept silent, only looking round at his assistants and interpreters.

"Admiral," I went on, "the lives of thousands of people are at stake, as well as
the victory over our common foe and the future of mankind. Meanwhile you
dare..."

His eyes riveted on something under his desk, Pound mumbled that that was a
vexing misunderstanding. But I knew that that was not the case. Like some other
people in the British Government, he simply failed to overcome his prejudices
and renounce the class hatred for the state of workers and peasants, even in the
name of Britain's national interests."

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain during
the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

The members of the Soviet military mission in Britain during the Second World
War had "guardians", responsible for liason with the Allies, attached to them.
These liason officers turned out to be Russian emigres, ex Tsarist army
officers, who had taken a special intelligence course. The "guardians" reported
everything they could find out about the Soviets to their superior, Assistant
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Brigadier General Firebrass. The officer
the British planned to send to Moscow as coordinator of the Allied Military
Missions was Firebrass's secretary, a Major Swan. Swan had been commander of
British occupational troops in the War of Intervention against the Soviet Union
after the revolution and was vehemently anti-Soviet. These were the people the
British government sent to work with their Soviet allies during the war.

The British used all sorts of excuses to try to prevent the supply convoys to
the USSR, such as conditions in the Arctic, which were always alleged to favour
the Germans.

Pound, in a letter to US Admiral King, said that the Arctic convoys were
becoming a millstone round the Allies' neck.

Losses are inevitable in a war, but in general the majority of convoy ships got
through. Churchill said about the convoys in a letter to General Ismay that "The
operation is justified if a half gets through."

To give credence to the diplomatic strivings to cease supplies to the USSR and
not to launch a second front, two acts of propaganda were staged.

Due to the German summer offensive of 1942 the Soviets could have done with
extra supplies from Britain and the US. But these supplies ceased just at that
time. The excuse used was the losses suffered in June of the convoy PQ17.

But the circumstances surrounding the loss of PQ17 are extremely suspicious.
Lord Beaverbrook had already reported in The Times that an influential group in
the British Government opposed supplies to the Soviet Union.

Convoy PQ17 left Iceland on June 27 1942 for Archangel. As soon as this convoy
had reached 200 km east of Medvezhy Island the British Admiralty said that it
had

"grounds for presuming" that German ships might attack the convoy.

On July 4 the Admiralty ordered the cruisers escorting the convoy to withdraw
westward at high speed and the convoy to disperse and make for Soviet ports
alone. Escorting destroyers also withdrew.

"Cruiser force withdraw to Westward at high speed."

(Admiralty signal to PQ17, 9.11pm, July 4 1942.) (1)

"Owing to threat from surface ships convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian
ports."

(Admiralty signal to PQ17, 9.23pm, July 4 1942.) (2)

?Convoy PQ17 scattered 10.15pm July 4.

"MOST URGENT. IMMEDIATE.1625B/5

Anticipate most likely time of enemy attack is now tonight 5th/6th or early
hours of tomorrow 6th July and that enemy may strike in 065 Degs. Direction from
North Cape."

(Admiralty signal to PQ17, 4.25pm, July 5 1942.) (3)

?But German ships were not attacking the convoy. History books say that the
Tirpitz put to sea in the afternoon of July 5. But the British Admiralty knew
where the Tirpitz was. She was at her base in a Norwegian fjord:

#"When the First Sea Lord asked (around 9pm) where they [the German Navy B.M.]
were, he was told they had not been seen to leave the anchorage... he promptly
scattered PQ17. Intelligence was right. Tirpitz was at anchor. Our history books
say she put to sea eventually pm on 5th July... The first time Admiralty knew
where Tirpitz really was since she left Trondheim...

#All I know at 5am on that memorable Sunday morning, after digesting Signal 59,
was that those enemy heavy ships which I had expected to appear every successive
moment since 10.10pm the previous evening - which according to my report was the
time of the 'disperse' and 'scatter' signals were first known to us - were not
even known to be at sea. I now felt quite certain that they were nowhere near
us."

(Captain of British PQ17 vessel Keppel, Jack Broome, in his book "Convoy Is To
Scatter.")

"Then the well documented and still shameful events of PQ17 began to be set in
motion. Our cruisers and batleships who were screening us were withdrawn in the
face of what was thought to be a threat from German warships. They made it back
to Scapa Flow. The close escort destroyers followed to try to engage the enemy,
an enemy which never appeared. PQ17 was abandoned.Thyen came the notorious
signal from Whitehall: Convoy to Scatter. What would become known as Bloody
Sunday was about to begin... Ships, out of sight of each other and alone, were
easy prey... we heard the death cries... On that Arctic night without darkness,
men died frozen stiff, huddled close on rafts... Eventually, we arrived at
Archangel... Only 13 made it. Twenty-three had been sunk with a loss of 469
tanks, 1,400 vehicles, 200 aircraft and 158 merhcnt seamen. A rescue ship and a
fleet oiler also went down. But not one Royal Navy vessel was lost. A shameful
episode."

(Harold W. Charlton DSC, SS River Afton, Saga March 1992.)

After carefully monitoring the situation, German aircraft and U-boats operating
from Norway then proceeded to sink 23 ships of the 34 of convoy PQ17 without
hindrance. But as for the German fleet which gave the British "grounds for
presuming" a German attack; German ships had not left their bases,to attack the
convoy. 130,000 tons out of an original 200,000 tons of supplies to the USSR
were lost

(1)See:Captain Jack Broome "Convoy is to Scatter." William Kimber. London 1972.

(2)See:Captain Jack Broome "Convoy is to Scatter." William Kimber. London 1972.

(3)See:Captain Jack Broome "Convoy is to Scatter." William Kimber. London 1972.

When Captain Broome's ship Keppel docked in London after the PQ17 disaster the
First Lord of the Admiralty stepped aboard:

"I asked him down to my cabin. The moment of truth seemed near. When we were
alone I asked him point blank: "Why was PQ17 scattered?" All I remember about
the answer I got was that it was no answer, or moment of truth. My question was
precisely what he had come, armed with evasive politics, to decry.

Of this I am certain. The Right Honourable A.V.Alexander left my cabin in no
doubt whatever that I was both disappointed and disgusted.

My conclusion: had the Admiralty's conscience been clear, I would never have had
the doubtful pleasure of that meeting."

(Captain of British PQ17 vessel Keppel, Jack Broome, in his book "Convoy Is To
Scatter.")

"There are a great many things that I could say. But perhaps I had better not."

(Admiral Tovey, to British newspapermen.) (1)

What was the "great deal" that Admiral Tovey could have said?

It was disclosed fifteen years later, in 1957, by the official British Naval
history that Admiral Tovey's orders had be repeatedly overruled by the First Sea
Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound. (2)

It is known that the German Naval Command and Hitler himself did not want to
risk a conflict with the superior forces of the British fleet. The German
surface fleet left Altenfjord at noon on July 5, but in trying to do so the
German pocket battleship Lutzow and three destroyers ran aground. The German
surface ships were ordered to make a quick strike and withdraw in order to avoid
a clash with the British fleet. Tirpitz was recalled and turned back at 9.30pm
on July 5.

The withdrawal of the British naval escort from convoy PQ17 was an open
invitation to the strong but vulnerable German heavy ships at Altenfjord.

The British Government ordered an inquiry, but no one was given blame. Instead,
the convoys were stopped. (3)

"In view of the disaster to PQ17 the Admiralty proposed to suspend the Arctic
convoys."

(Winston Churchill "The Second World War.")

"To attempt to run the next convoy, PQ18, would bring no benefit to you and
would only involve a dead loss to the common cause."

(Churchill, in a telegram to Stalin, July 18 1942.) (4)

"According to our naval experts, the arguments of British naval experts on the
necessity of stopping deliveries of war supplies to Northern harbours of the
USSR are untenable. They are convinced that, given goodwill and readiness to
honour obligations, steady deliveries could be effected, with heavy loss to the
Germans. The British Admiralty's order to the PQ17 convoy to abandon the supply
ships and return to Britain, and to the supply ships to disperse and make for
Soviet harbours singly, without escort, is, in the view of our experts, puzzling
and inexplicable. Of course, I do not think steady deliveries to northern Soviet
ports are possible without risk of loss. But then no major task can be carried
out in wartime without risk or losses. You know, of course, that the Soviet
Union is suffering far greater losses. Be that as it may. I never imagined that
the British Government would deny us delivery of war materials precisely now,
when the Soviet Union is badly in need of them in view of the grave situation on
the Soviet-German Front."

(Soviet Government protest note to Churchill, July 23 1942.)(5)

Lend Lease supplies were also ceased later in 1942 with the excuse that "too
many ships" were tied up in convoy duty:

(1)See:P.Lund and H.Ludlam "PQ17 - Convoy to Hell." New English Library. London
1968.

(2)See:"The War At Sea." HMSO London 1957.

#(3)See:The Times June 22 1942.

(4)See:Admiral N. Kharlamov "Difficult Mission." Progress Publishers. Moscow
1986.

(5)See:Admiral N. Kharlamov "Difficult Mission." Progress Publishers. Moscow
1986.

"Churchill, late in September 1942, suggested dropping the Murmansk convoy of
Lend Lease aid because it tied up too many ships in convoy duty. Roosevelt
agreed, but suggested keeping Stalin ignorant of this decision as long as
possible."

(US historian William Neumann.) (1)

The attitude of the British to the Soviets during the war is also revealed in
the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the British ship Edinburgh, loaded
with seven tons of gold from the Soviet Union to pay for supplies from Britain.
The Soviet officers sailing on the Edinburgh were received with warm friendship
from the lower officers, but were treated by the Admiralty officers with a
frostiness bordering on contempt. The head of the Soviet Military Mission to
Britain during the war recalls:

"As for the commander of the convoy escort Rear Admiral Bonham-Carter... He gave
the Soviet officers a frosty reception and, having muttered a few formal words,
rose giving them to understand that the audience was over. Of aristocratic stock
and arrogant by nature, Bonham-Carter was sceptical about the Soviet Navy and
the qualification of the Soviet sailors and officers. I have mentioned this
trait of the Admiral's character because, in my opinion, it largely accounted
for the misfortune that yet was to befall the flagship.

...the People at the [Soviet B.M.] Northern Fleet Headquarters informed the
British Admiral about the situation en route and indicated to him on the map the
most probable areas of German submarine attacks. Bonham-Carter listened with a
weary air. He, an Admiral of the "world's best Navy", was being instructed by
dabblers.

"It seems we've got a hard job ahead of us, sir," the cruiser's commanding
officer said...

"Nonsense," the Admiral grumbled. "I hope you are not going to take the
Russians' information seriously?"

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain during
the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

After being hit by German torpedos, the Edinburgh was rudderless, listing around
15 degrees and floating dead in the water. The Soviets suggested that the
cruiser be towed to Kola Bay, but Bonham-Carter would not hear of it, saying we
shall wait for the British destroyers. The tow cables of the British destroyers
broke. Two Soviet destroyers drew up and suggested that the passengers and gold
be transferred to them to reduce the weight on the Edinburgh. Bonham-Carter
refused. Bonham-Carter also rejected a Soviet tow boat reinforced with
destroyers and aircraft. Soviet Admiral Kharlamov recalls:

"The Edinburgh was still afloat and could still be towed to Kola Bay. That would
have taken only two or three days to do, but Rear Admiral Bonham-Carter ordered
that she should be sunk. The destroyers fired three torpedoes... and the cruiser
floundered into the deep by the head."

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain during
the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

The British also had the strange and suspicious policy of sinking convoy
transport ships bound for the Soviet Union that were hit but could easily be
saved. They even wanted to sink Soviet transport ships in the convoys.
Naturally, the Soviets refused to allow this and saved their ships themselves.
One such example was the Soviet tanker Azerbaijan with convoy PQ17. Azerbaijan
was hit by a torpedo from a German plane and was burning. The Soviet crew put
out the fire while the tanker's anti aircraft gun crew, which were all women,
kept firing at the enemy. A rescue ship pulled alongside and proposed taking off
the ship's company, but was told by

(1)William Neumann "Making the Peace, 1941-1945." Washington 1950.

Azerbaijan "No assistance needed, move away." Shortly afterwards the convoy
commander was surprised to receive the message fron the Azerbaijan "Number 52
reporting. Going to take my place in the order." When the Allied ships William
Hooper and Navarino were damaged and abandoned they were sunk by British Naval
ships. Soviet Admiral Kharlamov writes:

"In our opinion, to sink a vessel carrying valuable cargo, without even so much
as assessing the extent of the damage and attempting to save it, is not only
nonsensical, but also is counter to all the good naval traditions.

But it is not just a case of disregarding traditions here. According to the
British Admiralty's instruction, the escort ships were to sink the vessels
damaged by torpedoes or bombs. In many cases, however, such vessels were not
fatally damaged, and could remain afloat and proceed on their voyage.

However, in keeping with the Admiralty's instruction, the transport's companies
made no attempt to save the damaged vessels. I do not question the tenacity of
the British and US navy men. Most of them deserved every praise. What I question
is the Admiralty's decision to finish off the damaged ships. I am sure they
could have been saved."

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain during
the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

Another example was the Soviet ship Stary Bolshevik, with convoy PQ16, which
after fighting off some fifteen air attacks, was on fire. The British escort
commander suggested the ship's company transfer to an escort ship while the
British navy sank the Stary Bolshevik. The captain ot the Stary Bolshevik
replied "We are not going to bury the ship," and the escort ship departed. The
next day the crew put out the fire and got the ship and its cargo safely to its
destination.

PQ17 check and add:

"Secret. Most Immediate. Cruiser force to withdraw to westward at high speed."

"Secret. Immediate. Owing to threat from surface ships convoy is to disperse and
proceed to Russian ports."

"Secret. Most Immediate. Convoy is to scatter."

Azerbaijan, though badly damaged, together with the Soviet ice-breaker Murmansk,
helped to refloat aeveral Allied ships and tow them out of the Matochkin Shar
straits.

PQ17

On July 18 1942, while rescue ships were receiving distress signals one after
the other from stricken ships of convoy PQ17, Churchill sent the following
telegram to Stalin:

"To attempt to run the next convoy, PQ18, would bring no benefit to you and
would only involve a dead loss to the common cause."

(Winston Churchill, in a telegram to Stalin, July 18 1942.) ()

()See:Admiral N. Kharlamov "Difficult Mission." Progress. Moscow 1986.

It became obvious to the Soviets that the British policy was to see that as much
material as possible headed for the Soviet went to the bottom of the ocean.

September 1942 the 40 vessels of convoy PQ18 put to sea. Out of 12 transport
vessels lost west of Bear Island ten were sunk by the Allies in accordance with
British Admiralty instructions. East of Bear Island (the Soviet operational
zone), only one ship, the American ship Kentucky, was lost. Kentucky was damaged
but still able to move, but following Admiralty instructions, the company left
the ship and it was sunk by British and German fire.

Because of the widespread public pressure for a second front; the government
felt they had to find a way to get out of it. In Britain at the time there were
Canadian forces who were becoming impatient for action and were creating trouble
verging on mutiny. They wanted to fight or go home. The government felt they had
to do something.

Churchill set up an act of propaganda for the British and US press far exceeding
that of Goebbels. He directed a raid on the French coastal resort of Dieppe on
August 19/20 1942 with the Canadians as the main assault force, using tanks, and
in daylight.

The coast at Dieppe consists of a steep shingle beach, which was unsuitable for
tanks, and was surrounded by high cliffs which could only be scaled under
massive air cover.

British troops who were supposed to be the second wave of attack, with tanks
waterproofed for the occasion, were held back in the UK. The mission was sent to
storm the beach and cliffs of Dieppe in daylight and without air cover and were
defeated by the German forces.

There was no military purpose in the Dieppe landing:

"There were no military objectives to justify landing a division in France, and
why use tanks and why attack in daylight? Heavy bombers could have destroyed the
batteries, harbour facilities...

It was a bad plan, and it had no chance of success."

(Lord Lovat, participant in Dieppe landing.) (1)

The day after the landing, with stories saying "see, we weren't ready", "it's
too costly", "a second front is not possible", the Western allied media let the
British, Canadian and American public know, and tried to let the Soviet public
know that a second front was "not possible".

AP press headlines from Canada reported:

"CANADIANS CALL ATTACK ON DIEPPE TOO COSTLY."

(AP Cincinnati Times-Star, Sept 18 1942.)

"CANADA LOST 67% OF FORCE AT DIEPPE."

(AP New York Times, Sept 19 1942.)

"CHURCHILL HUSHES SECOND FRONT TALK."

(New York Times Sept 30 1942.)

"Of the 5,000 Canadian troops who made up five-sixths of the assault forces,
there were 3,350 casualties."

(Statement of Canadian Defense Minister Ralston.) (2)

Those in the US who still spoke for a second front were labelled "reds" by the
US press and the Dies Committee for Un-American Activities.

Churchill reasoned that the longer the Soviets fought the weaker they would be
at the end of the war and the stronger the British domination of Europe. The
Dieppe raid was a great propaganda success for Churchill against a second front.

"We share completely Mr. Churchill's belief that ' a dozen Dieppes on one day,
and a couple of Dunkirks a week or two later, would not have helped Russia'...
The alternative plan of a strong attack delivered from North Africa 'at the soft
underbelly of the Axis' has far greater promise of success."

(The Times Nov 18 1942.)

(1)See:John Grigg "1943 - The Victory That Never Was." Eyre Methuen. London
1980.

(2)See:George Seldes "The People Don't Know. The American Press and the Cold
War." Gaer Associates. NY 1949.

#The truth about the Dieppe incident came out in February 1943. There were no
heavy losses, no 67% casualties. The Canadians lost only 170 dead; and claimed
2,540 missing. The Germans claimed 2,500 prisoners. (1)

"We went to Dieppe with the intention of re-embarking. If it had been planned as
another sort of operation there is no doubt that we could have made the thing
stick. We could have stayed put; the Germans could not have driven us off."

(Lieutenant-General NcNaughton, Canadian Commander of Dieppe landing.) (2)

"We were sent into the raid, in my opinion, largely to prove to our people, the
Americans, and the Russians that a second front just wasn't on."

(Canadian Officer on the Dieppe raid Forbes West, Royal Regiment of Canada.) (3)

The British even found reasons for delaying the 1944 invasion of Europe,
operation Overlord, at the Teheran Conference of November 1943:

"If we allot further resources for operations in the Aegean and the Balkans, as
we should do to take full advantage of the situation, Overlord [the invasion of
Europe B.M.] must perforce be postponed. The Americans take the view that this
is a breach of contract and almost dishonourable."

(British General Kennedy, Oct 31 1943.) (4)

"We have now crystallised our ideas as to the strategy to be advocated in the
coming conference. The main points are... to accept a postponement of Overlord.
All these proposals have been worked out in a fair amount of detail here, and
the stage is now set for the discussions."

(British General Kennedy, in his diary, Nov 1943.) (5)

(1)See:George Seldes "The People Don't Know. The American Press and the Cold
War." Gaer Associates. NY 1949.

(2)See:George Seldes "The People Don't Know. The American Press and the Cold
War." Gaer Associates. NY 1949.

(3)See:Ronald Atkin "Dieppe 1942." MacMillan. London 1980.

(4)John Kennedy "The Business of War." London 1957.

Quoted in:V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1970.

(5)John Kennedy "The Business of War." London 1957.

"Certain circles, both in the United States and Britain, feared that should the
Red Army defeat Germany single-handed, the Soviet Union would have enormous
influence on the post-war development of and social progress in the European
countries. The Allies could not allow that to happen. This is why they
considered the opening of a second front in Europe not so much a military action
but as a political measure aimed at preventing the progressive political forces
from coming to power in European countries."

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain during
the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

Invading the Balkans and Italy, Churchill's idealistic and meaningless "soft
underbelly of Europe", would still leave Hitler's main economic centres intact;
he still had the resources of most of Europe. Also Italy and the Balkans are far
from the Allies supplies. An invasion of France would attack Hitler directly in
Europe and also be far easier to supply.

After the British and Americans launched their Mediterranean invasion and made
it quite obvious that they intended to put off a second front in Europe until
after 1943 Stalin wrote to Churchill:

"You say that you 'quite understand' my disappointment. I must tell you that the
point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the
preservation of its confidence in its Allies, a confidence which is being
subjected to severe stress. One should not forget that it is a question of
saving millions of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia and
reducing the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet armies, compared with which the
sacrifices of the Anglo-American armies are insignificant."

(Stalin, in a message to Churchill, June 24 1943.) ()

()See:Correspondence.

"When our three-day-long tour of the forward positions was over, Firebrass
...said that the reporters were eager to have an interview I had promised
them... I decided to prepare the text of a written statement.

No sooner had I left my tent in the morning than I met General Firebrass who
informed me that the reporters had already gathered. He looked anxious.

"Excuse me, sir," he said as soon as we exchanged greetings. "I should like to
know what you are going to tell the journalists."

...I handed him the text... his face paled: quite obviously he was displeased by
my statement, which read as far as I remember as follows: "The Soviet Military
Mission has familiarised itself with the state of affairs at the Allied front.
We saw an abundance of modern, powerful materiel. We observed the high fighting
trim of officers and men. We saw that the supply services were excellently
organised...

But we also saw weak, unprotected German positions. And we do not understand why
the Allies are marking time..."

General Firebrass took off his glasses, folded the paper and mouthed grimly, "We
can't agree with such a statement. There is hardly any sense in your addressing
a press conference."

"But why, General? I have been objective in all I wrote."

"And yet, the press conference will have to be cancelled."

"That's up to you, General. But I insist in your telling the journalists that it
was you, not I, who cancelled the press conference."

(Soviet Admiral Kharlamov, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain during
the Second World War, in his book "Difficult Mission.")

An example of the extremes of pettiness to which the British government and
media would go is its refusal to play the Soviet National Anthem, which at the
time was "The Internationale", along with those of the other Allies as was the
custom prior to the BBC's 9 0'clock News on Sunday nights. This refusal, on
instructions from the Foreign Office, was maintained even after the Anglo-Soviet
Pact of July 12 1941. On Sunday July 13 a Soviet march was played instead. When
this insulting behaviour against the USSR was widely objected to, the Minister
for Information Mr. Duff Cooper's even more absurd reply in the House of Commons
was that in future no national anthems would be played because "The increase in
the number of national anthems renders it impossible to do justice to them in
the time allotted."



Chapter 32

WHILE THE GERMANS CONTINUE TO KILL "AS MANY AS POSSIBLE" –
THE WEST DELAYS A SECOND FRONT FOR THREE MORE YEARS.
If Hitler had gained the USSR he would have had all its massive resources and
have continued his drive to the Middle and Far East and then Britain and the
USA. But despite their empty praises, the West feared a victorious Soviet Union.

#But the Soviet war economy began to rise in early 1942. Then came the Soviet
counteroffensive and the defeat of German troops at the very gates of Moscow.
Hitler's blitzkrieg was failing. For the first time in the war the Nazis were
forced to retreat. The Red Army had shown that the German army was not
invincible. Even The Times remarked that:

"Russia has been reborn and regenerated through Lenin's leadership. He laid the
foundation of an edifice whose solid strength, firmly based on a united and
unshakable national spirit, has withstood the utmost fury of a rampant and
hitherto victorious Hitlerism... It was Lenin who first brought home to the
consciousness of the Western world the truth that a civilisation based on the
antagonism of capital and labour inevitably carried within it the seeds of its
own destruction."

(The Times April 23 1942.)

And later:

"The people's army of the days of weakness in 1918 is still the people's at this
moment of their supreme and victorious effort; it is because through these 25
years it has never lost touch with the people or ceased to draw its strength
from the people's life that it has proved itself invincible by all the malice of
the invader...

...the Red Army is a thinking army, in whose minds you find the unquenchable
curiousity of Russian people as you find their richness of talent and their
great-heartedness."

(The Times Feb 22 1943.)

After much pressure from the general public and labour movement; on May 26 1942
an Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance for 20 years was signed.

This was not announced in the House of Commons until June 11.

"Had it [this treaty B.M.] been a fact some years ago... this war could never
have occurred."

(Lloyd George, House of Commons, June 11 1942.) (1)

Although public opinion had forced the British government to agree to an
alliance in May 1942, which contained a commitment to launch a second front in
1942, the government had other ideas.

Even before the Anglo-Soviet-US communique was made public, British diplomacy
was trying to find a way out of the Western Allies' commitment to a second front
in Europe in 1942. Seeking US agreement, Churchill sent one of his Chiefs of
Staff Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten to Washington:

"[Mountbatten] presented to the President and Hopkins the British case against
trying to gain a foothold across the English Channel in 1942."

(US historians Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell in their book "Strategic Planning
for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942.") (2)

(1)See:Pat and Zelda Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Lawrence and
Wishart. London 1944.

(2)Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell "Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
1941-1942." Washington 1958.

If the Western Allies were not going to launch a second front in 1942, how were
they going to show their commitment to the Allied Communique of June 11 1942 -
"complete agreement... to the urgent tasks of the creation of a second front in
Europe in 1942"?

Churchill supplies the answer:

"There were other alternatives which lay in my mind. The first was the descent
on French Northwest Africa [operation Torch B.M.]... I had a second alternative
plan... This was Jupiter, namely, the liberation of Northern Norway... If it had
been in my power to give orders I would have settled upon Torch and Jupiter."

(Winston Churchill, April 1942.) (1)

Eight days after the Communique was made public, on June 19, Churchill arrived
in the USA to discuss the matter. In a memorandum to Roosevelt he wrote:

"What else can we do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre during
the whole of 1942?... It is in this setting and on this background that the
French Northwest Africa operation should be studied."

(Churchill, in a memorandum to Roosevelt, June 1942.) (2)

The British defeats and surrenders at Singapore and North Africa made Churchill
realise he had to do something to save the British forces in North Africa. He
also had to save himself, since he had just been through a political storm in
Parliament and a motion of no confidence in the conduct of the war. An
Anglo-American landing in North Africa would ease both, since a North Africa
landing would delay the opening of a second front.

"During the month of July, when I was politically at my weakest and without a
gleam of military success, I had to procure from the United States the decisions
which... dominated the next two years of the war. This was the abandonment of
all plans for crossing the Channel in 1942 and the occupation of French North
Africa in the autumn or winter by a large Anglo-American expedition."

(Winston Churchill "The Second World War.") (3)

Hesitant at first, Roosevelt agreed:

"Even though we must reluctantly agree to no Sledgehammer [a European invasion
B.M.] in 1942, I think we should press forward vigorously for the 1943
enterprise... Gymnast [the North African operation B.M.] has the great
advantage of being a purely American enterprise."

(Roosevelt to Hopkins, July 15 1942.) (4)

"By nightfall of the twenty-fifth Hopkins was able to send the President a cable
which may be cited as a model of triumphant brevity. It consisted of the single
word, 'Africa'. 'Thank God!' was President Roosevelt's scarcely more verbose
reply."

(US historian Trumbull Higgins.) (5)

(1)Winston Churchill "The Second World War." Vol IV.

(2)See:Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World War." Vol. IV

(3)See:Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World War." Vol. IV

(4)See:Robert E. Sherwood "Roosevelt and Hopkins." New York 1948.

(5)Trumbull Higgins "Winston Churchill and the Second Front, 1940-1943." New
York 1957.

Churchill pointed to the British "Torch" invasion of North Africa in November
1942 as the "true second front in 1942". The British operations against the
Germans in the North African theatre in 1941 and 1942 could not have been a
serious attempt to defeat the German army, the bulk of which were in the Soviet
Union, nor could they have been a substitute for a second front. It made more
sense in terms of British imperial interests in that area and even more sense as
a delaying tactic in order that the Western Allies might take advantage of what
they hoped would be a Soviet weakness at the end of the war. It was maintained,
and still is in some history books, that the North African invasion would take
the pressure off the Soviets.

False reports "from Ankara" about many German divisions diverting from the
Eastern front to France because the Germans now feared an allied invasion were
published by The Times to create the impression that the pressure had been taken
off the Soviets:

"Now, as German troops begin to be withdrawn from the Eastern Front for use in
France - Ankara reports that as many as 42 divisions are involved."

(The Times Nov 18 1942.)

This report, like all the "Ankara" reports in the war and since, was completely
false. Would the British have really disclosed where their intelligence was
coming from anyway? Or was "Ankara" merely created to provide a credible
"source" for false British propaganda?

As German war documents and Goebbels' diaries show, German divisions did not
move from the Eastern Front during those years:

"Obsessed with the idea of securing a decisive victory over the Soviet armies,
Hitler refused to give his attention to the Central Mediterranean theatre... did
not bring any relief to the Soviet Armies."

(French General Koeltz, commander of French troops in N. Africa.) (1)

"At 4pm I drove up to Goering's home... He is somewhat worried about our having
pretty much stripped the West in order to bring things to a standstill in the
East. One dreads to think what would happen if the English and the Americans
were suddenly to attempt a landing."

(Goebbels, in his diary March 3 1942.)

"The Fuhrer is somewhat worried lest the English now attempt an invasion in the
West. While we have very strong lines of fortifications, there is nothing behind
them but a thin veil of reserves."

(Goebbels, in his diary Sept 10 1943.)

"The armed forces of Germany and her allies are strained to the utmost... In the
West, Germany has 1,373,000 men. In the East, the Russians have 5,500,000, we
have 4,183,000... It is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should
have avoided forming the Second Front in the West, which their Russian allies
have demanded for two years. A successful penetration of the Western defences
would soon break through to Belgium, North French and West German industry and
so prove fatal."

(Hitler's Chief of General Staff General Jodl, Nov 1943.) (2)

The Germans were again convinced of Allied evasion of a real second front; so
much so that they did not, as dishonest British historians suggest, take any
pressure off the Soviets:

(1)Quoted in:V.Trukhanovsky "British Foreign Policy During World War II."
Progress Publishers. Moscow 1970.

(2)See:The Nuremberg Trial documents.

Also quoted in The Times Nov 28 1945.

"Instead of pulling German troops out of Russia, the disclosure of the Allied
hand with Torch enabled the Germans to strengthen their army in Russia... This
fact is contrary to the claims in Britain to this day to the effect that Torch
was designed to bring aid to Russia."

(US historian Trumbull Higgins, International Affairs, April 1959.)

But the overriding reason for delay in a second front was that the German and
Soviet armies hadn't yet exhausted each other and destroyed "as many as
possible".

Churchill's hidden policy and the more open statements of Truman and
Moore-Brabazon were fully in line with a US strategic plan of 1942, which
advised that the invasion of Western Europe should take place not earlier than
1943. An operation in 1942 would be justified only if:

"(1) The situation on the Russian front becomes desperate, i.e. the success of
German arms becomes so complete as to threaten the imminent collapse of Russian
resistance... (2) The German situation in Eastern Europe becomes critically
weakened."

(Robert E. Sherwood "Roosevelt and Hopkins.") (1)

"We have hitherto discussed Sledgehammer on the basis that Russia is either
triumphant or crushed. It is more probable that an intermediate situation will
confront us. The Russian battle may long hang in the balance; or, again, the
result may be indeterminate, and the Russian front will be maintained, though
somewhat further to the east."

(Winston Churchill The Second World War.")

"I was quite clear in my own mind that the moment for the opening of a Western
Front... would not present itself during 1943... This plan, of course, depended
on Russia holding on... it seemed a safe bet that she would last out."

#(Lord Alan Brooke, December 1942.) (2)

In other words, the Truman - Moore-Brabazon policy: if we see the Germans
winning, we help the Soviets; if we see the Soviets winning, we help the
Germans; and in that way, the two armies will severely weaken and destroy each
other and we will march in and occupy as far as the Urals.

US historian Trumbull Higgins wrote that Churchill "deliberately deceived his
Russian ally". In order to placate Stalin Churchill declared that the second
front had been put off only until 1943:

"British and American governments... were preparing for a very great operation
in 1943. For this purpose a million American troops were now scheduled to reach
the United Kingdom... in the spring of 1943."

(Winston Churchill The Second World War.")

No doubt to wait while the German and Soviet armies destroy "as many as
possible."

(1)See:Robert E. Sherwood "Roosevelt and Hopkins." New York 1948.

(2)See:Arthur Bryant "The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943." London 1957.



Chapter 33

STALINGRAD – KURSK – THE TURNING POINT IN THE WAR.
The Germans took advantage of Britain's failure to open a second front in 1942
and their cessation of supplies to Northern USSR and launched an offensive
towards the Caucasus. The German armies got as far as occupying nine tenths of
Stalingrad before being halted and turned back.

"The Russians had sacrificed more men to save one ruined city than the Americans
were to lose in combat during all the campaigns of the war. In doing so they had
made the defence of Stalingrad a turning point in the history of Europe, if not
the world."

(British historians F. Knapton and T. Derry.) (1)

Another British historian wrote:

"If you are honest, whatever you may think about Communism, you cannot withhold
admiration for the Russians and their military leaders, for the courage,
endurance and skill in holding the Germans at Stalingrad in 1942, and with
Stalingrad as their springboard, eventually turning the tide of war in their own
favour, and, incidentally, to the advantage of the Western Allies."

(British historian Ronald Seth.) (2)

The Germans easily recovered from El Alemein, but they never recovered from
Stalingrad. Soviet soldiers who stood against the Germans at Stalingrad said
"There is nowhere to retreat to; there is nothing behind us now but the Volga."
The Red Army halted the Germans at Stalingrad. The only road open for the
Germans at Stalingrad was back to Berlin.

After the failure of the Germans' most concentrated attack on Stalingrad the
Soviet counter-offensive began and the Red Army surrounded over 300,000 Germans.
By February 2 1943 German Field Marshal von Paulus had surrendered at Stalingrad
together with 24 Generals, 2,500 officers and more then 90,000 German troops -
all that was left of the German Sixth Army.

The Germans were retreating from the Caucasus. Later in January the Red Army
liberated Voronezh. In February the Soviets re-took Rostov and the battle of
Kursk began.

Even in 1943 the Western Allies repeated what they had done in 1942. They
announced delays in opening a second front and delays in supplies of war
materials to the USSR just before the new German summer offensive at Kursk.
Plans for British escapades in the Mediterranean and North Africa showed the
Germans that they would not be threatened by a second front in Europe.

Britain and the US began a campaign of disinformation to the Soviet Government
saying that as a result of a planned Anglo-American landing in the Mediterranean
the Wehrmacht had put off its summer offensive. Churchill suggested to Stalin
that:

"You may not even be heavily attacked by the Germans this summer. That would
vindicate decisively what you once called the "military correctness" of our
Mediterranean strategy."

(Churchill to Stalin, June 27 1943.) (3)

A few days later the Nazi offensive at Kursk began.

Just before the German offensive the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull told
Andrei Gromyko that Germany would not be able to launch such an offensive.

British intelligence also informed Moscow that no such German offensive would
take place:

(1)F. Knapton and T. Derry "Europe and the World Since 1914." London 1967.

(2)Ronald Seth "Stalingrad - Point of Return." London 1959.

(3)See:Alexander Werth "Russia at War 1941-1945." Pan Books. London 1965.

"We decided not to pass this information on to the Russians at once. It was
fortunate that we did so, because the long awaited German offensive started a
few days later."

(Lieutenant General MacFarlane, head of the British Military Mission in Moscow,
in a report to London.) (1)

However, the Soviet Union did not depend on information from the West. The
Soviet economy was also now less dependent on supplies from the West and in 1943
Soviet military production outstripped the Germans. The Soviets were producing
9,000 aircraft per month. In 1943 the Soviet factories built 24,000 tanks. It
was the famous T34 tank which defeated the Nazis on the Eastern front. And there
were the new quickly mobile Soviet lorry-mounted rocket mortars affectionately
named Katyushas which roared and screamed at the Nazis, who called them fire
devils.

Despite the deceitfulness of the Western allies, the Soviet Government had its
own intelligence about the Germans' summer offensive and the Red Army was
prepared. Massive Nazi forces launched their offensive behind schedule on July 5
1943. The Soviet forces on the Central and Voronezh fronts launched a massive
artillery and air attack against the concentrated German forces, causing heavy
losses to the surprised Germans.

"Surprise as a vital prerequisite for a successful panzer offensive was not
achieved because the enemy was expecting the attack and was fully prepared to
defend itself."

(Panzer Commander General Heinz Guderian, in a secret memo to Hitler.) (2)

The Germans were completely taken by surprise. Soviet aircraft bombed the German
airfields before the German planes could take off. On July 15 the Red Army began
a massive counter-offensive. Soviet heavy guns fired and Katyushas streaked with
burning tails into the morning air, and when the tanks rumbled forward the earth
shook with the vengeance of the entire Soviet people.

#Kursk was indeed the biggest tank battle on any front in the whole of the war.
The Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk were indeed the turning point of
the war.

Unlike Churchill's false words, Roosevelt had genuine admiration and respect for
the Soviet conduct of the war. Commenting on the Soviet victory he said:

"Their (the Soviets') glorious victory stemmed the tide of invasion and marked
the turning point in the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of
aggression."

(US President Roosevelt.)

During the battle of Kursk Roosevelt wrote to Stalin:

"Your forces have, during a month of tremendous fighting, by their skill, their
courage, their sacrifice and their ceaseless effort, not only stopped the long
planned German attack, but have launched a successful counter-offensive of
far-reaching importance."

(Roosevelt, in a letter to Stalin during the battle of Kursk.) (3)

(1)See:Public Records Office. F.O. 371/970.

(2)Militärarchiv der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (MA DDR), Nº 02, 14/2,
sheet 340.

Quoted in: Boris Solovyov "The Turning Point of World War II." Progress
Publishers. Moscow 1982.

(3)See:"Recalling the Past For the Sake of the Future: The Causes, Results and
Lessons of World War Two." Novosti. Moscow 1985.

The Nazi armies were now going to be chased all the way back to Berlin by the
Red Army.

Every village, town and city re-captured from the Germans revealed to the
advancing Red Army soldiers the horrible atrocities the Germans had committed on
Soviet soil, especially as they retreated. The Germans had destroyed everything
possible, and corpses of women and children and old people were everywhere. Some
Soviet soldiers came across the ruins of their own villages and the corpses of
their own family - wives, mothers, children, loved ones and friends and
neighbours.

In anger at the horrible atrocities and destruction the retreating Germans had
carried out wherever they went on Soviet soil, and in higher spirits now that
they were winning, the Red Army advanced with ever increasing momentum. In
August the Red Army re-took Orel and Belgorod, Kharkov, Taganrog and Glukhov. In
September they liberated the Donbas, Novorossisk and Smolensk. In October they
cleared the Germans out of the Taman peninsular and crossed the Dnieper and
re-took Zaporozhe and Dniepropetrovsk. In November they re-captured Zhitomir and
Kiev and found the thousands of corpses the Germans had thrown into a ravine at
Babi Yar. By the end of 1943 two thirds of occupied Soviet territory was
liberated. By January 1944 Leningrad was free. In February the Germans were
routed in the Korsun salient and Krivoi Rog was liberated. In the Soviet spring
offensive the Red Army liberated the Ukraine, recapturing Uman, and crossed the
Dniester and cleared the fascists out of Rumania. Tarnopol and Sebastopol were
liberated and the Crimea was cleared of Germans. In June the Soviets began their
offensive in Byelorussia. The German armies were encircled at Vitebsk, and about
100,000 Germans were captured in the taking of Minsk. The Soviets also took
Kovel and Vilno. Between July and December the Red Army had liberated Praga and
Bessarabia, Rumania, Bulgaria. Soviet and Yugoslav soldiers liberated
Yugoslavia, and Norway was freed of Nazis. The Warsaw uprising, about which
there is so much Western lies and propaganda is written in history books, and
about which even Churchill changed his story to suit the needs of the cold war,
will be dealt with in a later chapter.

In Poland the Red Army reached Lublin and discovered what the Nazis had done
nearby at Maidanek, where one and a half million had been exterminated. At this
point, allow me a description of the scene the Soviet soldiers came upon at
Maidanek:

Carefully sorted for transport to Germany and piled up in large rooms were the
possessions of the victims of Maidanek. In one room marked Herrenschuhe and
another marked Damenschuhe were thousands of pairs of shoes. In another room
were thousands of trunks and suitcases. There was a massive pile of spectacles
and another of toothbrushes and other large piles of combs, hairbrushes, razors,
shaving brushes, pen-knives, pens, pencils, and every other human possession;
all carefully sorted into huge separate neat piles. Along a long corridor were
thousands of women's dresses. Another corridor had thousands of overcoats. One
room was full of children's toys - teddy-bears, dolls, toy cars, jigsaw puzzles.
An office downstairs was full of letters and orders from Nazi organisations in
Germany requesting long lists of articles such as kitchen utensils, clothes, bed
linen, shoes, and so on. Sizes were specified. Some of the orders were for 4,000
German children or 2,000 children and requested such things as "sports shirts,
training suits, coats, aprons, gym shoes, skiing boots, plus-fours, warm
underwear, warm gloves, woollen scarves". One letter from a German woman in
Lublin was for a pram and complete layette for her newborn baby. One document
showed that eighteen railway wagons left Maidanek full of goods for Germany in
the first few months of 1944 alone. (1)

Then the Soviet soldiers came across the horrors of Auschwitz, Treblinka, and
many other Nazi death camps. The Soviets fought on across Poland towards the
German border. In January 1945 the Germans who had hoped to chase the Soviets
across the river Yenisei now saw the Red army coming towards them across the
Oder. Early in 1945 Hungary was completely liberated from the Germans. The
Soviets liberated Poland and entered Austria and liberated Vienna. By April the
Red Army was in Berlin. The Soviets reached Czechoslovakia and by May Prague was
liberated. On May 8 1945 the

(1)See:Alexander Werth "Russia at War 1941-1945." Pan Books. London 1965.

remaining Nazis were encircled and the centre of Berlin was taken. The Reichstag
was burning again. This time it really was the Communists.

All during this time, communist led national liberation movements in the German
occupied countries of Europe exacerbated the Nazis in their rear and helped to
change the military-political aspect of the war, and the political geography of
post-war Europe. These combined features led the Western Allies to fear the
spread of communism in the liberated countries of central and even Western
Europe before their own forces could get there.

The West had to acknowledge even more their own need for a second front. This
was the main reason the second front was launched; since by now it was obvious
that the Soviets were going to be to the forefront of the peace. The need for a
second front and for military aid from the West had now become less important
for the Soviet Union. During the war Britain and the US had planned their
military political strategy in order to establish new frontiers for a weakened
Soviet Union. Stalingrad and Kursk squashed this hope once and for all.

"By that time, the notable achievements of Russian industry in producing
armaments, and the growing confidence and skill of the massive Red Army, opened
the prospect of total victory over Germany. Even without the help of winter
weather, the Russian Army had shown itself able to advance against the Germans;
even without a Second Front in France in 1943 Hitler's troops could not stand
fast against Russian attack."

(US historian William Hardy McNeill.) (1)

"By 1943, panic seized the Western rulers at the prospect of the fall of fascism
and the victory of communism."

(Labour Monthly, March 1963.)

After the Soviet victory at Stalingrad the US began working frantically on the
atom bomb. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad had not only marked the turning
point of World War II but also determined the entire post-war world
international geo-political situation. It began to dawn on the the minds of
world capital that the Soviet Union was not going to be beaten. Western
attitudes changed.

(1)William Hardy McNeill "America, Britain and Russia. Their Co-operation and
Conflict, 1941-1946." London 1953



Chapter 34

QUEBEC: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN-GERMAN ALLIANCE AGAINST THE USSR?
The majority of the Ultra-Enigma coded information about the enemy which the
Western Allies were obtaining from German secret communications was criminally
kept from the Soviet Union. After the Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk;
and the Soviet drive West began to advance with speed and it became obvious to
Western politicians that the Soviets were going to win, the very limited amount
of the Ultra-Enigma decoded information which was given by Britain to the Soviet
Government about the enemy stopped coming altogether. Then, as a secret document
declassified in the US in 1978 reveals, there was a plan in August 1943 to not
only not launch a second front, but to rearm Germany from the West and push the
not yet fully weakened German armies back into the Soviet Union and for the US
and Britain to then destroy what was left of the German army and to take over
the European part of the USSR as far as the Urals mountains. However, there were
some sane attitudes in the West. To his credit, Roosevelt turned down the plan.

At a meeting in Quebec in August 1943 between British and US military, political
and intelligence forces. to which the Soviet allies were not invited, US General
Donovan, the head of OSS (Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the CIA),
wheeled out Goebbels' old "Russian threat" bogey in the form of a now
declassified (1978) secret Memorandum: JCS121, called "Strategy and Policy: Can
America and Russia Cooperate?", with a section entitled "Soviet War Aims" which
threatened:

"...a considerable Westward extension of the Soviet revolutionary system."

(JCS121.) (1)

In other words: Communist led uprisings by the people of other European
countries.

The memorandum continues:

"Strategy is literally inseparable from policy...

The present crisis in the relations of the United States and Great Britain with
Soviet Russia calls most urgently for a re-examination and definition of the
strategy and policy that will give shape to the postwar settlement.

1. The major American aim is the security of the United States. [ie: capitalism.
B.M.] …

3.The second requisite is that after the defeat of Germany, no single power, and
no group of powers in which we do not have a strong influence, shall direct the
strength of Europe.

4. The final aim is the fostering in Europe of certain other conditions that
will make for peace, freedom and prosperity - for the benefit not only of Europe
but of ourselves. [Capitalism again. B.M.]

On the Continent the strength of the United States, Great Britain and their
satellites will be substantially less than that of the two great continental
powers - Russia or an undefeated Germany..."

(JCS121.) (2)

The memo outlined three policy choices. It was the third choice that was given
most prominence.:

"In view of the disproportion between our aims and our capabilities...

3. That we attempt to turn against Russia the full power of an undefeated
Germany, still ruled by the Nazis or the generals."

(JCS121.) (3)

(1)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow. Available in UK in English.

(2)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

(3)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

It meant, in effect, to go back to 1939, with Truman's 1941 dictat that the
Soviets and the Germans would destroy each other and the US would take over what
was left:

"There appears to be only one way in which the Soviet Union could be defeated by
sheer force, and that is by turning against her a Germany still strong (and that
means a Germany still ruled by the Nazis or the Generals). This would probably
result in the conquest of the Soviet Union by the same powerful and aggressive
Germany that declared war against Russia, and against us, in 1941. But in order
to prevent the subsequent domination of all the strength of Europe by Germany,
we, together with Great Britain, should be obliged, after the German conquest of
Russia, to undertake once more, and without Russia's help, the difficult and
perhaps then impossible task of defeating Germany."

(JCS121.) (1)

In other words: each of them is too strong for the US and Great Britain to
destroy by ourselves, so we will help them to destroy each other and we will
take control of a weakened victor.

But what about public opinion?:

"Even if this were feasible, in statistical terms of man-power and materiel, the
double shift in policy involved would probably be quite unworkable in terms of
American and British politics and morals. In the United States, and still more
in Britain, with public opinion now strongly mobilised against Germany, (and
mobilised to a much more limited extent in favour of Russia), it would probably
be impossible to demobilise opinion for the duration of a German conquest of
Russia (or at least until the conquest was well advanced) and then to mobilise
it once more for a successful war of our own against Germany."

(JCS121.) (2)

So; unlike 1939 or 1941, British and American public opinion would not have
tolerated such a proposal or such a "policy shift"; that is: first to be
"mobilised" to back a German destruction of the USSR, and then to support a
British and American destruction of a thus weakened Germany. What then - a
Dollar Reich?

Still delaying a second front; how were these plans to be carried out
militarily?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with various options, had it all planned:

"First phase to the end of winter, 1943-44...

a. United States and Great Britain.

...No major land operations may be undertaken in Western Europe.

...Political warfare activity may be devoted in part to attempt to divide the
non-nazis in Germany from the nazis and other persons responsible for the war,
and terms somewhat concilliatory in character may be offered,...

b. Soviet Russia.

Operations against Germany may continue on approximately the present scale, and
with considerable success.

c. Germany.

German forces may be directed more and more from Western to Eastern Europe. The
following factors may contribute to this change:

The absence of major Allied pressure in the West.

Heavy Russian pressure in the East, and widespread German fear of Russia and of
Communism..."

(JCS121.) (3)

(1)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow. Available in UK in English.

(2)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

(3)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

A second phase, for the spring and summer of 1944, was to consist of:

"a. The United States and Great Britain might launch an offensive of limited
strength in the West.

b. The Germans, preferring Anglo-American occupation to Russian, might offer
comparatively little resistance in the West, but attempt to hold their
then-existing lines in the East.

c. In this situation, control might pass from the nazis to the German Generals.

d. With limited Anglo-American forces advancing, with little opposition, into
Germany, and the German army still attempting to check the Russians in the East,
the generals might then ask the Western Allies for an armistice. It has been
suggested that after rejection of that appeal, the next steps might be as
follows:

Transfer of authority to a centralist-Socialist government.

The support of this government by the Anglo-American forces."

(JCS121.) (1)

JCS121 set out the US long term war aims:

"To repeat, the fundamental aims of the United States in this war are, in the
interest of American security,

1) to destroy the German domination of Europe, and

2) to prevent the domination of Europe in the future by any single power (such
as the Soviet Union), or by any group of powers in which we do not have strong
influence."

(JCS121.) (2)

Even the EEC?

"Given the continuance, on a moderately increased but still limited scale, of
the Anglo-American attack on the Axis, the termination of hostilities with
Germany would find the Soviet forces on the continent much stronger than those
of the Western Allies. Yet with this prospect, the Soviet government still urges
with increasing insistence that the Allies open a major land offensive against
Germany."

(JCS121.) (3)

And what did the Joint Chiefs of Staff threaten to do if there was no
cooperation with their plans? Opt for the last two alternatives?

"If compromise fails, America and Britain will have no choice but to pursue
their aims independently."

(JCS121.) (4)

The Quebec Conference rejected OSS General Donovan's JCS121 plan in favour of
President Roosevelt's more sensible and realistic plan of cooperation with the
USSR:

(1)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

(2)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

(3)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

(4)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

"Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every
assistance and every effort must be made to gain her friendship. Likewise,... it
is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with
Russia. Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in
relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as
an ally in the war against Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at
less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the
war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or a negative
attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased
and operations might become abortive."

(From Roosevelt's Quebec Conference document "Russia's Position.") (1)

But the anti-Communist die-hards who can only follow the inherent, immutable
economic laws of transnational capital, just as the aircraft builder must follow
the immutable laws of gravity and aerodynamics if he wants to get off the
ground, have not abandoned their designs.

As Donovan's JCS121 threatened the frightening picture to the US and British
reactionaries of:

"The disintegration of German civil authority, and of the German army on the
Eastern front as the results of defeats by the Russians, the advance of the
Allies, and attempted transfer of power from the nazis to the generals, and the
generals to the newly improvised government."

(JCS121.) (2)

This might lead to:

"Outbreak of a vigorous minority group of German Communists and Communist
sympathisers.

An almost unopposed westward march of the Russians in force considerably greater
than that of the Anglo-Americans. An un-favourable bargaining position of the
Western Allies, in spite of any practicable reinforcement, and possibly an
actual conflict with the stronger Soviet forces."

(JCS121.) (3)

Suddenly the need for a second front in the war became important.

(1)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

(2)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.

(3)See:New Times, No.2, Jan 20 1986. Moscow.



Chapter 35

A SECOND FRONT IS LAUNCHED –
CHURCHILL PLEADS FOR HELP FROM THE RED ARMY.
After almost three years of delaying tactics by the Western allies, and
particularly by Churchill, who used all sorts of excuses such as "unfavourable
weather", the Second Front, known in Britain as "D-Day", was launched on June 6
1944 in Northern France.

It was agreed at the Teheran Conference of November/December 1943 to launch a
second front in May 1944. The Western Allies delayed this as much as possible.
As was also agreed at Teheran, in order to facilitate the US and British landing
across the Channel, the Soviets launched a massive counter-offensive on the
Eastern front. Regarding the 1943 Quebec discussions on the post-war occupation
of Germany, British Foreign Office Minister Lord Strang had written:

"There was still some doubt whether... the Soviet armies would cross the German
frontier, and whether they would not stand fast there, having expelled the enemy
from their soil and that of their neighbours, and leave the Western Allies to
finish off the war... It seemed to our Government to be of advantage to us that
they should be encouraged to work with us to the end."

(British Foreign Office Minister Lord Strang "Home and Abroad.") (1)

The Soviets did not have to launch this offensive for their own benefit. The
Soviet Union was now cleared of Nazis; and the Soviets could have said: that's
it, we've finished our war now. It was from their previous agreement to help
their Western Allies that the Soviet Union launched this major attack,
destroying over 170 German divisions. Between January and May 1944 the Germans
had to transfer 40 divisions from Germany and France to the Eastern front, thus
weakening their strength in the West prior to the Allied invasion of France in
June 1944. On June 10 1944, four days after the start of Operation Overlord -
the Normandy landings - in accordance with the agreement at Teheran, the Soviets
launched Operation Bagration - major offensives along a front extending from the
Byelorussian front to the Leningrad and Karelian fronts. In June 1944 the
Germans had to move over 70 divisions to the Eastern front which left them with
insufficient forces to hold France. This very much facilitated the landing of
allied troops in Northern France.

US historian Herbert Feis writes:

#"When this promise was kept and the Soviet armies did start their great
offensives roughly on schedule, and did keep all the German forces in the East
engaged, the Western military commanders were not only appreciative but
impressed. They - and and their number included the Supreme Commander of
Overlord, General Eisenhower - were convinced of the reliability [of the Soviet
Government's word B.M.]".

(US historian Herbert Feis.) (2)

On December 16 1944 the Germans launched a major counter-offensive, breaking
through on the Western front in order to cut off and destroy the Allied armies.
It became more obvious than ever, even this late in the war, how dependent the
West still was on the Soviet Army. With more than two thirds of their total
forces held up by the Red Army and less than a third of their forces engaged in
the West, the Germans were creating a great danger to British and American
troops in the Ardennes. This was known as the Battle of the Bulge. Incidentally,
part of British strength had been diverted to suppress the popular ELAS/EAM
anti-Nazi resistance forces in Greece. The Germans launched another offensive at
Alsace on January 1 1945.

(1)William Strang "Home and Abroad." London 1956.

#(2)Herbert Feis "Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace
They Sought." Princeton University Press 1957. p264

"We can still lose this war."

(US General Patton, in his diary, Jan 4 1945.) (1)

In urgent need of help, Churchill sent a plaintive cable to Stalin on January 6
1945:

"The battle in the West is very heavy and, at any time large decisions may be
called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience
how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended
after a temporary loss of the initiative... I shall be grateful if you can tell
me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or
elsewhere, during January?... I regard the matter as urgent."

(Winston Churchill, in a cable to Stalin, Jan 6 1945.) (2)

Parodying Churchill's "bad weather" excuses for not launching a second front
earlier; Stalin replied immediately:

"I received your message of 6th January, 1945, in the evening of 7th January...
It is very important to make use of our superiority over the Germans in
artillery and air force. For this we need clear weather for the air force and an
absence of low mists which prevent the artillery from conducting aimed fire. We
are preparing an offensive, but at present the weather doesn't favour our
offensive. However, in view of the position of our allies on the Western Front,
Headquarters of the Supreme Command has decided to complete the preparations at
a forced pace and, regardless of the weather, to launch wide-scale offensive
operations against the Germans all along the Central front not later than the
second half of January. You need not doubt that we shall do everything that can
possibly be done to render help to the glorious troops of our allies."

(Stalin, in a message to Churchill, Jan 7 1945.) (3)

Churchill replied:

"I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message... the news you give me
will be a great encouragement to General Eisenhower [on the Ardennes B.M.]
because it gives him the assurance that German reinforcements will have to be
split between both our flaming fronts... May all good fortune rest upon your
noble venture."

(Churchill to Stalin, Jan 9 1945.) (4)

On January 12 1945, eight days before the agreed time, the Soviets launched a
massive attack against the German armies on a front extending from the Baltic to
the Carpathian mountains. 6 days later two German Panzer armies had to be
withdrawn from the Western front to the Eastern front.

Churchill later wrote:

"It was a fine deed of the Russians and their chief to hasten this vast
offensive, no doubt at heavy cost of life."

(Winston Churchill "The Second World War.")

(1)See:G.Patton "War As I Knew It." Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1947; the
Riverside Press, Cambridge 1947.

(2)See:Winston Churchill "The Second World War" Vol VI.

(3)See:D.N.Pritt "Russia Is For Peace." Lawrence and Wishart. London 1951.

Also:W.P. and Zelda K. Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Vol.II.
Lawrence and Wishart. London 1948.

(4)See:W.P. and Zelda K. Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations." Vol.II.
Lawrence and Wishart. London 1948.

Also:Winston Churchill "The Second World War" Vol.VI.

And:

"On behalf of His Majesty's Government, and from the bottom of my heart, I offer
you our thanks and congratulations on the immense assault you have launched upon
the Eastern Front."

(Churchill, in a cable to Stalin, Jan 17 1945.) (1)

That Soviet offensive was undoubtedly crucial in holding and maintaining
positions on the Western front. (2)

"These tremendous and courageous operations by the Soviet Army and the fact that
Stalin honoured such a vital military commitment influenced the attitude of
British and American representatives in subsequent negotiations with the Soviet
Union - and built up favourable opinion for the Soviet Union among the people of
the United States and the other Western Allies."

(US Statesman Averell Harriman, 1951.) (3)

Throughout the war Churchill was full of deceitful praise and platitudes for the
Soviet Union. But, as we shall see, he was already scheming to weaken and
destroy them in 1945.

The Soviets, on the other hand, had more genuine and responsible feelings and
attitudes to their allies:

"We had different, very different attitudes to the allies, and these attitudes
changed during the course of the war. At the time of Stalingrad, when only a few
metres were left between us and the Volga, and the allies continued to postpone
the opening of the Second Front, the attitude was distinctly hostile. The
political workers were hard put to somehow neutralise these feelings of
antipathy...

And when the allied advance in the Ardennes turned into a retreat our soldiers
felt genuine comradely sympathy: "Oh, well, the lads are a bit green yet. Never
mind, they'll soon learn"."

(Boris Polevoi, in "Liberation.")

British history books, war stories and war films, and commemorations incorrectly
or dishonestly mark the opening of the Second Front - 'D-Day' - as the "turning
point" in the war. When the Second Front was opened in Normandy the outcome of
the war had already been decided 18 months earlier - on the First Front - the
Eastern front. A survey of the deployment of forces makes this quite evident.

As was agreed, the Soviet army launched a major offensive all along wide
sections of the Eastern front in order to tie down the bulk of the Nazi forces.
By June 1944 some 235 German divisions were in deployment on the Eastern front
while 65 German divisions were at the Western front. The Eastern front was over
2,600 miles wide while the combined French and Italian Western fronts were less
than 700 miles wide. After six months the Eastern front had advanced some 750
miles whereas the Western front had advanced some 280 miles. During the whole
war more than 600 Nazi divisions were defeated on the Eastern front while the
Western allies defeated some 170 enemy divisions.

The Red Army continued to be the major and decisive force that directed the war.
Apart from comfrontations with strong German resistance, it was the Soviet
advance that would determine the rest of the war and not the Anglo-Americans.

(1)See:D.N.Pritt "Russia Is For Peace." Lawrence and Wishart. London 1951.

#(2)See:Winston Churchill "The Second World War." Vol VI p238."

#See also:W.P. and Zelda K. Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations."
Vol.II. p62. Lawrence and Wishart. London 1948.

(3)Congressional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 82nd Congress, First
Session, Vol.97, No.158.

"How far the Russian advance might go remains to be seen. It might be that
before long, owing partly to difficulties of supply and partly to a certain
rallying somewhere or other, the Russians would come across a stiffer resistance
than they were experiencing just now. If that happened, it would only postpone
the event, because recent progress on the Russian front had shown that the
Russians were thoroughly competent to destroy the German Army, and it is only a
matter of time before that would be accomplished."

(Lord Addison, House of Lords, Jan 25 1945, The Times, Jan 26 1945.) (1)

"Well deserved tributes had been paid to the brilliant achievements of the
Russian commanders and their soldiers in the triumphant advance, which we were
still watching with breathless wonder. How far that advance was going to carry
them no one yet could say. Already at several points, they had passed the
frontiers of Germany and there appeared as yet to be no slackening on their
progress.

No doubt a time would come when some breathing space would be necessary to
enable them to bring up their supplies. That had been the general experience in
this new sort of mechanised warfare."

(Viscount Cranbourne, House of Lords, Jan 25 1945, The Times, Jan 26 1945.) (2)

(1)See also:W.P. and Zelda K. Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations."
Vol.II. Lawrence and Wishart. London 1948.

(2)See also:W.P. and Zelda K. Coates "A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations."
Vol.II. Lawrence and Wishart. London 1948.



School and college history, economics and business studies teaching and books do
not contain any of this information.



All the material and information I have presented here is readily available to
historians, writers, journalists, teachers, educators and syllabus publishers.
Although I have spent many hundreds of hours gathering it all together, I did
not have to look very far to find any of it.



When as a trainee history lecturer, it was suggested I take the class on a trip
to the Tower of London and then set them an essay on what life was like for a
soldier in King Charles’ Army centuries ago. Very useful knowledge that! A
sociology of the past perhaps? But certainly not history in its most important
sense; unless history is to mean anything old or ‘interesting’ that you can do
in evening classes, like antiques, flower arranging or basket weaving. When
instead I taught real history, learning from the past in order to change the
future, the collective life-experience of humanity, I was got rid of. The head
of the history department complained that the students had remarked that I made
them think; which the head of history had probably never done in a lifetime of
teaching. I ended up washing and cleaning and emptying human surgical waste in a
hospital.



Unless teachers learn to be brave and intellectually honest (difficult when they
have a mortgage and bills to pay), future historical, social and economic
education and popular ‘knowledge’ will also not refer to the US or British
history and continuing complicity in global plunder, exploitation, domination
and control, wars of aggrandisement and acquisition, causing the deaths and
devastation of the homes and lands of millions of people – the thousands of
children under the age of two who will die tonight through simple lack of food,
clean water, medicine and education – the untold millions of unnecessary deaths
among the overwhelming majority of humanity on this incredibly rich and abundant
and ultimately sustainable earth.



From Brian Mitchell. Evolution.



Responses and criticisms welcomed. Reply to my personal e-mail if you prefer. My
replies to criticisms will be posted.



.


"Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery; None but ourselves can free our
minds." (Bob Marley, Redemption song.)

"The most remarkable thing about the world is that you can understand it."
(Einstein.)

"I find television very educating. Every time somebody turns on the set I go
into the other room and read a book." (Groucho Marx.)

"To thine own self be true, and it must follow, as night the day, that thou
canst not be false to any man." (Shakespeare. Hamlet.)

"And if we were all capable of unity to make our blows stronger and infallible
and so increase the effectiveness of all kinds of support given to the
struggling people – how great and close would the future be." (Che Guevara.)



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