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Jena

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  • mumbasa2009
    I just downloaded the map of Jena and the roster. There was no victory conditions or descriptions of the battle like there is with all the other BBB
    Message 1 of 25 , 8 Apr 09:58
      I just downloaded the map of Jena and the roster.  There was no victory conditions or descriptions of the battle like there is with all the other BBB scenarios.  Am I missing something?
      John
      Denver, Colorado 


    • vtsaogames
      Not everything is complete. The files also contain works in progress. Feel free to join in.
      Message 2 of 25 , 8 Apr 10:19
        Not everything is complete. The files also contain works in progress. Feel free to join in.
      • oct251415
        Hi John, I have the files at work. I use the battle to train military officers. For the French, they need to hold both objectives in Jena, plus Dornburg,
        Message 3 of 25 , 8 Apr 14:47
          Hi John,

          I have the files at work. I use the battle to train military officers.

          For the French, they need to hold both objectives in Jena, plus Dornburg, Camburg, and Kosen, plus Apolda or Eckartsburg. This reflects the French cutting off the allies from Berlin, and their main line of supply east. If they do that the allied army withers on the vine even if it is not smashed. It also reflects the French need to keep their army connected to prevent it being defeated in detail.

          For the allies, they need to hold Apolda and Eckartsburg, and capture both objectives in Jena, plus one of Dornburg, Camburg, or Kosen.

          n.b. There should be few to none allied skirmish units. They simply were not capable of doing it. This is despite their nominally having light infantry. They did not deploy effective skirmishers until after the 1811 reforms to the infantry. 

          To make it more of a fight, you could give a few of the Prussian units devastating volleys, but there is not much evidence to support this. Alternatively, you could allow the allies to simply defend their objectives in Eckartsburg and Apolda.

          I hope this helps.

          Nick
        • mumbasa2009
          Thanks, Nick. Do you recall how long the game is supposed to last? Thanks in advance, John
          Message 4 of 25 , 8 Apr 21:35
            Thanks, Nick.  Do you recall how long the game is supposed to last?
            Thanks in advance,
            John
          • Nicholas Murray
            blockquote, div.yahoo_quoted { margin-left: 0 !important; border-left:1px #715FFA solid !important; padding-left:1ex !important; background-color:white
            Message 5 of 25 , 9 Apr 04:31
              I think I had it set at a move every 90 minutes, starting at 0630 and running seven turns. Sunset was around 1700. 

              Best,
              Nick

              PS If you want to use hour turns, go for it, but we found that seven placed the French under some time pressure, which was to the benefit of what we were doing in class.


              Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPad

              On Sunday, April 9, 2017, 12:39 AM, mumbasa@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

               

              Thanks, Nick.  Do you recall how long the game is supposed to last?

              Thanks in advance,
              John
            • Bill Haggart
              I have to comment on a couple of things. The Map: The was far more wooded areas around east of Closewitz and south of Isserstadt And Nick s observations:
              Message 6 of 25 , 9 Apr 09:23

                I have to comment on a couple of things.

                 

                The Map:   The was far more wooded areas around east of Closewitz and south of Isserstadt

                 

                And Nick’s observations:

                 

                n.b. There should be few to none allied skirmish units. They simply were not capable of doing it. This is despite their nominally having light infantry. They did not deploy effective skirmishers until after the 1811 reforms to the infantry.

                This isn’t accurate. Unfortunately, it is an old myth that doesn’t bear inspection; Keep in mind also that throughout the battle, each engagement found the Allied troops outnumbered at least 2:1. For instance, in the opening engagement, Tauentzien, with 12,000 troops faced Lannes’ corps of 21,000 as well as St. Hilaire’s division of 10,000 of Soult’s corps moving through the Closewitz woods on the Allied east flank.  

                 

                Prussian and Saxon light infantry and skirmishers [Fusiliers, Schutzen AND line infantry] did far more than nothing.

                 

                1. In the opening stages of the battle, the third ranks of two Saxon battalions were deployed as skirmishers along with the Schutzen from every battalion in Tauentzien’s force along with the Fusilier battalions defending the woods and villages on both flanks… about 3,000 men—25% of the entire force
                2. The light infantry forced out of the Closewitz woods retreated east and caused enough trouble for Napoleon that he sent Lannes entire reserve brigade to drive them off.
                3. Skirmishers from the third rank of Santiz’s brigade under Holtzendorf drove off the first waves of tirailleurs from St. Hilaire’s division and through the woods separating the two forces.
                4. Driven out of the Isserstadt woods and Isserstadt itself, Prussian and Saxon skirmishers not only recaptured Isserstadt, but at one point drove the French nearly out of the woods too.
                5. The small woods between Isserstadt and VH [not going to try writing that one out] at one point was filled with Ney’s troops including the elite battalions and legere. The Prussians drove them out and inflicted enough damage that the French did not attempt to reenter until the Prussians retreated.
                6. The colonel of the Hohenlohe regiment—among others-- reported that his schutzen and several groups of volunteers held off the French skirmishers and protected the formed troops for ‘a long time.’  

                 

                Now, this isn’t suggesting that the Prussian light infantry and line troops deployed as skirmishers were the equal of the French, but it does indicate that they did deploy effective skirmishers in a number of places. In many cases, it was one side outnumbering the other in deployed skirmishers that made the difference, and in that respect, the French, always outnumbering the Prussians and Saxons, usually could and did deploy more skirmishers. Part of this was because the terrain dominating the battlefield was light infantry territory.  As Guard Chasseur Barras states in his memoirs, “Several times our approach was enough to force the Prussians and Saxons to abandon the positions they were defending; but in spite of this the struggle was keen, the resistance desperate, above all in the villages and copses.”   That is hardly the report you’d expect if the Allied infantry was incapable of deploying few if any skirmish units.  From a rough count using Bessonet’s study, the Prussians deployed @25% of all their infantry as skirmishers at one point or another.

                 

                Bill

                 

                 

                 

              • Nicholas Murray
                Bill, N.B. I said there should be few to none! i.e that allows for some.  That there were a few units who skirmished is not in doubt. What was pointed out
                Message 7 of 25 , 9 Apr 12:55
                  Bill,

                  N.B. I said there should be few to none! i.e that allows for some. 

                  That there were a few units who skirmished is not in doubt. What was pointed out after the battle, was the lack of effect the allies had in this regard despite some individual units doing well (I think it was Blucher who even commented about the work of two jaeger units).  But surely that is the point. As this battle represents armies of 100,000 or so men on each side, I chose not to allocate a factor based upon the performance of a few units. I simply don't believe the evidence is sufficient to justify an S rating for a large proportion of the allies. Clearly, you disagree. If you don't like it and want to give a few allied units who didn't perform poorly an S, write an OOB and post it. I don't think there were enough of them to justify this at the scale being represented, but that should not stop you doing what you think is correct. But you already know that, as this was previously discussed. 

                  For those others who might be interested in the topic: there is a large amount of scholarship on this: e.g. have a look at Peter Paret's Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform. Plenty of scholars agree with Paret. But don't take my word for it, look at his chapters on Jena and the subsequent army reforms. 

                  Designer's note: I thought the key was the French ability to coordinate the combat arms and the corresponding allied inability to do the same. The Prussians, by their own admission in the wave of analysis and reforms after the loss at Jena, admit this. I thought the use of S would be one simple to way to represent this, and to reflect the vast majority (unanimity might not be too strong) of scholarship on the reasons for the allied failure: poor tactics; poor generalship; bad luck; no real combined arms organizations; and yes, partly because of their ineffective use of light infantry; etc. Hence, my choosing to give the French skirmish rating and the allies none.  

                  As for the map, and given the lack of genuinely accurate contemporary maps, I find it odd that you choose to state it is wrong with such certainty. 

                  Nick 



                  From: "'Bill Haggart' bhaggart@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                  To: BBB_wargames@...
                  Sent: Sunday, April 9, 2017 12:29 PM
                  Subject: [BBB_wargames] Re: : Jena

                   
                  I have to comment on a couple of things.
                   
                  The Map:   The was far more wooded areas around east of Closewitz and south of Isserstadt
                   
                  And Nick’s observations:
                   
                  n.b. There should be few to none allied skirmish units. They simply were not capable of doing it. This is despite their nominally having light infantry. They did not deploy effective skirmishers until after the 1811 reforms to the infantry.

                  This isn’t accurate. Unfortunately, it is an old myth that doesn’t bear inspection; Keep in mind also that throughout the battle, each engagement found the Allied troops outnumbered at least 2:1. For instance, in the opening engagement, Tauentzien, with 12,000 troops faced Lannes’ corps of 21,000 as well as St. Hilaire’s division of 10,000 of Soult’s corps moving through the Closewitz woods on the Allied east flank.  
                   
                  Prussian and Saxon light infantry and skirmishers [Fusiliers, Schutzen AND line infantry] did far more than nothing.
                   
                  1. In the opening stages of the battle, the third ranks of two Saxon battalions were deployed as skirmishers along with the Schutzen from every battalion in Tauentzien’s force along with the Fusilier battalions defending the woods and villages on both flanks… about 3,000 men—25% of the entire force
                  2. The light infantry forced out of the Closewitz woods retreated east and caused enough trouble for Napoleon that he sent Lannes entire reserve brigade to drive them off.
                  3. Skirmishers from the third rank of Santiz’s brigade under Holtzendorf drove off the first waves of tirailleurs from St. Hilaire’s division and through the woods separating the two forces.
                  4. Driven out of the Isserstadt woods and Isserstadt itself, Prussian and Saxon skirmishers not only recaptured Isserstadt, but at one point drove the French nearly out of the woods too.
                  5. The small woods between Isserstadt and VH [not going to try writing that one out] at one point was filled with Ney’s troops including the elite battalions and legere. The Prussians drove them out and inflicted enough damage that the French did not attempt to reenter until the Prussians retreated.
                  6. The colonel of the Hohenlohe regiment—among others-- reported that his schutzen and several groups of volunteers held off the French skirmishers and protected the formed troops for ‘a long time.’  
                   
                  Now, this isn’t suggesting that the Prussian light infantry and line troops deployed as skirmishers were the equal of the French, but it does indicate that they did deploy effective skirmishers in a number of places. In many cases, it was one side outnumbering the other in deployed skirmishers that made the difference, and in that respect, the French, always outnumbering the Prussians and Saxons, usually could and did deploy more skirmishers. Part of this was because the terrain dominating the battlefield was light infantry territory.  As Guard Chasseur Barras states in his memoirs, “Several times our approach was enough to force the Prussians and Saxons to abandon the positions they were defending; but in spite of this the struggle was keen, the resistance desperate, above all in the villages and copses.”   That is hardly the report you’d expect if the Allied infantry was incapable of deploying few if any skirmish units.  From a rough count using Bessonet’s study, the Prussians deployed @25% of all their infantry as skirmishers at one point or another.
                   
                  Bill
                   
                   
                   


                • Bill Haggart
                  ... units who didn t perform poorly an S, write an OOB and post it. I don t think there were enough of them to justify this at the scale being represented, but
                  Message 8 of 25 , 9 Apr 21:03

                    >Clearly, you disagree. If you don't like it and want to give a few allied units who didn't perform poorly an S, write an OOB and post it. I don't think there were enough of them to justify this at the scale being represented, but that should not stop you doing what you think is correct. But you already know that, as this was >previously discussed. 

                     

                    Nick: 

                    Well, yeah. I don’t agree. A simple count of the infantry deployed as skirmishers by the Allies at Jena suggest 20-25% of all the infantry available as Barras notes, fighting for villages and woods. 1 out of every four or five stands of whatever size unit you choose to create is hardly a ‘few units.’ We can debate the comparative effectiveness of the skirmishers on the Allied and French sides, but the evidence for how many were deployed isn’t any mystery. Sanitz brigade 1/3, Hohenlohe’s battalions, Schutzen reinforced by volunteers at least 3 times [around 500 men of 1600 troops] The grenadier battalion Huhn next to Hoenlohe’s regiment, 2 platoons of 4. Zweiffel Regiment deployed its third rank from two battalions, or some 550 men of 1600. I could go on.  

                     

                    >For those others who might be interested in the topic: there is a large amount of scholarship on this: e.g. have a look at Peter Paret's Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform. Plenty of scholars agree with Paret. 

                     

                    I’ve read Paret and the evidence he based his statement on.  I have also read plenty of scholars who agreed with him. Unfortunately, few of them agree with the primary sources, the officers and men reporting on the actual battle of Jena… Bressonet is one who does agree with me in general and did a far more in-depth study of the campaign than Paret. Lots of scholars agreed with Oman when he said that Maida was evidence for the power of British linear tactics over French columns…and scholars repeated that conclusion for nearly a century. It didn’t make it true. One look at the primary sources established that both sides fought in line—but once the myth was started and repeated, even Oman’s admission that he’d been wrong didn’t keep other scholars from repeating for decades. It isn’t a numbers game. It is an evidence game.  

                     

                    But you are right. You and I are free to create whatever OOB we wish.

                     

                    Bill

                  • TIM CARNE
                    Not contemporary - dates from 1903 - 1862 http://geogreif.uni-greifswald.de/geogreif/geogreif-content/upload/mtbl/5035Jena1903Kopie.jpg
                    Message 9 of 25 , 10 Apr 06:08
                      Not contemporary - dates from 1903 - 1862










                      From: "Nicholas Murray oct251415@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                      To: "BBB_wargames@..." <BBB_wargames@...>
                      Sent: Sunday, 9 April 2017, 20:56
                      Subject: Re: [BBB_wargames] Re: : Jena

                       
                      Bill,

                      N.B. I said there should be few to none! i.e that allows for some. 

                      That there were a few units who skirmished is not in doubt. What was pointed out after the battle, was the lack of effect the allies had in this regard despite some individual units doing well (I think it was Blucher who even commented about the work of two jaeger units).  But surely that is the point. As this battle represents armies of 100,000 or so men on each side, I chose not to allocate a factor based upon the performance of a few units. I simply don't believe the evidence is sufficient to justify an S rating for a large proportion of the allies. Clearly, you disagree. If you don't like it and want to give a few allied units who didn't perform poorly an S, write an OOB and post it. I don't think there were enough of them to justify this at the scale being represented, but that should not stop you doing what you think is correct. But you already know that, as this was previously discussed. 

                      For those others who might be interested in the topic: there is a large amount of scholarship on this: e.g. have a look at Peter Paret's Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform. Plenty of scholars agree with Paret. But don't take my word for it, look at his chapters on Jena and the subsequent army reforms. 

                      Designer's note: I thought the key was the French ability to coordinate the combat arms and the corresponding allied inability to do the same. The Prussians, by their own admission in the wave of analysis and reforms after the loss at Jena, admit this. I thought the use of S would be one simple to way to represent this, and to reflect the vast majority (unanimity might not be too strong) of scholarship on the reasons for the allied failure: poor tactics; poor generalship; bad luck; no real combined arms organizations; and yes, partly because of their ineffective use of light infantry; etc. Hence, my choosing to give the French skirmish rating and the allies none.  

                      As for the map, and given the lack of genuinely accurate contemporary maps, I find it odd that you choose to state it is wrong with such certainty. 

                      Nick 



                      From: "'Bill Haggart' bhaggart@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                      To: BBB_wargames@...
                      Sent: Sunday, April 9, 2017 12:29 PM
                      Subject: [BBB_wargames] Re: : Jena

                       
                      I have to comment on a couple of things.
                       
                      The Map:   The was far more wooded areas around east of Closewitz and south of Isserstadt
                       
                      And Nick’s observations:
                       
                      n.b. There should be few to none allied skirmish units. They simply were not capable of doing it. This is despite their nominally having light infantry. They did not deploy effective skirmishers until after the 1811 reforms to the infantry.

                      This isn’t accurate. Unfortunately, it is an old myth that doesn’t bear inspection; Keep in mind also that throughout the battle, each engagement found the Allied troops outnumbered at least 2:1. For instance, in the opening engagement, Tauentzien, with 12,000 troops faced Lannes’ corps of 21,000 as well as St. Hilaire’s division of 10,000 of Soult’s corps moving through the Closewitz woods on the Allied east flank.  
                       
                      Prussian and Saxon light infantry and skirmishers [Fusiliers, Schutzen AND line infantry] did far more than nothing.
                       
                      1. In the opening stages of the battle, the third ranks of two Saxon battalions were deployed as skirmishers along with the Schutzen from every battalion in Tauentzien’s force along with the Fusilier battalions defending the woods and villages on both flanks… about 3,000 men—25% of the entire force
                      2. The light infantry forced out of the Closewitz woods retreated east and caused enough trouble for Napoleon that he sent Lannes entire reserve brigade to drive them off.
                      3. Skirmishers from the third rank of Santiz’s brigade under Holtzendorf drove off the first waves of tirailleurs from St. Hilaire’s division and through the woods separating the two forces.
                      4. Driven out of the Isserstadt woods and Isserstadt itself, Prussian and Saxon skirmishers not only recaptured Isserstadt, but at one point drove the French nearly out of the woods too.
                      5. The small woods between Isserstadt and VH [not going to try writing that one out] at one point was filled with Ney’s troops including the elite battalions and legere. The Prussians drove them out and inflicted enough damage that the French did not attempt to reenter until the Prussians retreated.
                      6. The colonel of the Hohenlohe regiment—among others-- reported that his schutzen and several groups of volunteers held off the French skirmishers and protected the formed troops for ‘a long time.’  
                       
                      Now, this isn’t suggesting that the Prussian light infantry and line troops deployed as skirmishers were the equal of the French, but it does indicate that they did deploy effective skirmishers in a number of places. In many cases, it was one side outnumbering the other in deployed skirmishers that made the difference, and in that respect, the French, always outnumbering the Prussians and Saxons, usually could and did deploy more skirmishers. Part of this was because the terrain dominating the battlefield was light infantry territory.  As Guard Chasseur Barras states in his memoirs, “Several times our approach was enough to force the Prussians and Saxons to abandon the positions they were defending; but in spite of this the struggle was keen, the resistance desperate, above all in the villages and copses.”   That is hardly the report you’d expect if the Allied infantry was incapable of deploying few if any skirmish units.  From a rough count using Bessonet’s study, the Prussians deployed @25% of all their infantry as skirmishers at one point or another.
                       
                      Bill
                       
                       
                       




                    • Nicholas Murray
                      blockquote, div.yahoo_quoted { margin-left: 0 !important; border-left:1px #715FFA solid !important; padding-left:1ex !important; background-color:white
                      Message 10 of 25 , 10 Apr 14:02
                        Hi Tim,

                        They might not be contemporary, but they look better than the ones I found. 

                        Thanks,
                        Nick


                        Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPad

                        On Monday, April 10, 2017, 9:08 AM, TIM CARNE timcarne@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

                         

                        Not contemporary - dates from 1903 - 1862










                        From: "Nicholas Murray oct251415@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                        To: "BBB_wargames@..." <BBB_wargames@...>
                        Sent: Sunday, 9 April 2017, 20:56
                        Subject: Re: [BBB_wargames] Re: : Jena

                         
                        Bill,

                        N.B. I said there should be few to none! i.e that allows for some. 

                        That there were a few units who skirmished is not in doubt. What was pointed out after the battle, was the lack of effect the allies had in this regard despite some individual units doing well (I think it was Blucher who even commented about the work of two jaeger units).  But surely that is the point. As this battle represents armies of 100,000 or so men on each side, I chose not to allocate a factor based upon the performance of a few units. I simply don't believe the evidence is sufficient to justify an S rating for a large proportion of the allies. Clearly, you disagree. If you don't like it and want to give a few allied units who didn't perform poorly an S, write an OOB and post it. I don't think there were enough of them to justify this at the scale being represented, but that should not stop you doing what you think is correct. But you already know that, as this was previously discussed. 

                        For those others who might be interested in the topic: there is a large amount of scholarship on this: e.g. have a look at Peter Paret's Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform. Plenty of scholars agree with Paret. But don't take my word for it, look at his chapters on Jena and the subsequent army reforms. 

                        Designer's note: I thought the key was the French ability to coordinate the combat arms and the corresponding allied inability to do the same. The Prussians, by their own admission in the wave of analysis and reforms after the loss at Jena, admit this. I thought the use of S would be one simple to way to represent this, and to reflect the vast majority (unanimity might not be too strong) of scholarship on the reasons for the allied failure: poor tactics; poor generalship; bad luck; no real combined arms organizations; and yes, partly because of their ineffective use of light infantry; etc. Hence, my choosing to give the French skirmish rating and the allies none.  

                        As for the map, and given the lack of genuinely accurate contemporary maps, I find it odd that you choose to state it is wrong with such certainty. 

                        Nick 



                        From: "'Bill Haggart' bhaggart@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                        To: BBB_wargames@...
                        Sent: Sunday, April 9, 2017 12:29 PM
                        Subject: [BBB_wargames] Re: : Jena

                         
                        I have to comment on a couple of things.
                         
                        The Map:   The was far more wooded areas around east of Closewitz and south of Isserstadt
                         
                        And Nick’s observations:
                         
                        n.b. There should be few to none allied skirmish units. They simply were not capable of doing it. This is despite their nominally having light infantry. They did not deploy effective skirmishers until after the 1811 reforms to the infantry.

                        This isn’t accurate. Unfortunately, it is an old myth that doesn’t bear inspection; Keep in mind also that throughout the battle, each engagement found the Allied troops outnumbered at least 2:1. For instance, in the opening engagement, Tauentzien, with 12,000 troops faced Lannes’ corps of 21,000 as well as St. Hilaire’s division of 10,000 of Soult’s corps moving through the Closewitz woods on the Allied east flank.  
                         
                        Prussian and Saxon light infantry and skirmishers [Fusiliers, Schutzen AND line infantry] did far more than nothing.
                         
                        1. In the opening stages of the battle, the third ranks of two Saxon battalions were deployed as skirmishers along with the Schutzen from every battalion in Tauentzien’s force along with the Fusilier battalions defending the woods and villages on both flanks… about 3,000 men—25% of the entire force
                        2. The light infantry forced out of the Closewitz woods retreated east and caused enough trouble for Napoleon that he sent Lannes entire reserve brigade to drive them off.
                        3. Skirmishers from the third rank of Santiz’s brigade under Holtzendorf drove off the first waves of tirailleurs from St. Hilaire’s division and through the woods separating the two forces.
                        4. Driven out of the Isserstadt woods and Isserstadt itself, Prussian and Saxon skirmishers not only recaptured Isserstadt, but at one point drove the French nearly out of the woods too.
                        5. The small woods between Isserstadt and VH [not going to try writing that one out] at one point was filled with Ney’s troops including the elite battalions and legere. The Prussians drove them out and inflicted enough damage that the French did not attempt to reenter until the Prussians retreated.
                        6. The colonel of the Hohenlohe regiment—among others-- reported that his schutzen and several groups of volunteers held off the French skirmishers and protected the formed troops for ‘a long time.’  
                         
                        Now, this isn’t suggesting that the Prussian light infantry and line troops deployed as skirmishers were the equal of the French, but it does indicate that they did deploy effective skirmishers in a number of places. In many cases, it was one side outnumbering the other in deployed skirmishers that made the difference, and in that respect, the French, always outnumbering the Prussians and Saxons, usually could and did deploy more skirmishers. Part of this was because the terrain dominating the battlefield was light infantry territory.  As Guard Chasseur Barras states in his memoirs, “Several times our approach was enough to force the Prussians and Saxons to abandon the positions they were defending; but in spite of this the struggle was keen, the resistance desperate, above all in the villages and copses.”   That is hardly the report you’d expect if the Allied infantry was incapable of deploying few if any skirmish units.  From a rough count using Bessonet’s study, the Prussians deployed @25% of all their infantry as skirmishers at one point or another.
                         
                        Bill
                         
                         
                         




                      • billh512002
                        Not contemporary - dates from 1903 - 1862 ;-7 What is important are the battle reports and quotes of actual participants used in Bressonet in his study. Paret
                        Message 11 of 25 , 10 Apr 17:51
                          Not contemporary - dates from 1903 - 1862

                          ;-7 What is important are the battle reports and quotes of actual participants used in Bressonet in his study. Paret is even less contemporary for that matter. 
                        • billh512002
                          Ooops: Tim: I thought you were responding to me. The last map, http://geogreif.uni-greifswald.de/geogreif/geogreif-content/upload/sach/2936Jena.jpg
                          Message 12 of 25 , 10 Apr 17:58
                            Ooops:

                            Tim: I thought you were responding to me.  The last map, 

                            http://geogreif.uni-greifswald.de/geogreif/geogreif-content/upload/sach/2936Jena.jpg

                             

                            looks like a later version of an earlier map. Unlike the later versions, it shows the correct extent of the Isserstadt woods and others to the east at the time of the battle.


                          • Nicholas Murray
                            blockquote, div.yahoo_quoted { margin-left: 0 !important; border-left:1px #715FFA solid !important; padding-left:1ex !important; background-color:white
                            Message 13 of 25 , 11 Apr 03:38
                              Bill,

                              I have already pointed out the map looks far better than any one I have. However, it is still not contemporary so we can only guess what it looked like in 1806. We cannot know.

                              As you well know, yet you fail to mention it, Bressonnet has been criticized for overplaying the performance of the Allies to make his boss Napoleon look good (now why would he do that). Paret and many others, including Clausewitz who was also involved, point out what I said: the allied performance was so bad that huge military and societal reforms were needed to fix them. That has been extremely well documented by multiple different contemporaries and subsequent scholars.

                              Now, as I said. Why not do this for yourself rather than nitpicking based upon a couple of discredited works on the topic (and yes, I am pretty certain you are McLaddie and this has been pointed out before).

                              For anyone else still bothering, I am sorry about this and please don't take my word for this. Go and look up the many serious scholars of the topic, such as Paret, Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, etc. Paret covers this extensively, and uses the original writings of many of the key players in the wars and reforms, showing what they were arguing and why.

                              Sincerely,

                              Nick




                              Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPad

                              On Monday, April 10, 2017, 8:51 PM, bhaggart@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

                               

                              Not contemporary - dates from 1903 - 1862


                              ;-7 What is important are the battle reports and quotes of actual participants used in Bressonet in his study. Paret is even less contemporary for that matter. 
                            • bbbchrisp
                              Nick, Bill, Valuable discussion - let s keep it friendly, please. How about this 1807 map from the Geographisches Institut:
                              Message 14 of 25 , 11 Apr 03:50
                                Nick, Bill,

                                Valuable discussion - let's keep it friendly, please.

                                How about this 1807 map from the Geographisches Institut:
                                http://mapire.eu/en/synchron/surveys/?bbox=2055758.070424905%2C6115880.346052408%2C2068771.4744904562%2C6126562.420755262

                                Found via Old Maps Online (search for "Jena"):
                                http://www.oldmapsonline.org/

                                Chris
                              • oct251415
                                Chris and Tim. Thanks for the maps, I had not seen them. Through the links, I found this from 1807. So I probably do need some more woods and some more marsh
                                Message 15 of 25 , 11 Apr 04:36
                                  Chris and Tim.

                                  Thanks for the maps, I had not seen them. Through the links, I found this from 1807. So I probably do need some more woods and some more marsh along the river.


                                  Thanks again.

                                  Nick

                                • greathallgames1
                                  Here is a link to a German site that has many maps. This is the only one I could find of Jena. It is from 1800. Looks like it might be the basis for the battle
                                  Message 16 of 25 , 11 Apr 10:00
                                    Here is a link to a German site that has many maps. This is the only one I could find of Jena. It is from 1800. Looks like it might be the basis for the battle map.


                                    This site also has an extensive map project of Saxony that was conducted at the end of the 18th beginning of the 19th c.


                                    Here is an example of one of the detail maps (Leipzig):


                                    You can use the overview map to locate detail maps. For example, Leipzig is Blatt (sheet) 19. South of Leipzig is 28. So in the url above, you just replace the final "df_dk_0002019" with "df_dk_0002028". Several Napoleonic era battlefields are included, for example Dresden and Lutzen.

                                    It's a cool resource, but very difficult to use. There is a download feature, but the map that is downloaded is much lower resolution. I have been using the zoom feature and then grabbing screen shots to piece together the map of Leipzig.

                                  • vtsaogames
                                    ... This ain t TMP. This is a classy joint. There are spittoons in the corners.
                                    Message 17 of 25 , 11 Apr 10:27
                                      Valuable discussion - let's keep it friendly, please.

                                      This ain't TMP. This is a classy joint. There are spittoons in the corners.
                                    • johnrohdeuk
                                      Clausewitz wrote an extensive notes on the 1806 campaign: https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1806/Clausewitz-ExcerptsFromNotesOnPrussia1806.pdf
                                      Message 18 of 25 , 11 Apr 14:13
                                        Clausewitz wrote an extensive notes on the 1806 campaign: https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1806/Clausewitz-ExcerptsFromNotesOnPrussia1806.pdf
                                        What I took from it was that he thought the tactical differences were that the Prussians at first out open fields where they could deploy in Frederician echelon formation and attack with close order volleys and the bayonet. A related point is that French commanders were more apt to commit their forces sparingly to attritional combat which, if one may borrow from his tactical notes of 1812, would involve feeding troops into a skirmish line. 
                                        It could be that we are looking at two aspects of light infantry service: fighting on broken ground (where Clausewitz doesn't mention any Prussian disadvantage, just a penchant for set-piece battle) and sustaining the firefight with minimum forces.
                                        It's an essay worth reading anyhow,even if it does seem to have been translated by a steam-powered form of Google translate.

                                        Cordialy,
                                                     John
                                      • vtsaogames
                                        ... Later in Frederick s reign the army had an annual formation drill. After several hours of arranging things, 22 battalions would advance in echelon. The
                                        Message 19 of 25 , 11 Apr 14:48
                                          he thought the tactical differences were that the Prussians at first out open fields where they could deploy in
                                          > Frederician echelon formation

                                          Later in Frederick's reign the army had an annual formation drill. After several hours of arranging things, 22 battalions would advance in echelon. The British drill-book author Dundas thought it grand. It must have been a sight.

                                          Sounds like they did it too much and made a fetish out of it.
                                        • Nicholas Murray
                                          blockquote, div.yahoo_quoted { margin-left: 0 !important; border-left:1px #715FFA solid !important; padding-left:1ex !important; background-color:white
                                          Message 20 of 25 , 11 Apr 14:58
                                            Great stuff. I used to use some extracts of that for our students.

                                            There is good some stuff in there, and more is drawn out in the reforms. There, they discuss in far more detail what the main problems were. One of the things that came up repeatedly, was the lack of effective use of light infantry (not their lack), and the ineffective tactics. 

                                            Pages 570-574 capture the essence. Also word-search tactic. That gets you to the key problems identified by Clausewitz, and expounded on in the later reforms.

                                            Thanks,

                                            Nick

                                            Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPad

                                            On Tuesday, April 11, 2017, 5:13 PM, johnrohdeuk@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

                                             

                                            Clausewitz wrote an extensive notes on the 1806 campaign: https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1806/Clausewitz-ExcerptsFromNotesOnPrussia1806.pdf
                                            What I took from it was that he thought the tactical differences were that the Prussians at first out open fields where they could deploy in Frederician echelon formation and attack with close order volleys and the bayonet. A related point is that French commanders were more apt to commit their forces sparingly to attritional combat which, if one may borrow from his tactical notes of 1812, would involve feeding troops into a skirmish line. 
                                            It could be that we are looking at two aspects of light infantry service: fighting on broken ground (where Clausewitz doesn't mention any Prussian disadvantage, just a penchant for set-piece battle) and sustaining the firefight with minimum forces.
                                            It's an essay worth reading anyhow,even if it does seem to have been translated by a steam-powered form of Google translate.

                                            Cordialy,
                                                         John

                                          • Rob Smith
                                            Bressonet makes a similar observation. If I recall, he feels this is more critical than the skirmished issue. The prussians ceded good defensive positions
                                            Message 21 of 25 , 11 Apr 15:12
                                              Bressonet makes a similar observation. If I recall, he feels this is more critical than the skirmished issue. The prussians ceded good defensive positions because of their offense in echelon doctrine. In several instances, the French were able to occupy the villages with only minor opposition. 

                                              Also, it seems that one role of the light troops was to be fighting in congested terrain, like towns. Unfortunately, most fusiliers and other such were attached to the avant garde and so were not with the main body to take up that role. 

                                              Sent from my iPhone

                                              On Apr 11, 2017, at 4:13 PM, johnrohdeuk@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

                                               

                                              Clausewitz wrote an extensive notes on the 1806 campaign: https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1806/Clausewitz-ExcerptsFromNotesOnPrussia1806.pdf
                                              What I took from it was that he thought the tactical differences were that the Prussians at first out open fields where they could deploy in Frederician echelon formation and attack with close order volleys and the bayonet. A related point is that French commanders were more apt to commit their forces sparingly to attritional combat which, if one may borrow from his tactical notes of 1812, would involve feeding troops into a skirmish line. 
                                              It could be that we are looking at two aspects of light infantry service: fighting on broken ground (where Clausewitz doesn't mention any Prussian disadvantage, just a penchant for set-piece battle) and sustaining the firefight with minimum forces.
                                              It's an essay worth reading anyhow,even if it does seem to have been translated by a steam-powered form of Google translate.

                                              Cordialy,
                                                           John

                                            • Andrew Holmes
                                              A great resource, thank you. If you look at the right hand side of the pages, there are two symbols. Hover over the lower one and a hint pops up saying
                                              Message 22 of 25 , 11 Apr 16:49
                                                A great resource, thank you.

                                                If you look at the right hand side of the pages, there are two symbols.
                                                Hover over the lower one and a hint pops up saying "herunterladen" (download).
                                                Click on this and another window opens with a larger resolution image that you can right-click to download
                                                 
                                                Regards
                                                Andrew HOLMES



                                                From: "rsmith.ghg@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                                                To: BBB_wargames@...
                                                Sent: Tuesday, 11 April 2017, 18:00
                                                Subject: [BBB_wargames] Re:: Jena

                                                 
                                                Here is a link to a German site that has many maps. This is the only one I could find of Jena. It is from 1800. Looks like it might be the basis for the battle map.


                                                This site also has an extensive map project of Saxony that was conducted at the end of the 18th beginning of the 19th c.


                                                Here is an example of one of the detail maps (Leipzig):


                                                You can use the overview map to locate detail maps. For example, Leipzig is Blatt (sheet) 19. South of Leipzig is 28. So in the url above, you just replace the final "df_dk_0002019" with "df_dk_0002028". Several Napoleonic era battlefields are included, for example Dresden and Lutzen.

                                                It's a cool resource, but very difficult to use. There is a download feature, but the map that is downloaded is much lower resolution. I have been using the zoom feature and then grabbing screen shots to piece together the map of Leipzig.



                                              • Nicholas Murray
                                                blockquote, div.yahoo_quoted { margin-left: 0 !important; border-left:1px #715FFA solid !important; padding-left:1ex !important; background-color:white
                                                Message 23 of 25 , 11 Apr 16:54
                                                  I missed that. Thanks. 

                                                  I should have some time in the next couple of weeks. I will try to update and repost the map. I have a version designed to be printed too, so will update that as well.

                                                  Nick


                                                  Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPad

                                                  On Tuesday, April 11, 2017, 7:50 PM, Andrew Holmes nitpickergeneral@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

                                                   

                                                  A great resource, thank you.

                                                  If you look at the right hand side of the pages, there are two symbols.
                                                  Hover over the lower one and a hint pops up saying "herunterladen" (download).
                                                  Click on this and another window opens with a larger resolution image that you can right-click to download
                                                   
                                                  Regards
                                                  Andrew HOLMES



                                                  From: "rsmith.ghg@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                                                  To: BBB_wargames@...
                                                  Sent: Tuesday, 11 April 2017, 18:00
                                                  Subject: [BBB_wargames] Re:: Jena

                                                   
                                                  Here is a link to a German site that has many maps. This is the only one I could find of Jena. It is from 1800. Looks like it might be the basis for the battle map.


                                                  This site also has an extensive map project of Saxony that was conducted at the end of the 18th beginning of the 19th c.


                                                  Here is an example of one of the detail maps (Leipzig):


                                                  You can use the overview map to locate detail maps. For example, Leipzig is Blatt (sheet) 19. South of Leipzig is 28. So in the url above, you just replace the final "df_dk_0002019" with "df_dk_0002028". Several Napoleonic era battlefields are included, for example Dresden and Lutzen.

                                                  It's a cool resource, but very difficult to use. There is a download feature, but the map that is downloaded is much lower resolution. I have been using the zoom feature and then grabbing screen shots to piece together the map of Leipzig.



                                                • Rob Smith
                                                  Cool. Thanks! Sent from my iPhone
                                                  Message 24 of 25 , 11 Apr 17:34
                                                    Cool. Thanks!

                                                    Sent from my iPhone

                                                    On Apr 11, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Nicholas Murray oct251415@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

                                                     

                                                    I missed that. Thanks. 


                                                    I should have some time in the next couple of weeks. I will try to update and repost the map. I have a version designed to be printed too, so will update that as well.

                                                    Nick


                                                    Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPad

                                                    On Tuesday, April 11, 2017, 7:50 PM, Andrew Holmes nitpickergeneral@... [BBB_wargames] <BBB_wargames@...> wrote:

                                                     

                                                    A great resource, thank you.

                                                    If you look at the right hand side of the pages, there are two symbols.
                                                    Hover over the lower one and a hint pops up saying "herunterladen" (download).
                                                    Click on this and another window opens with a larger resolution image that you can right-click to download
                                                     
                                                    Regards
                                                    Andrew HOLMES



                                                    From: "rsmith.ghg@... [BBB_wargames]" <BBB_wargames@...>
                                                    To: BBB_wargames@...
                                                    Sent: Tuesday, 11 April 2017, 18:00
                                                    Subject: [BBB_wargames] Re:: Jena

                                                     
                                                    Here is a link to a German site that has many maps. This is the only one I could find of Jena. It is from 1800. Looks like it might be the basis for the battle map.


                                                    This site also has an extensive map project of Saxony that was conducted at the end of the 18th beginning of the 19th c.


                                                    Here is an example of one of the detail maps (Leipzig):


                                                    You can use the overview map to locate detail maps. For example, Leipzig is Blatt (sheet) 19. South of Leipzig is 28. So in the url above, you just replace the final "df_dk_0002019" with "df_dk_0002028". Several Napoleonic era battlefields are included, for example Dresden and Lutzen.

                                                    It's a cool resource, but very difficult to use. There is a download feature, but the map that is downloaded is much lower resolution. I have been using the zoom feature and then grabbing screen shots to piece together the map of Leipzig.



                                                  • Bill Haggart
                                                    Nick, Bill, Valuable discussion - let s keep it friendly, please. Understood. ... However, it is still not contemporary so we can only guess what it looked
                                                    Message 25 of 25 , 12 Apr 14:58

                                                      Nick, Bill,

                                                      Valuable discussion - let's keep it friendly, please.

                                                      Understood.

                                                       

                                                      >Bill,

                                                      >I have already pointed out the map looks far better than anyone I have. However, it is still not contemporary so we can only guess what it looked like in 1806. We cannot know.

                                                       

                                                      Nick: I mistook Tim’s comments for a response to me as my comments were below as part of his post.  However, we can come close to knowing. Here is the 1807 map:

                                                       

                                                      http://tukart.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/224/1/index.htm    Any maps for the next several decades which show woods, show the Isserstadt Woods and the woods around Closewitz to the east covering the same area.



                                                      >As you well know, yet you fail to mention it, Bressonnet has been criticized for overplaying the performance of the Allies to make his boss Napoleon look good (now why would he do that). Paret and many others, including Clausewitz who was also involved, point out what I said: the allied performance was so bad >that huge military and societal reforms were needed to fix them. That has been extremely well documented by multiple different contemporaries and subsequent scholars.
                                                      >Now, as I said. Why not do this for yourself rather than nitpicking based upon a couple of discredited works on the topic (and yes, I am pretty certain you are McLaddie and this has been pointed out before).
                                                      >For anyone else still bothering, I am sorry about this and please don't take my word for this. Go and look up the many serious scholars of the topic, such as Paret, Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, etc. Paret covers this extensively, and uses the original writings of many of the key players in the wars and reforms, showing >what they were arguing and why.

                                                       

                                                      What discredited works are we talking about?? You lost me. It can be debated whether Bressonet did overplay the performance of the Allies for his own purposes, but most folks will from time to time. Both Scharnhorst and Clauswitz had very specific and obvious axes to grind, which led to some overstatements in driving home their points.  

                                                       

                                                      For instance, as Paret says [p.77] in his book on York and the Prussian reforms, he notes Scharnhorst wrote in his  1799 work <b>Basic Reasons for the French Success</b>:

                                                       

                                                      “Scharnhorst, on the contrary, termed it an undeniable truth that the Tirailleur…had decided the greater part of the engagements in the war.” [Revolutionary Wars] Scharnhorst wrote that first in an essay in Neues Militärisches Journal in 1797 and then as a book in 1799. That is some serious hyperbole, however important the French tirailleur tactics were. His many writings did help him obtain a commission with the Prussian army as a Chief of Staff and head of their schools in 1801. [I have a well-worn copy of Paret as well as Shananhan and White.]

                                                       

                                                      Clausewitz does indeed fault the Prussians for advancing in echelon on VH. I think it is important to see exactly what he says:

                                                       

                                                      “General Tauenzien sought, with true Prussian instinct, to reach the plain and thought impossible to d anything better than to abandon the French the difficult slopes of the valley of the Saale, and to retire to the open terrain of the plateau as far as necessary with a view to again attacking the enemy in echelon as the as the most suitable* as it had been one hundred thousand times taught, recommended and preached that in war the offensive was always preferable and have the most advantages, and this form of battle was particularly suitable to Prussian troops. Besides, an attack by echelon was the very nearly the height of Prussian tactics, the means by which Frederick the Second had beaten the Austrians at Leutzen; it was necessary to employ a similar maneuver in the most dangerous moments. Such a moment had arrived. Therefore, General Tauenzien abandoned the Salle and with drew on the evening of the 13th with a view to advancing in echelon on the 14th in a thick fog, after having, as was customary in the good old times, allowed the enemy space to establish his line of battle….  He was naturally beaten and half dispersed. Then General Grawert Arrived; he changed fronts and also advanced in echelon against the enemy and was beaten. Now, Ruchel came, advanced in echelons and was beaten.”  

                                                       

                                                      * Now one can hear the sarcasm in Clausewitz’s tone, and he had some serious concerns about the ‘drill ground routines’ that hampered the army as well as the Prussian love-affair with Frederick the Great’s tactics. However, there are some serious problems with his account…factual errors that have been pointed out several times, including the West Point Study of the Jena Campaign. They are:

                                                       

                                                      1.Tauenzien saw himself exposed when he heard that the Dornburg behind him had been abandoned by Hohenlohe, which is why he says he withdrew back from Jena and the Saale. The French followed him closely. He understood the importance of the rough terrain around the Landgrafenberg and was going to defend it as Clausewitz suggests should have been done, but then Massenbach brought him formal orders from GHQ forbidding any attacks or actions inciting engagements that might keep Hohenlohe’s forces from withdrawing.

                                                       

                                                      2. However enamored the Prussians were with the echelon attack, French general Suchet states his division attacked Tauenzien in echelon to the right and then later advanced on VH in echelon in a mirror image of Garwert’s advance on VH. So, it wasn’t some backward method if the experienced and victorious French used it to in the same battle.

                                                       

                                                      3. Tauenzien did follow the Prussian dictum of the offensive, but then Napoleon advocated the very same thing throughout his career—and his campaigns and battles demonstrate that[!], so can we fault the Prussians for doing the same as Clausewitz does? In fact, it was Hohenlohe that failed to advance in Prussian style.   

                                                       

                                                       My point was and is that the Prussians deployed a lot more skirmishers than few. For instance:

                                                      The report of Colonel von Kalckreuth, commander of infantry Regiment Prince of Hohenlohe (No. 32) at Jena (printed in Jany's "Gefechtausbildung", pp. 123ff.)

                                                      "The skirmishers of the regiment spurred on by those officers commanding them stopped the enemy light troops from advancing for a very long time although they were better protected everywhere by terrain which was most advantageous to them. Kalckreuth states that he reinforced those skirmishers “several times” with volunteers. The practice was to support the Schutzen with the same number as deployed which would be 80-100 line infantry each time or @400 of 1600 all together. Later he reports that “Close in front of the position, which the regiment had occupied, at the right hand in front of us was the wide stretched Isserstedt forest, and on the left a bit closer, another wood, which was strongly occupied by enemy voltigeurs. Our Schützen soon dislodged out of this small wood the enemy, [This was Ney’s elite battalions—some @2,000 men] but the Isserstedt forest couldn't be cleaned completely from the enemy there as it stretched into the position of the enemy.” [There were at least 4 full battalions of French infantry in the Isserstadt woods at the time. ]  Marwitz reports the same thing—as do the French. [The after-action report of the 16th Legere, for instance.]

                                                      Kalckreuth later reports, "However, the enemy now undertook an attack with force on the Grenadier Battalions von Sack and von Hahn to our right and at the same time on our right flank with a vanguard of a very impressive number of light troops supported by a strong infantry column behind them.” The Huhn grenadiers report that two platoons [half] of the battalion were deployed as skirmishers to meet them.

                                                      Kalckreuth, Massenback, Marwitz and the many others who reported on the battle weren’t scholars, serious or otherwise.  They were reporting their experiences. The first-hand evidence says that the Prussians deployed a good portion of their infantry as skirmishers. That’s it. They lost, often overwhelmed by superior numbers as Kalckreuth observes.

                                                      There are numerous examples of this from the combatants in memoirs and after-action reports. There are later ‘scholarly’ comments and judgements that just don’t make a lot of sense in the face of these reports. For instance, the Prussians are seen by some scholars giving up villages around Jena without a fight, yet four of the five villages on the battlefield were defended and the first assault on VH was thrown back, so it wasn’t given up without a fight. Isserstadt was captured by the French, but the Allies drove them out and as Kalckreuth notes, nearly cleared the adjacent woods at one point.  

                                                      This isn’t about whose scholars are the best or how many believe what. It is about the evidence that they and everyone else uses to come to their conclusions.  Certainly, those conclusions have to have some relationship to the evidence available.

                                                      Bill

                                                       

                                                       

                                                       

                                                      Bill

                                                           

                                                       

                                                       

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